Essays on banking sector development and economic growth in developing economies. by Parvin, Naima.
Essays on 
Banking Sector D evelopm ent and 
Economic Growth 
in D evelop ing Economies
by
Naima Parvin
A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy of Cardiff University
Economics Section of Cardiff Business School 
Cardiff University
January 2011.
UMI Number: U584626
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U584626
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Summary
This thesis examines the impact o f banking sector development in economic growth in 
developing countries. Chapter 1 examines the linkage between financial development and 
economic growth in an economy with an informal and a formal sector. We find that growth in 
such economies is mainly stimulated by human capital and higher allocations in the formal 
sector. Higher revenue through consumption taxation in the formal sector that results in more 
redistribution creates a multiplier effect on growth. For developing countries there is therefore 
a need to design policies that encourage accumulation o f human capital and a shift o f the 
additional human capital to the formal sector.
Chapter 2 empirically examines how banking development affects growth in regional output, 
agriculture and industry in India. Using state level data for India for 1999-2008, we examine 
if  and to what extent the recent banking reforms have affected regional growth. Results show 
that there is strong evidence o f banking development-led growth effects in India. Deposits o f 
commercial banks positively affect growth in industry but do not significantly affect growth 
in agriculture. Rural banks’ credits stimulate agricultural growth. Given the large share o f 
agriculture in Indian GDP, this clearly implies that expansion o f regional rural banks can 
positively affect economic growth in India.
Chapter 3 extends chapter 2 by examining how and to what extent development in 
infrastructure and rural well being can assist in explaining the banking development-led 
growth in state level output, agriculture and industry in India. We find that there is clear 
evidence o f growth effects o f development in banking, infrastructure and rural well being in 
26 states o f India. Transport expansion generally improves growth in output and industrial 
output, but more allocation o f production in the informal sector can hurt growth. 
Improvement in rural well being can stimulate growth. A major determinant o f the success o f 
rural banking development-led growth in India is therefore the development o f physical 
infrastructure and rural well being.
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Introductory Chapter
In this thesis we examine the impact of banking sector development and 
economic growth in developing economies. The relation between financial 
development and economic growth has been long under debate. Although there is 
plenty of evidence that financial as well as banking development plays an important 
role in promoting economic growth of the industrialized countries (see Beck and 
Levine, 2004 for a detailed survey), evidence is rather mixed within developing or 
emerging countries.
Economists hold startlingly different opinions regarding the importance of the 
financial system for economic growth. Bagehot (1873) and Hicks (1969) argue that 
the financial system played a crucial role in igniting industrialization in England by 
facilitating the mobilization of capital for ‘immense works’. Levine (1997) also 
supports this argument when he says that “the industrial revolution had to wait for the 
financial revolution.” Schumpeter (1912) contends that well functioning bank spur 
technological innovation by identifying and funding those entrepreneurs with the best 
chances of successfully implementing innovative products and production processes. 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw and McKinnon (1973) have also 
produced considerable evidence that financial development has a strong correlation 
with economic growth. Recently, endogenous growth literature has reinforced the role 
of financial intermediaries by showing that such intermediaries can contribute to 
economic growth through various aspects of productive activities (e.g. Pagano, 1993). 
Many models in the recent literature emphasize that well-functioning financial 
intermediaries and markets ameliorate information and transactions costs and thereby
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foster efficient resource allocation and hence faster long-run growth (e.g. Bencivenga 
and Smith 1991; Bencivenga, Smith and Starr 1995; King and Levine 1993a).
By contrast, several well-known economists are sceptical of the view that finance 
plays any major role in economic development. Robinson (1952) argues that “where 
enterprise leads finance follows.” According to this view, economic development 
creates demands for particular types of financial arrangement and the financial system 
responds automatically to these demands. Moreover, some economists just do not 
endorse the view that the finance-growth relationship is important. Lucas (1988), for 
instance, asserts that economists ‘badly over-stress’ the role of financial factors in 
economic growth, while development economists frequently express their scepticism 
about the role of the financial system by ignoring it (Chandavarkar, 1992). For 
instance, in a collection of essays by the ‘pioneers of development economics,’ there 
is no argument in favour of the finance growth nexus.
Despite the claim in Chandavarkar (1992), Lewis (1956), one of the pioneers of 
development economics, in his ‘The Theory of Economic Growth’ postulates a two- 
way relationship between financial development and economic growth—financial 
markets develop as a consequence of economic growth which in turn feeds back as a 
stimulant to real growth. This view is also supported by Patrick (1966). Likewise, a 
number of endogenous growth models (e.g. Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; 
Greenwood and Bruce 1997) show a two-way relationship between financial 
development and economic growth.
Theory also provides conflicting predictions about whether stock markets and 
banks are substitutes, complements, or whether one is more conducive to growth than 
the other. For instance, Boyd and Prescott (1986) models the critical role that banks 
play in easing information frictions and therefore in improving allocation of 
resources, while Stiglitz (1985) and Bhide (1993) stress that markets will not produce 
the same improvement in resource allocation and corporate governance as banks. 
Some models emphasize that markets mitigate the inefficient monopoly power 
exercised by banks and stress that the competitive nature of markets encourages 
innovative and growth—enhancing activities as opposed to the excessively 
conservative approach taken by banks (Allen and Gale, 2000). Finally, some parts of
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the theory stress that it is not banks or markets, it is rather banks and markets; these 
different components of the financial system ameliorate different information and 
transaction costs. A burgeoning empirical literature however suggests that well- 
functioning banks accelerate economic growth.
In the light of these different views and aspects of this issue, this thesis uses 
existing theory to organize an analytical framework of the finance-growth nexus and 
then assesses the quantitative importance of the financial system in economic growth 
for developing economies. We design a theoretical model which is specifically 
appropriate for developing economies. We consider an endogenous growth monetary 
economy with profit maximizing financial intermediary sector. We introduce the idea 
of bank based creation of financial services and market based delivery of financial 
services. To show the true nature of developing economies we incorporate informal 
market in this framework. With this model and its relevant balanced growth 
conditions, we explain different properties of sectoral growth and its linkage with 
banking development.
Chapter 1 of this thesis investigates the linkage between financial development 
and economic growth in an endogenously growing monetary economy with informal 
and formal markets. In order to capture this linkage, we consider a profit maximizing 
financial intermediary sector in the spirit of Gillman and Kejak (2011). This chapter 
extends their model by introducing an endogenous growth framework that captures 
the idea of bank based creation of financial services and market based delivery of 
financial services. The main aim of this study is to investigate how and to what extent 
such a framework can explain the linkage between financial service and economic 
growth in an economy with formal and informal markets. The chapter is therefore 
primarily aimed at answering an important question in the contemporary growth 
literature; how does banking development affect growth in developing countries?
In many developing countries rural channels of credit and financial services 
create ease of transactions in a cash-only market. Because such transactions do not 
typically leave a paper trail, the predominance of such a sector (or an informal market, 
in general) allows consumers to avoid indirect taxes. Primarily we find that such a 
setting can be useful for an aggregative study on the finance-growth nexus in
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developing countries. In its simplest form if one adds two channels of financial 
services to an otherwise standard model (e.g. Gillman & Kejak 2011), one can 
examine the relative effects of financial development and the growth in aggregate real 
variables. Standard endogenous growth models are in general not capable of capturing 
the transactions which are accomplished in such markets and the growth effects of 
financial development in such economies. Our key motivation stems from this 
insufficiency of the models in the literature.
Chapter 1 and its key model are also motivated from the fact that in many 
countries across the world, the informal sector contribute large share in their GDP and 
in their labour forces. That is why incorporating the informal market in a standard 
growth model enhances the model’s capacity to capture the growth effect of financial 
development in this type of economies.
Using state level data for the US, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) find a positive 
influence of liberalization of the banking sector on growth. The findings of Levine 
and Zervos (1998) reveal that measures of liquidity are strongly related to capital 
accumulation, productivity and economic growth, but stock market size is not 
strongly related to growth*. They also show that bank lending to the private sector has 
a strong effect on growth. King and Levine (1993) for instance also argue that 
financial development causes economic growth, and the predetermined components of 
financial development are good predictors of growth for the next 10 to 30 years to 
follow. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) concur to the same opinion, and with 
cross-country evidence they show that growth is positively related to the stock market 
turnover and different measures of law enforcement.
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) in their paper evaluate whether the exogenous 
component of the development in the financial intermediary influences economic 
growth and whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems explain 
differences in the level of financial development. Using both traditional cross-section 
instrumental variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, they find that
* In a relatively more recent paper Luintel, Arestis and Demetrades (2001) discuss the links between 
stock market development and long term growth, where they argue that development of stock market 
can stimulate economic growth only under certain specified conditions.
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the exogenous components of financial intermediary development are positively 
associated with economic growth. Their findings also suggest that legal and 
accounting practices can boost financial development and accelerate economic 
growth. But these empirical studies didn't say much about growth and its linkage with 
sectoral financial development. Contributions to the theory of growth and its linkage 
with sectoral financial development leave some areas that can benefit from our model. 
Our model presents a simple framework which can be considered as a benchmark that 
can lead to more sophisticated as well as complicated set ups. But our simple setup 
presents some very useful insights into the sectoral difference in productivity in 
producing financial services and its impact on economic growth. We find that the two 
sector model in this chapter serves well in providing the insights into the issue of how 
predominance of the informal sector affects the allocation and growth along the 
balanced growth path.
Many empirical studies assess the role of financial development in economic 
growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Odedokun, 1996; and Ram, 1999). Most of the 
recent studies have suggested that financial development would have a substantial 
positive impact on growth (King and Levine, 1993; Odedokun, 1996; and Levine 
1997). But these empirical investigations are mainly based on the data from industrial 
countries. The main focus of this thesis is on developing countries. That is why our 
empirical investigation in chapter 2 and chapter 3 is on India, one of the largest 
developing economies in the world. We choose India to carry out our empirical 
investigation not only because it is one of the most emerging economies in the world, 
but also because it has a rich history of varying types of banking sector reforms. In 
recent years the government of India has been making attempts to encourage the 
expansion of rural banking through policy reforms.
In chapter 2, we examine the effect of banking sector development on regional 
economic growth, agricultural growth and industrial growth in India. Using state level 
data for India for a sample period of 1999-2008, we examine whether or not such 
reforms have affected the state level growth in output and growth in the key 
components of state level output. Based on an empirical analysis that involve fixed 
effects panel and GMM estimation, we show that there is clear evidence of growth
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effects of commercial and rural banking development in 26 states and union territories 
of India.
There are very few studies that attempt to analyze the impact of banking 
development on local economic growth of developing countries. Among the few 
studies, Cheng and Degryse (2010) consider the impact of bank and non bank 
financial development on local economic growth of China. Their study is a follow up 
of a stream of studies that deal similar issue on China, such as Hasan, Wachtel and 
Zhou (2006), Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2010), and Ping (2003).
Prior to the current study there have been some attempts to examine the link 
between financial development and economic growth in India, but most of these look 
either at the aggregate economy or at the development of corporate finance schemes. 
Luintel and Demetriades (1996) consider aggregate data on Indian economy and 
examine the role of interest rate controls on aggregate economic growth. Das and 
Guha (2001) study the impact of aggregate financial development on economic 
growth of both India and China. One of their key arguments is that for both these 
economies financial development can be attributable to short term sustained growth in 
per capita income. However for the long term growth pattern their arguments are 
rather inconclusive.
Prior to the current study, Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2011) investigate the 
relationship between financial development and regional economic growth in India. 
Their approach was based on panel co-integration and fully modified ordinary least 
squares estimation of ad hoc growth specifications. Given the consideration of 
banking regulations in India their approach confirms a long run relationship between 
commercial banking development and regional economic growth. Their methodology, 
however, is one of reduced form which is unable to determine whether the proxies for 
banking sector development have any endogenous effects. In addition, they do not use 
a well defined growth regression, which is why their approach is unable to identify 
the exact growth effect of deposits and credits of the commercial banking system. 
Finally, their study only considers regional growth in per capita state domestic 
product and not the regional growth in the different components of the state domestic
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product. These three are the areas where the current study adds value to this particular 
literature.
In recent years, the structure of employment and income generation in the Indian 
economy has been through some important changes. India, which was predominantly 
an agrarian economy, is now experiencing a boost in its service sector. The recent 
reforms in the banking sector say a different story, however. Although the regional 
rural banks (RRB) started their operation since the establishment of the banking sector 
in India, it was only during the most recent banking sector reforms in India where the 
government made attempts to encourage the expansion of RRBs. This reform is aimed 
at promoting rural development and development in the agricultural and allied sector. 
We consider this as an interesting mix of facts for a fast growing emerging economy 
like India, which is why we find the analysis of local economic growth effects of 
banking sector development in India as an important economic issue. In summary, our 
main motivation is investigating the two questions, which are (a) if the recent banking 
sector reform in India is aimed at promoting and expanding rural banking, what 
impact it is likely to have on the state level growth in per capita domestic product and 
its components?; (b) which dimension of banking sector development (demand side or 
supply side) has a significant marginal impact on state level growth in per capita 
domestic product and its components? Thus the three areas where our study 
contributes are very important from the policy point of view. This study is therefore 
motivated by the literature, the state level growth facts, and the series of banking 
sector reforms undertaken in India.
In chapter 3, we examine how and to what extent development in infrastructure 
and rural well being can assist in explaining the banking development led growth in 
state level output, agricultural output and industrial output in India. We use state level 
data for India for a sample period of 1999-2008. Based on an empirical analysis that 
involve fixed effects panel and GMM estimation, we show that there is clear evidence 
of growth effects of commercial and rural banking development, infrastructure 
development and development in rural well being in 26 states and union territories of 
India.
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What primarily motivates us in examining the key research question in chapter 3 
is that for a fast growing and predominantly rural economy like India, there is huge 
disparity in state level infrastructure growth, rural well being and banking 
development, and there is no study in the literature that attempts to identify their 
growth effects in a unified growth accounting approach*. Identifying the exact state 
level growth effects of infrastructure, rural well being and banking development 
would enable one to directly infer policy lessons that are directed towards boosting 
state level growth and encouraging convergence at the state level. Also, identifying 
the marginal effect of infrastructure and rural well being on the components of state 
level growth is in fact equivalent to identifying the channels through which state level 
growth in production sectors (agriculture and industry) are affected by these, which in 
turns provides clear policy implications.
There are very few studies in the relevant literature that attempt to analyze the 
impact of banking development, infrastructure and rural development on local 
economic growth of developing countries in a unified framework. Cheng and Degryse
(2010) consider the impact of bank and non bank financial development on local 
economic growth of China, where they give some insight about the relationship 
between infrastructure and local economic growth of China*. They consider 
infrastructure (rail and road) as conditioning set of variables for regional growth 
difference in Chinese provinces, but they do not emphasize on the marginal growth 
effect of these infrastructure. They do not really focus on how variations in these can 
affect growth or can explain the reasons behind the regional difference in growth of 
output. They also do not consider the marginal effect of infrastructure on the growth 
of different sectors of the economy. Among others, Cull and Xu (2000) and Cull and 
Xu (2005) examine how the level of bureaucracy has affected in the efficiency of 
agricultural credit extended towards the state owned enterprises in China.
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) in their paper develop a structural model of 
infrastructure and output growth that takes account of institutional and economic 
factors that mediate in the infrastructure-GDP interactions. Their cross country
f The role o f infrastructure development in influencing economic growth and development has been 
highlighted in important works such as Schumpeter (1911), Solow (1956) and Lucas (1988).
* Their study is a follow up from a stream o f  studies that deal similar issue on China, such as Demurger 
(2001) and Ping (2003).
XVIII
estimates of the model indicate that the contribution of infrastructure services to GDP 
is substantial and in general this level exceeds the cost of provision of those services. 
Their results also shed light on the factors that shape a country’s response to its 
infrastructure needs and offer policy implications for facilitating the removal of 
infrastructure inadequacies.
Some empirical studies also provide clear evidence that in the vast majority of 
cases infrastructure does induce long run growth effects. Among those studies, one of 
the important one is made by Canning and Pedroni (2008), where they investigate the 
effect of infrastructure on long run economic growth in a panel of countries for 1950- 
1992. They however find that these results can be inconclusive across individual 
countries and across individual groups of countries. They find that while telephones, 
electricity generating capacity and paved roads are provided at close to the growth 
maximizing level on an average, these are under-supplied in some countries and over­
supplied in others. Their results also help in explaining why cross section and time 
series studies have in the past found contradictory results regarding a causal link 
between infrastructure provision and long run growth. Boopen (2006) in his paper 
provides evidence on the importance of transport capital development in promoting 
economic development for African and island states. His study analyses the 
contribution of transport capital to growth for two different data sets, namely for a 
sample of Sub Saharan African countries, and for developing states. In both sample 
cases, the analysis concluded that transport capital has been a contributor to the 
economic progress of these countries.
In chapter 2 and chapter 3, our regressions show that there is clear evidence of 
growth effects of commercial and rural banking development in the 26 states and UTs 
of India that we consider over the period 1999-2008. We find that deposits of 
commercial banks in general have a significant positive impact on the growth of per 
capita SDP. Thus domestic savings in commercial banks affect local economic growth 
positively and significantly. We also find that domestic savings and mobilization of 
domestic savings through commercial banks do not significantly affect the state level 
growth in the agricultural component of SDP, and their positive and significant 
impact on per capita SDP growth mainly stems from their significant marginal effect 
on the growth of the industrial component of SDP. This finding is robust whether we
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use fixed effects panel estimation or system GMM estimation. We also find that the 
marginal effect of SCB credits on the growth of per capita SDP is mixed. Credits that 
are channelled through rural banks positively affect the growth in the agricultural 
component of per capita SDP and the growth in per capita industrial SDP.
From these results we find some strong policy implications. In general, per capita 
growth in SDP in Indian states can be improved by increasing savings (i.e. deposits) 
in commercial banks. But it is the mobilization of savings through the RRB expansion 
that can contribute to the growth in agricultural production and rural well being. For 
industries, development in deposits and credits through commercial banking in 
general contributes to growth. In addition to these, from chapter 3, we also find that 
expansion of road transportation and rail routes improves state level growth, and 
expansion of informal sector has a negative effect on growth. Improving rural well 
being can bring in more growth to the economy. Thus these additional results suggest 
that in order to get the best from rural banking development in India there is a need to 
emphasize the role of development in the infrastructure and rural well being.
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Chapter 1
Financial Development and 
Endogenous Growth in an Economy 
with Informal Sector
Chapter summary:
This chapter examines the linkage between financial development and economic growth in an 
endogenously growing economy with an informal and a formal sector. We find that the key 
engine of growth in such economies is the accumulation of hum an capital and greater 
investment of the accumulated hum an capital in the formal sector. An increase in the share of 
labour in the formal sector results in a relatively higher positive effect on growth as compared 
to that in the informal sector. Any such increase in the formal sector reduces the growth in 
consumption dem and but increases the demand for hum an capital. Further accumulation of 
hum an capital contributes to more growth in the economy. For the formal sector higher 
revenue through consumption taxation creates a multiplier effect on net aggregate economic 
growth, which is why the growth effect of formal sector is greater. For most developing 
countries there is therefore a need to design policies that contribute to accumulation of 
hum an capital and a shift of the additional hum an capital to the formal sector. We also show 
that standard policy measures can hurt growth, which is why there is a need to design 
policies which create incentives for agents to shift more investment in the formal sector.
1.1 Introduction.
In this chapter we investigate the linkage between financial development and 
economic growth in an endogenously growing monetary economy with informal and 
formal markets. In order to capture this linkage, we consider a profit maximizing 
financial intermediary sector in the spirit of Gillman and Kejak (2011). We extend 
their model by introducing an endogenous growth framework that captures the idea of 
bank based creation of financial services and market based delivery of financial 
services. We build a model that can capture the net growth effects of expansion in the 
financial sector for the informal market and in the financial sector for the formal 
market. The main aim of this study is to investigate how and to what extent such a 
framework can explain the linkage between financial service and economic growth in 
an economy with formal and informal markets. The chapter is therefore primarily 
aimed at examining an important topic in the contemporary growth literature; one way 
in which financial development can affect growth in developing countries.
The paper’s central result is that an increase in the allocation of effective 
labour in the formal sector results in relatively higher positive effect on growth as 
compared to an increase in the allocation of effective labour in the informal sector. 
Along a balanced growth path any such increase in the allocation of effective labour 
reduces the growth in consumption demand but increases the growth in consumption 
price, leaving the growth in total consumption expenditure from both sectors growing 
at the same rate. Allocation of more effective labour in any sector is associated with a 
trade off of working time across sectors and a higher demand for human capital. 
Because of the trade off of working time in production, economic agents can 
accumulation more human capital which contributes to more growth in the economy. 
Because more production in the formal sector allows the government to redistribute 
more (through consumption taxation), if the government adjusts the growth in money 
supply so as to fix the inflation at a particular level the net growth effect of an 
increase in the share of effective labour in the formal sector is much higher relative to 
that of an increase in the share of effective labour in the informal sector1. This result
1 In our setting economic agents can avoid paying consumption tax by purchasing from the informal 
market where transactions are generally o ff the books.
2
extends important previous works such as Gillman, Harris and Matyas (2004), who 
find negative net growth effects for any such increase in the share of effective labour.
Our results imply that for most developing countries more allocation of real 
factors in the formal sector is associated with higher economic growth. This can be 
accomplished by accumulation of human capital, and relative to the case of allocating 
more labour in the informal market the higher rate of growth is achievable through 
higher amounts of redistribution which results from the collection of higher tax 
revenue. We also show that standard fiscal and monetary policy measures can hurt 
growth. This is why there is a need to design policies which create incentives for 
agents to accumulate more human capital and shift more human capital investment in 
the formal sector.
According to very early studies in the literature, such as Schumpeter (1911), 
financial development can act as a catalyst to economic growth by reallocating 
resources. Cross-country evidence of this conjecture is well documented in many 
studies. King and Levine (1993) for instance argue that financial development causes 
economic growth, and the predetermined components of financial development are 
good predictors of growth for the next 10 to 30 years to follow. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996) concur to the same opinion, and with cross-country evidence they 
show that growth is positively related to the stock market turnover and different 
measures of law enforcement. Using state level data for the US, Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1996) also show a positive influence of liberalization of the banking sector on 
growth. The findings of Levine and Zervos (1998) reveal that measures of liquidity 
are strongly related to capital accumulation, productivity and economic growth, but 
stock market size is not strongly related to growth. They also show that bank lending 
to the private sector has a strong effect on growth.
Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) in their paper evaluate whether the 
exogenous component of the development in the financial intermediary influences 
economic growth and whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting 
systems explain differences in the level of financial development. Using both 
traditional cross-section instrumental variable procedures and recent dynamic panel 
techniques, they find that the exogenous components of financial intermediary
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development are positively associated with economic growth. Their findings also 
suggest that legal and accounting practices can boost financial development and 
accelerate economic growth. But these empirical studies didn't say much about growth 
and its linkage with sectoral financial development. Contributions to the theory of 
growth and its linkage with sectoral financial development leave some areas that can 
benefit from our model. Our model presents a simple framework which can be 
considered as a benchmark that can lead to more sophisticated as well as complicated 
set ups. But this simple setup presents some very useful insights into the sectoral 
difference in productivity in producing financial services and its impact on growth.
Prior to this study, theoretical models that attempt to answer the sectoral 
production as well as distribution of financial services involved mainly micro-founded 
models that followed the game theoretic approach. Important contributions in this 
spirit include Chaudhuri & Gupta (1996), Gupta & Chaudhuri (1997), Bose (1998) 
and Jain (1999). In these studies the key concentration is on formal and informal 
sector interaction in rural credit markets. Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) in their paper 
presented a theory of interest rate determination in the informal credit market. 
According to them the market for informal credit is created by the delay in 
disbursement of formal credit. They use game theoretic approach in their model and 
show that the informal sector interest rate and the effective formal sector interest rate 
are equal in equilibrium. Agricultural price and credit subsidy policies may raise the 
interest rate in the informal credit market. According to Bose (1998), the majority of 
small cultivators in the least developed countries are not regarded as credit-worthy by 
the formal sector financial institutions and are forced to borrow from the financial 
institution in the informal credit market. In a framework that is similar to that in 
Chaudhuri and Gupta (1996) he showed that when such borrowers differ in their 
likelihood of default, and the informal financial institutes are asymmetrically 
informed about the client-specific degree of risk, the policy of providing cheap credit 
through the formal sector can generate adverse "composition effects" which worsen 
the terms of credit and the availability of loans in the informal sector.
Jain (1999) in his paper argue that in many developing countries where 
enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets, the 
formal sector's superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the
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informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy. The formal sector 
can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing 
borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan. They use their 
model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment, 
and they consider the policy implications of various forms of government 
intervention. Dasgupta (2009) examines whether the presence of informal credit 
markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. With the help of 
Indian household level data they show that the informal market reduces the cost of 
rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. According to them this higher 
growth rate (in the presence of an informal sector) is due to the ability of the informal 
market to separate the high risk from the low risk due to better information .
While these important studies mainly concentrate on the strategic interaction 
between financial stakeholders in informal and formal markets, in the aggregative 
models of economic growth this issue has not been formally addressed. In this chapter 
we introduce a model economy where both formal and informal market for credit and 
financial services co-exist, which takes the model closer to the stylized facts of many 
developing countries. In many developing countries rural channels of credit and 
financial services create ease of transactions in a cash-only market. These are markets 
where goods and services are exchanged for cash. Since such transactions do not 
typically leave a paper trail, it is not possible to tax these. This simply means that the 
predominance of an informal sector or an informal market in general allows 
consumers to avoid VAT type taxes. So in such economies advantage of buying in the 
informal market (e.g. a farmers' market) is that such purchases can evade the 
consumption tax. At the same time advantage of buying in the formal market (e.g. 
tesco direct) is that for such purchases credit is available. In addition, having an 
informal market at tandem with a formal market enables buyers to consider a number 
of allocation decisions across markets, such as supply of factors and purchase of 
consumption. With this model and its relevant balanced growth conditions, we explain 
different properties of sectoral growth and its linkage with financial development.
2 Rajan and Zingales (1998) hold similar views when they discuss the impact o f financial repression on 
economic growth.
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We consider an endogenous growth monetary economy with households, 
firms, banks and a government. Households are identical, infinitely lived and they 
maximize their utility. Households own firms and banks; firms and banks own 
nothing except the technologies. Households supply factors of production to the firms 
and the banks, gets paid for their work or investment. They use their earnings to buy 
consumption and investment goods in perfectly competitive markets. There are two 
markets for the single final good: a formal market, where the good is sold for cash and 
credit, and an informal market where the good is sold for cash only. For the banks, 
two technologies exist for two types of markets. Although the bank technology in the 
informal market is not as efficient as bank technology in the formal market, together 
the banking technologies play an important role in determining growth in the financial 
system vis a vis the aggregate economy.
This particular chapter, thus, depicts the relationship between financial 
development and endogenous growth in an economy with informal and informal 
markets. In the remainder of the chapter, section 1.2 discusses the motivation of this 
study, section 1.3 presents the model and section 1.4 presents the discussion on the 
competitive equilibrium and balanced growth path of this model, including some 
analytical results of this model which are drawn from the equilibrium properties and 
properties of the balanced growth path. Section 1.5 presents an illustrative calibration 
of the BGP and some numerical examples. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Motivation.
In many developing countries rural channels of credit and financial services create 
ease of transactions in a cash-only market. Since such transactions do not typically 
leave a paper trail, the predominance of such a sector (or an informal market, in 
general) allows consumers to avoid indirect taxes. Primarily we find that such a 
setting can be useful for an aggregative study on the finance-growth nexus in 
developing countries. In its simplest form if one adds two channels of financial 
services to an otherwise standard model (e.g. Gillman & Kejak (2011)), one can 
examine the relative effects of financial development and the growth in aggregate real
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variables. Standard endogenous growth models are in general not capable of capturing 
the transactions which are accomplished in such markets and the growth effects of 
financial development in such economies. Our key motivation stems from this 
insufficiency of the models in the literature.
This chapter and its key model are also motivated from the fact that in many 
countries across the world, the informal sector contribute large share in their GDP and 
in their labour forces. In table 1 we present some relevant evidence where it is clear 
that a large proportion of GDP and labour force are contributed by the informal sector 
in many developing countries. That is why incorporating the informal market in a 
standard growth model enhances its capacity to capture the growth effect of financial 
development in this type of economies. These leading indicators are collected from 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations.
Table 1: Average Size of the Informal Economy in Terms of Value-Added
and the Labour Force Over Two Periods (2004/2005), _______________________
Countries Average size of the 
Informal Economy Value- 
Added in % of Official 
GDP
Average size of the 
Informal Economy Labour 
Force in % of Official 
Labour Force
Developing Countries (Number of Countries) (Number of Countries)
Africa 42 48.2
(23) (23)
Central and South America 41 45.1
(18) (18)
Asia 29 33.4
(26) (26)
Transition Countries 35 -
(23)
Western OECD Countries- 18 16.4
Europe (16) (7)
North American and 13.4 -
Pacific OECD Countries (4)
Source: ILO and United Nations Statistics
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In an economy where the same commodity can be purchased from two 
different markets, one needs to distinguish features of these markets so that one can 
model clear incentives of using the two markets. One way to model such incentives is 
to introduce the idea of variable marginal utility for the same commodity purchased 
from the two markets. While this methodology is simple, it leaves much to be desired 
when one is interested to examine the balanced growth properties of the equilibrium. 
A simple parameter in the utility function is insufficient to capture the growth effects 
of sectoral allocation of resources and financial services that facilitate to channel these 
resources. Our motivation is thus based on the approach as in Gillman and Kejak
(2011) which shows the correspondence between the developments in financial 
services to sectoral allocation of resources. In our model we capture such a 
correspondence not only between one sector's financial development with the 
remainder of the economy, but also across sectors. Put differently, we identify the 
need to model financial services with certain characteristics that enable one to assign 
such services to a particular sector of the economy.
Ideally, financial services produced and utilized in an informal sector are 
different from that produced and utilized in a formal sector. Such services have two 
different demands, which allow one to choose different levels of the two services. In 
an economy with formal and informal markets, the financial services that can be used 
in one sector also imposes a different marginal cost of producing as well as using such 
a service as compared to the service that can be used in the other sector. Intuitively, in 
an informal market the utility cost of producing a financial service can be modelled as 
much higher than the utility cost of producing a financial service in a formal market. 
This may be because producing and selling rural credit or any cash service often 
requires more working time which decreases utility. On the other hand, producing and 
selling financial services for the formal sector may require higher level of human as 
well as physical capital but may not require high level of working time. The 
difference in the intensity of factor allocation across these two sectors can be 
modelled by variations in the relevant parameters. We build on this idea. We model 
two financial services, one particular for the informal sector and the other particular 
for the formal sector. In a model with only human capital (and no physical capital) we 
model the informal sector financial service production as more working time intensive 
and the formal sector financial service production as more human capital intensive.
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1.3 The Model.
We consider an endogenous growth monetary economy with households, firms, banks 
and a government. Time is discrete and runs forever. There is a continua of measure 
one of identical, infinitely lived utility maximizing households, and each household is 
endowed with one unit of time, h0 > 0 units of human capital in the initial period,
M 0 > 0 amount of cash money in the initial period, and the property rights of the
firms and the banks. Firms and banks own nothing except the technologies. 
Households supply factors of production to the firms and the banks, gets paid for their 
work or investment, and use the proceeds to purchase consumption and investment 
goods in perfectly competitive markets.
There are two markets for the final good, an informal market where the good 
is sold for cash, and a formal market, where the good is sold for cash and credit. 
Although these are essentially the same commodity, we model them as two different 
goods only because in equilibrium they may have different unit prices. For the 
financial intermediary (or more simply the banks) two technologies exist for two 
types of markets. Sellers in the formal market combine financial services and the final 
good, and sell to households in exchange of credit or in cash. Sellers in the informal 
market combine financial services and the final good, and sell to households in 
exchange of cash. Consumption good purchased from the informal market for cash are 
not subject to consumption taxation, but consumption good purchased from the formal 
sector for cash or credit is subject to consumption taxation. In short, consumption 
goods purchased from the formal market are on the books, while those purchased 
from the informal sector are off the books.
The advantage of buying in the informal market is that such purchases can 
evade the consumption tax, while the advantage of buying in the formal market is that 
for such purchases credit is available. All incomes from working are subject to 
income taxation. The government supplies money makes lump sum transfers to 
households and collects revenue through income and consumption taxation.
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1.3.1 The Households:
The representative household's discounted utility stream depends on the 
consumption purchased from the informal market, cst the consumption purchased
from the formal market, cfl and leisure, x, in a constant elasticity fashion:
The representative household uses either nominal money, M t or lump sum 
transfer of cash, denoted by Vt , given by government, in order to purchase
We assume that all expenditures are sourced from the deposits, denoted in real 
units by d sl for the informal sector and dft for the formal sector. The per unit
dividend is in essence the payment of a nominal interest rate on deposited funds. We 
denote the per unit nominal dividend by Rst and Rft for the informal and the formal
sector, respectively. Total nominal dividends are then PtRstd st and PtRfid fi for the
informal and the formal sector, respectively. Since all expenditures are sourced from 
deposits the households face the exchange constraints:
«(c + lnc^ + cdnx, );J3 e (0,l),a > 0 (l)
consumption from the informal market at the informal market price Pcts , or purchase
consumption from the formal market at the formal market price P j  . The households 
face the cash-in advance (CIA) constraint:
(2)
(за)
(зб)
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Normalizing by P, , we can rewrite the CIA constraint and the exchange 
constraints as:
(4 a)
(4b)  
(4c)
The households accumulate human capital through a constant return to scale 
production function, and this accumulation is assumed to be an internal process. The 
households use effective labour and stock of human capital in this production process, 
and with AH > 0 , and denoting the fractions of working time allocated to the 
production of human capital by nHt, the law of motion for human capital is:
The other fractions of labour allocated to work include the one for the final 
good production, n , banking production in the informal sector, nst, and banking
production in the formal sector, nft .The fractions of working time add up to the total
The government has two tax instruments. The proportionate tax rates are 
denoted by r ,c and t " for consumption and labour income, respectively. The 
household's budget constraint for all time t is:
hl+l — Ah (nHth, )+ (l 8 h )K (5)
productively utilized time, or (l -  x ,), i.e. the time allocation constraint is:
\ - x ,  = n))+ nH, +nf  +«,, (6)
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In this framework optimal behaviour of the representative household is 
characterized by the solution to the representative household's utility maximization 
problem. The households take prices as given. They choose allocations
utility defined by (1) subject to constraints (2), (3a), (3b), (5), (6) and (7). The 
household's normalized budget constraint ((7) divided by Pt ), using (6), (4b) and (4c)
1.3.2 Firms:
There is one final good in this model economy, and we will denote its level 
by y t . There is a continua of measure one of identical profit maximizing firms in this
sector, who hire effective labour and use these labour in the production of the final 
good. The production technology for the final goods production is:
where, ny1h, is the fraction of effective labour allocated to production in this sector, 
and A e  (0 , oo). The representative firm in this sector hires these effective labour, 
pays wage equal to wt per unit of effective labour, and sells this final good in two 
markets (the informal market and the formal market) at a competitive price Pt . The 
representative firm’s profit maximization problem is:
{cs,>cf ’K  i ,M t+l,x n nynnft,nsnnHnd st,d fi}t=Q*3 in order to maximize discounted
to substitute out, [nyt + nst + nft} d sl, d fl, is:
(«)
y, = Ay(n„h,) (9)
m axll (10)
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subject to (9). Competitive profit maximization in this sector is associated with the 
first order condition:
w =  A (11)
which simply states that in this economy the equilibrium wage is inelastic of working 
time or effective labour.
1.3.3 Bank Technologies:
For the informal market there is a self-produced exchange function by walking to the 
sector. The production for financial services is CRS in effective labour and deposited 
funds. Exchange cost in this sector is just carrying the cash. 
With As e (0, oo), ys e (0, l) the production function is given by:
Here, As doesn't change over time, d sl = M sl = cash and qst denotes the 
financial services available in the informal market. The residual return per unit of 
deposit, Rsl, results after profit maximization. The informal sector bank chooses the 
levels of the two inputs (effective labour and deposits) and competitively maximizes 
profits. Profits here is the revenue Pstqst minus costs Ptwthtnsl and the dividend pay
out P,Rstd st. The profit maximization problem is:
subject to the production function (12). The first order conditions associated with this 
problem include:
(12)
max n
K A  J s i )
(13)
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w, = Ps,rsAs(ns,fl,y '~ 'd s,'~r'
=  p s, ^ - r s ) A X n s A ) r ‘ d s, ' 7‘
(14 a) 
(14 b)
In the formal market we have bank-produced exchange function. The
production for financial services is CRS in effective labour and deposited funds 
with Af  e (0, oo), y f  e (0,l). The production function is given by:
Here, d fi = M ft = cash and qfi denotes the financial services available in the 
formal market. The residual return per unit of deposit, Rfi, results after profit
maximization. The competitive profit maximization problem then can be written as 
maximization of profit choosing the two inputs (effective labour and deposit) subject 
to the production function (15). The profit maximization problem is:
subject to the production function (15). With normalized variables, and with
Here we do not impose any restriction on the relative sizes of ys and y f , but
financial development led economic growth in the economy. In general, it is intuitive 
to assume that ys > y f , implying that the production of financial services in the
informal sector is more labour intensive than the production of financial services in 
the formal sector.
(15)
max. n y  = Pj,qj, -  P,nfih ,w ,-P ,R t d f
f t }
(16)
the first order conditions associated with this problem are:
(17a) 
(17 b)
as we will show later in the chapter, their relative size assist big time in explaining
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1.3.4 The Informal Market:
The informal market sellers combine each unit of the good with one unit of 
financial service qsl and sell to households at price Pcts . The profit maximization 
problem for the representative seller in the informal market is:
m axn/ = P j c s, -  Ps,q„ -  P,cs! (l8a)
(O
sJ- q„ = c„ (186)
The first order condition associated with this problem is:
Pa' = P „ + P ,  (19)
P ' PWe define p j  = —!— and p st = — , and rewrite the first order condition as:
Pt Pf
Pa = P>, + 1 (2°)
1.3.5 The Formal Market:
The Formal market sellers combine each unit of the good with y/ > 0 units of 
financial service and sell to households at unit price P j . The profit maximization 
problem for the representative informal market seller is:
m a x n /  = p j c ft - P f,qfi - P,c„ (21a)
{Cji)
sJ .q JI=y/cJI (216)
The first order condition associated with this problem is:
P /^ y s P j+ P ,  (22)
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, the first order condition can be rewritten as:
p j  =¥Pf + 1 (23)
This is where our model can explain the relative difference between 
purchasing from the informal market and purchasing from the formal market. Here, 
the consumer price of the same commodity from the two markets has two different
services attached to these two goods. This is why the difference between the 
equilibrium consumer prices of the two goods is simply equal to the difference 
between p st and p ft, i.e. the equilibrium prices for financial services in the two
sectors adjusted by the marginal cost of financial services in the two markets.
1.3.6 The Government:
The government makes a lump sum transfer of cash, denoted by Vt , to
households. It has two tax instruments. The proportionate tax rates are denoted by r ,c
and ztn for consumption and labour income, respectively. The government's budget 
constraint is:
• s fprices, p ct and p ct . We model a difference between the unit cost of financial
V,+M , =P,w,( 'jh.r.’ + M ^ + P (24)
With M t+i = (l + cr)Mt , where a  is the constant growth rate of money supply, 
we rewrite the budget constraint as:
} i,t;  +aM, (25)
and dividing by Pt , (25) becomes
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y  = P a V c  f +w,  (n„ + ns, +nf )h,T; + am, (26)
M,
where mt = — - is the real money supply.
1.3.7 Utility maximization:
Taking the prices and taxes as given, the representative household chooses
allocations {csncft,ht+l,M t+l,xn nHl}t=Qa3 in order to maximize discounted utility
defined by (1) subject to constraints (5), (4a) and (8). Let A,,, X2t and X3l denote the
current value multipliers associated with the budget constraint, (8), the cash-in- 
advance constraint (4a), and the human capital accumulation constraint, (5). 
Conditions for optimal behaviour include the three constraints (5), (4a) and (8), and:
= K P c’ ^ - R„) + ^ 2IPc,S {21a)
(27 b)
(27 c)
p
: A,, = 0 —— (>1,,^ , + ) (27 d) 
(27«) 
(27/)nH. : —— = ------ 1-
K  AHh,
From (27c) we get:
(28)
We substitute (28) in (27a) in order to derive:
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i  1 - R,,)
p j c «
We substitute (27c) in (27b) and derive:
X 1 +
2' p J c!,
Substitute (27c) in (27f) in order to derive
x,AHh,
1.4 Competitive Equilibrium and Balanced Growth.
Before defining the competitive equilibrium, we summarize the market clearing 
conditions:
Ay\nA ) = P « C« + P j Cf< (32a)
1 -x , =n„ + nH, +ns, +nf (32 b)
a h (« » * ,)= fy+i_ 0  ~&h (32c)
As(r' A Y ‘d J ' r- =CS, (32 d)
^ / («yA)'7<V ~ '7 =y/cf (32c)
Here, (32a) is the goods market clearing condition, (32b) explains how time is 
allocated across leisure and work, (32c) is the market clearing condition for human 
capital, and (3 2d) and (32e) are the market clearing conditions for financial services 
for informal and formal market. A set of allocations in this framework that satisfies 
(32) is essentially a set of feasible allocations.
(29)
(30)
(31)
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Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium in this economy 
is a set o f  prices {P,,pas , p j  ,R si,R j,,P „ ,P ji^w, } , ^  > Policy  {M ,,V i , tic
and allocations {csl, cf , hM , M m  , x ,, n ^ , na , nf , nH, , da , d f , qs, , q f, , y, , such that
(a) Given the set o f  prices and the policy, the allocations
{csncft,hl+x,M l+x,x n nyt,nsnnftinHndstid fi}t=f  solve the representative household's 
utility maximization problem;
(b) Given the set o f  prices, the allocations { h ^ n ^ ^ y , } ^  solve the profit 
maximization problem o f  the representative firm in the goods production sector;
(c) Given the set o f  prices, the allocations {nst, nfl, ht , dst, d fl,qst, qft }/=0°° solve
the profit maximization problem o f the representative bank in the financial 
intermediary sector;
(d) Given the set o f  prices, the allocations {cst,c fn q snqft },=0°° solve the profit
maximization problem o f  the representative sellers in the informal and formal market;
(e) Given the set o f  prices and the allocations, the government policy 
{M t , Vt , xtc, z f  },=0°° satisfies the sequence o f  government budget constraints;
(f) Allocations satisfy the market clearing conditions.
As long as the representative household's optimum has an interior solution, 
given the production technologies and the utility function, a competitive equilibrium 
exists m this model . In this model a comer solution would imply that one of the 
sectors close down and the entire consumption is sold through only one of the 
markets. Given the utility function in (1) the model is therefore useful in providing
3 For a broader class o f utility function that satisfy standard regularity conditions a competitive 
equilibrium may exist for comer solutions as well. Given the utility function that we use only interior 
solutions are interesting and useful. In effect we are only interested in interior solutions to the 
household’s optimization problem. In general we are interested in the competitive equilibria where both 
sectors operate and the households purchase from both markets.
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insights into the issues that we are interested in only if we consider an interior solution 
to the household’s optimization problem. We therefore propose the conditions that are 
required to guarantee an interior solution to the representative household’s optimum.
Proposition 1 The representative household’s optimum has an interior
solution i f  t "  <1 and Rst > \,andRft > 1 + ztc.
Proof. From (28) , \ t ~ —t—  >and from (28-29) and (30),
,  1 1 «(1 +  < - - RJ  j  ,  a  „/L, = ------------------------------------ t----------r--------1—— and /L. = ---------- . These
P c SCs, x , { l - T ; } v ,h ,  p j c f  x,A„h,
are the shadow prices o f the budget constraint, the CIA constraint and the human 
capital accumulation constraint, respectively. These are all strictly positive i f  rtn <1
and Rst > \,and Rft > 1 + rtc, which in turns ensure interior solution, m
The competitive equilibrium dynamics can be characterized by the market 
clearing conditions (32), equilibrium factor price equations (1 l),(14a),(14b),(17a) and 
(17b), equilibrium goods price equations (20), (23), the government budget constraint 
(26), and the consolidated system from (27a)-(27f), which after using (28)-(31), is:
1 1 i, a ' i J r >e + (33>X,[l-T , jw,h,Pc/Cfi P jc *
which is the intratemporal optimality condition that explains how the marginal rate of 
substitution across consumption and leisure is explained by their relative prices in 
equilibrium. Following proposition 1 and from (33), it is straightforward to see that
for Rsl =l ,Rfi = l + r,c we have a comer solution where at the optimum the
representative household’s expenditure across the two markets are equal, and this 
model collapses to a simple one sector model. As long as proposition 1 holds, this 
model can bring some insights into the problem where the representative household 
has a clear advantage and a clear disadvantage of purchasing from a particular market.
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Throughout the analysis of this model, we will continue assuming that the
inequality restrictions T," < 1, R„ > 1, andRfi > \ + rtc hold, i.e. the solution to the
representative household’s optimum is an interior solution. This is also tantamount to 
assuming that within the government’s policies, we do not allow any subsidy. 
Following Proposition 1 and using the association between the endogenous variables 
and the tax instruments, this model gives some important insights of the two sector 
economy.
Proposition 2 At the optimum, i f  all other variables remain unchanged,
higher nominal return to deposits in the informal sector bank and higher consumption 
tax rate are associated with higher consumption expenditure in the informal market.
Proof. From (33), the difference between the consumption expenditure in the
informal market and the consumption expenditure in the formal market is simply
(t,c + Rst -  Rf t \* ( f s \ 
equal to  t— -—t------- \pct cfip ct cst). Here Rsl is the nominal return to deposits
in the informal sector bank, and given an interior solution to the representative 
household’s optimum the term (r,c + Rst -  Rft )> 0 as long as Rst > Rfl. In addition, 
this term is increasing in the spread in the nominal return (i.e. Rst -  Rfl) and in the 
policy instrument rtc. ■
Proposition 2 is an intuitively very important equilibrium property which 
brings some insights into the stylized allocation problem in mixed structured financial 
markets. In this model economy, since equilibrium wage is constant the only channel 
through which allocation decisions are affected is the nominal return to deposits. If 
the nominal return to deposits in the informal sector bank is relatively higher, the 
representative household puts more deposit in this sector’s bank which in turns results 
in higher production of the financial service in the informal sector bank. Because the 
total quantity of financial service produced in this sector is simply equal to the total 
quantity of consumption purchased from this sector’s market, a relatively higher 
nominal return to deposits in this sector ultimately result in more purchase from this 
sector’s market. In addition, if the government increases the consumption tax rate, the
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representative household evades this additional tax burden by purchasing higher 
amounts of consumption from the informal sector market. In effect, as we will discuss 
in proposition 3 to follow, the representative household’s equilibrium reaction to any 
tax increase is to shift consumption to the informal market in order to avoid the excess 
burden of the tax.
Proposition 3 At the optimum, i f  all other variables remain unchanged,
higher nominal return to deposits in the informal sector bank and higher labour 
income tax rate are associated with higher consumption expenditure in the informal 
market.
Proof. Once again from (33), the difference between the consumption
expenditure in the informal market and the consumption expenditure in the formal
(r,c +Rst - R ft)oc t f s \ 
market is simply equal t o  r— -—t—^— \pct cfip ct cst J. Given an interior solution
to the representative household’s optimum the term (r/ + Rsl -  R* )>0 as long as 
R s, > Rfi. This term is increasing in the spread in the nominal return (i.e. Rst -  Rfi).
(r,c + Rsl - R fi )a n
In addition, the term -— -t—  \ in increasing in the policy instrument r, . ■
h h,
We have already discussed the intuition behind the correspondence between 
the spread of nominal returns and the spread of consumption expenditure. The 
intuition behind the remainder of proposition 3 is as follows. With wages and 
consumption tax fixed (and strictly positive), a higher income tax rate incurs the 
additional burden of paying higher income tax. Since equilibrium wage is inelastic to 
labour supply, the only way to avoid paying too much in taxes is to evade part of the 
consumption tax burden, which can be done by shifting consumption to the informal 
sector market (i.e. use cash). Thus in this economy, any tax increase leads to evasion 
of consumption tax which the households accomplish by shifting consumption from 
the formal market to the informal market.
Substituting (27c) and (30) in (27d) gives us the Euler equation that explains 
the intertemporal allocation of human capital in terms of current consumption and 
other current levels of allocations and prices,
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Notice here that same substitution in (27e) also yields an Euler equation.
( l - r ”/+i)w
p f ct+\cft+l ^
Combining (27e) and (27f), after substituting out the multipliers, we derive the 
equilibrium condition:
Thus the optimum intertemporal allocation of human capital is determined by 
the subjective discount rate, the rate of human capital depreciation, the human capital 
productivity parameter, and the optimum intertemporal allocation of leisure time.
1.4.1 Balanced Growth Path:
We consider a balanced growth path (BGP). Given the multi sector approach in our 
setting and the cash-credit purchase of goods, the definition of the balanced growth 
path deserves attention, where one would have to take care in characterizing the 
growth of the real variables. In proposition 4 to follow we summarize the properties of 
the balanced growth path for this model.
Proposition 4 A Balanced Growth Path (BGP) in this economy is a path
along which for a particular set o f government policy {Mn Vn rtc ,rtn}l=f  the 
endogenous variables nyl, nHt, nst 9nfi9xn wt remain stationary and the remaining 
endogenous variables grow at constant rates.
x,^h,t+\rit+1 P[a h {1- x,+i ) + ! - < ? „ ] (36)
x,h,
Proof. Verify (32a), which states that along the BGP y t ,ht and
i J
, . J .  Pcl+l ^  St+1 P c t , 1 ^  f t , 1 , . 1  .aggregate consumption expenditure -------------------    grow at the same rate,
P c t  Cst +  P c t
and therefore
y t + 1  ^ t +1 _  P a , i  ^ s t+1 P c t +1 ^ f t , i  _  j
Pc, Cs, + p a cf
+ g (37)
Notice that ~ ~ ~  = 1 + o’, and mt = . Along the BGP all growing real variables
TYl
grow at the same rate, and therefore —— = 1 + g , which in turns imply that
m,
P„ i _1  + a _  _ = ------- = 1 + n .
p, i + g
The growth in nominal deposits follow the growth in nominal money supply, because 
the amount o f  deposit at any time t to any sector bank is simply equal to the cash 
allocated to that sector’s bank. This, together with qsl = csl and qfi = ij/cft imply that 
along the BGP
's/+l
ft+\
c ft
P c i
S
P a
P a , I
U  + cr.
' l  + * Y '= (l + (t)
l + cr
/
l + 8 
1 + < j 
1 + 8.
V f
(38 a) 
(38 b) 
(38 c) 
(38 d)
Along the BGP, the real output and aggregate expenditure grows at constant rate 
g, but expenditure in individual sector grow at rate cr. This implies that the ratio o f  
growth in expenditure across two sectors is constant.
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Growth in the production o f  financial services along the BGP in the informal sector 
bank and in the formal sector bank is characterized by the growth in the amount o f  
consumption from these two markets, characterized by (38a) and (38b), respectively. 
Since wage is fixed  in this model, (14a) and (17a) imply that the unit price offinancial 
services in the informal sector bank and in the formal sector bank grow at constant 
rates, given by
P s , + 1 
Psr
P ft+ i
Pfi
v*_1\ +  <j
V / -1
(38e)
(3 8 /)
Finally, (14b) and (17b) imply that,. ^ s,+x = fi+x- = - + ^  . Along the BGP the list o f
Rsl Rft l + a
growing variables are (ht , y t ,csl,Cfl,qst,qfl ,dsl, d f l , pst, p ft, p cls, p c/ ) ,  while the 
remaining endogenous variables remain constant, m
We discuss the details of the BGP in the next section where we present a 
closed form solution method of the BGP. As in (38) along the BGP the growth
properties of endogenous variables {psnCfl,qsnqfiip snp fnp ct\ p c/ ]  depend
crucially on the parameters ys and y f , which are the parameters associated with the
marginal product of effective labour in producing the financial services. If ys = y f ,
the growth properties (and rates) are same for consumption and prices across sectors. 
This would imply that the two sectors are perfectly symmetric and the financial 
services produced by the two sectors are perfectly substitutable. In contrast, any 
difference in these two parameters would imply that the quantity of consumption 
purchased from these sectors, their unit price in the retail market, and the unit price of 
financial services from these two sectors grow at different rates. In addition, from (38) 
it is straightforward to verify that consumption expenditure from the two sectors 
grows at the same rate, and this is simply equal to the rate of growth in nominal 
money supply, i.e. cr.
25
1.4.2 Solution of the BGP:
In order to discuss the analytical properties of the BGP, we first propose a 
closed form solution method for the BGP. For a given set of government policy,
{M ,,F ,,r,c,r,"},=0co, the BGP is characterized by the solution to the system of
equations that involve the BGP versions of representative household’s optimality 
conditions (33), (34), (35), (36), (4), (5), (6) and (8), market clearing conditions (32), 
equilibrium factor price equations (11), (14) and (17), equilibrium goods price 
equations (20) and (23), and the government budget constraint (26), for sets of 
allocations and prices, {csncft,hn x,ny,nsinf ,n H,d st,d ftiqsnqft,y t ) and
{ p a S < P c / > R s> R f < P s , ’ P j i > w>)> respectively.
From competitive equilibrium condition (32c) and (32b), it is straightforward 
to show that along the BGP4:
Notice that from (39b) it is straightforward to understand the role of human 
capital in growth. More allocation of working time in accumulating human capital 
contributes to growth. Also from (39a) more leisure is associated with lower growth
levels of welfare, but the BGP condition (39b) states that such higher levels of welfare 
can result in lower growth. Along the BGP, the competitive equilibrium conditions 
(34) and (35) become:
PA„
(39a)
(39 b)
in the economy. Given the utility function more leisure is associated with higher
We will use a time subscript for endogenous variables that grow along a BGP, and no time subscripts 
will be used for those which remain constant along the BGP.
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( i+ g X i+ ?0
p
= R. 1 + r,
(i+ gX 1 + ^ ) 
P = R
1 +
( i - r , K
y f
( i - r / K
\  a  y
- r
(40a)
(406)
Using the BGP versions of (11) and (14a) and (11) and (17a), we derive
ysPs,c,, = Aynsh, 
Vyf Pj,cf  = A ynf h,
(41 a) 
(416)
Using the BGP versions of (20) and (23) in (41), it is simple to show that
c* = Pa Cs
Aynsht
Ys
f  A ynf kl
Cft = Pct Cfi------------
Yf
(42 a) 
(426)
Furthermore, from the BGP versions of (14b) and (17b), one can show that
Pa ca =
P J C1<
y.
(l - y f ) (  Aynf h f I
y f R f  J
(43 a) 
(436)
Substituting (42) and (43) in (32a), we derive:
0 - n k  , i ' - y / h
R, y ,  Rf y f
(44)
Substituting (40) in (44) we derive:
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n„ =p 0 - r J , b - r f ) T
r s ^ 0 + sXi + * ) rr (l + gXl + ^ ) + /? r cV J  _
(45)
Notice that with (32b) and (39), the BGP condition (45) is simply an equation 
with two unknowns, ns and nf . We now combine the other BGP conditions in order
to derive another equation with the same two unknowns. Using (43) in the BGP 
versions of the CIA constraint (4a) and the market clearing condition (32a), for a
particular set of policy {M ,, Vt , r / , z ” },=0°°, we derive:
M. +V,+ v r 1
Lf - L  =  A » h ‘ V - - X ~ n H  J (46)
From the BGP version of the government budget constraint (26), and (43), we
derive:
+ ^  = A htTn (l -  jc -  nH )+ (l + c r ) ^ -  + r°A nf h,P
{\ + g^ \  + n)+ P t '
(47)
The two equations, (46) and (47) can be solved in order to substitute out ht , 
which gives one equation in two unknowns, ns and nf . More specifically, from (46) 
we solve for h,, and use the solution in (48) in order to derive:
M,+V, (l+a)M,
P, P,
M,+V,
P,
t " ( \ -  x - n H ) +  z cn f p O+gX^M*-
\ - x - n H - n s - n f
(48)
Together with (32b) and (39), (48) is simply a BGP condition with two 
unknowns, ns and nf . The BGP conditions (45) and (48) give unique solutions for
the two unknowns ns and nf . Using these solutions in (40) gives solution to Rs
and Rf , and using them in (44) gives solution to ny . The BGP condition (46) gives
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unique solution to ht . Once we derive this solution, (41) gives unique solution to 
p ficfi and p stcst, i.e. the solution for d fi and d st. The BGP conditions (32d) and 
(32e) then can be solved in order to derive the solution for cst and cfi, respectively 
(vis a vis qst and qf , respectively). Solving for the remainder of the endogenous 
variables, i.e. p st, p cl s, p ft, p ct f  is then straightforward.
1.4.3 Analytical Properties of the BGP:
We will now discuss some important analytical properties of this model 
economy that can be drawn from the BGP conditions. The BGP has a unique closed 
form solution. Along the BGP the total expenditure on consumption from the two 
sectors grow at the same rate. This growth rate is equal to the growth rate in nominal 
money supply. Along the BGP the growth factor associated with the unit price of
financial services is equal to (1 + n ) r r \ j  = s , / ,  and the growth factor associated
with the quantity of financial services produced is equal to (l + n  r ^ o + s ) .  j = s , f .  
This simply implies that along the BGP the total revenue from selling financial 
services in any sector does not grow.
Proposition 5 Along the BGP, growth in the quantity o f  financial services is
strictly decreasing in y . , j  = s , f , while growth in the unit price o f  financial services
is strictly increasing in Y j, j  = s , f .
Proof. Along the BGP the growth factor associated with the unit price o f
financial services is equal to , ^ + — r , which is strictly increasing in
(l + n f l l  + g )
Ti € (0>l). j  = s , f . The growth factor associated with the quantity o f  financial
services is equal to ^ + + s )   ^ whic}7 clearly is strictly decreasing in
(l + n ) j
Y j  e (0,l ) , j  =  s , f .  ■
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Corollary 1 Along the BGP, growth in the quantity o f  financial services is strictly 
increasing in inflation, while growth in the unit price o f  financial services is strictly 
decreasing in inflation.
Proposition 5 also implies that along the BGP, growth in the quantity of 
consumption purchased from each sector is strictly decreasing and growth in the unit 
price of consumption from each sector is strictly increasing in y } e (0,l ) , j  = S , f .
This analytical property provides a useful explanation of the growth properties of the 
model. Notice first that the magnitude of the parameter y.  e (0,l), j  = s , f  in this
model is closely related to the amount of time required to producing the financial 
service in a particular sector. This is because from (14a) and (17a), along the BGP, 
A n jh,
y i  = -------- -— , j  = s , f .  With inelastic wage which is equal to A ,  any increase in y
Pj'Vj'
is tantamount to an increase in the share of effective labour in the production of 
financial services. This can be associated with the allocation of higher amount of 
working time or higher amount of human capital, or both. It is perfectly justifiable to 
assume that producing the financial service for the informal sector is more labour 
intensive (i.e. ys > y f ). This is a representative case of a developing economy where
more working time is devoted to the informal sector. More use of effective labour in 
the informal sector for such an economy results in a lower growth in the production of 
financial services in the informal sector but a higher growth in the price of this 
service. This would also imply that the cash price of consumption in the informal 
sector grows at a higher rate.
Prior to this study, Gillman et al (2004) show that in a one sector monetary 
economy higher allocation of working time in the financial sector can contribute to 
lower aggregate economic growth. For a one sector economy this result is perfectly 
consistent with the fact that more allocation of deposits contributes to growth but 
further allocation of labour does not do so, something for which Gillman et al. (2004) 
find strong empirical support. Given the current model, their study would suggest a 
negative relation between the parameter y  and aggregate economic growth. However, 
for a two sector model like the one we discuss in this study, this result is not very
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obvious. Given (40), any change in the parameter y changes the allocation of 
working time in both sectors in opposite directions. This is because more working 
time in one sector is associated with higher allocation of working time in human 
capital allocation which can be accomplished only by reducing working time in the 
other sector. The trade off of working times across sectors changes the BGP level of 
leisure. The net growth effect of the trade off of working time across sectors is 
therefore unclear from (40), and therefore one would need to characterize it 
numerically.
Along the BGP higher inflation results in a lower real price of financial 
services because lesser amount of financial services is now available for the same 
price. Because wage is inelastic in labour supply, with more money in hand 
households will increase the amount of deposits in both sectors which results in higher 
production of financial services. Inflation therefore results in higher quantity of 
available financial services which can be purchased at a lower price.
We now turn to the BGP properties of the retail sector where the households 
purchase consumption. In the retail sector, the growth properties are determined by 
the marginal cost of financial service for the retailer, which is represented by the 
parameter if/ > 0.
Proposition 6 Along the BGP high (low) marginal cost o f  financial service in
the formal market induces lesser (more) allocation o f  working time in the informal 
sector.
Proof. The BGP condition (41) implies
”s
and clearly the term —  is decreasing in if/ m
Ys_
Tf
r  \  
Ps,Cs<
Pftcft ¥
(49)
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Along the BGP, higher marginal cost of financial services in the formal retail 
market makes the purchase price of consumption in the formal market higher, which 
in turns results in a drop in the demand for consumption from the formal market. The 
shift in demand from the formal to the informal market implies that more financial 
service is now required in the informal sector. However, since wage is inelastic in 
labour supply and more work results in higher disutility, the households allocate more 
deposits to the informal sector and less amount of working time in producing higher 
quantities of financial service in the informal sector.
Notice that while the productivity parameters of informal and formal sector 
banks matter less for BGP properties, the productivity parameter in the final goods 
sector affects the production of financial services. From BGP conditions (14a) and 
(17a), it is straightforward to see that a supply shock which is characterized by an 
increase in the productivity parameter of the final goods sector, A , results in higher
production of financial services in both sectors. Because these services come in a 
package in the retail sector, higher amount of goods requires higher amounts of 
financial services to be combined with in order for the retailers to deliver it to the 
consumers.
Finally, we explain the aggregate growth properties for changes in government 
policy. We summarize this in proposition 7.
Proposition 7 Along the BGP, a higher tax rate on labour income and/or a
higher tax on consumption reduces economic growth.
Proof. The BGP condition (40) imply that economic growth is decreasing in
both r ” and r c, and in particular the BGP condition (40b) imply that economic 
growth is decreased when the government raises both taxes, u
The intuition behind proposition 7 is that because higher wage tax reduces 
disposable income and higher consumption tax increases the purchase price of 
consumption from the formal market, and because wage is inelastic for labour supply, 
for any increase in these tax rates the households respond with lower expenditure on
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consumption. Because of this, the households also reduce the accumulation of human 
capital. Aggregate economic growth in this model is determined by the aggregate 
consumption expenditure and the accumulation of human capital, both of which 
decrease for any increase in tax rates, resulting in lower aggregate economic growth.
For developing countries where the informal sector is predominant and so is 
the total consumption expenditure from the informal market, the growth effect of tax 
increase is more severe. In such economies an increase in wage tax results in a shift of 
consumption to the informal sector, as we have previously discussed in proposition 3. 
If consumption tax is fixed, this shifting results in a lower demand for the financial 
services in the formal sector. More purchase from the informal sector implies that the 
government collects less revenue from consumption taxation. Following the BGP 
condition (40b), lesser production of financial service in the formal sector implies that 
in order to keep the net growth effect of tax reform neutral the government must 
increase the consumption tax rate. An increase in the consumption tax rate encourages 
more evasion which results in more shifting of consumption expenditure towards the 
informal market. The net result is a further drop in aggregate economic growth.
1.5 An Illustrative Calibration.
In this section, we calibrate the model economy in order to present some quantitative 
analytics. Our aim for the calibration is to validate the analytical propositions related 
to the BGP of the model. Put more simply, we calibrate the model in order to 
numerically test the analytical findings. We are interested in BGP properties of the 
growth effects of changes in key parameters. We first set plausible parameter values 
as in the calibrations of Gomme and Rupert (2007), who use data for the US from 
1954 to 2001. The calibration of the model is only intended to validate and examine 
the different analytical properties of the model which we have discussed5.
5 Our calibration technique is close to the technique applied in Basu and Femald (1997) and Cooley 
and Prescott (1995).
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Table 1.2: Baseline param eter values for calibration.
Parameter Description
Baseline
Value
A Banking productivity parameter in informal sector 0.9
A Banking productivity parameter in formal sector 1.4
A Productivity parameter in final goods sector 1
¥ Proportion o f financial service sold as a package in the formal sector 1.2
7s Share parameter for the informal sector bank 0.4
7  f Share parameter for the formal sector bank 0.14
TC Proportionate tax rate for consumption 0.15
Tn Proportionate tax rate for labour income 0.30
<J Money supply growth rate 0.067
P Subjective discount rate 0.9615
a Leisure weight 8
A Human capital productivity parameter 0.15
A Human capital depreciation rate 0.05
8 Economic growth rate 0.017
The depreciation rate of human capital is set equal to 0.05. Wage is 
normalized to 1, which implies that A = 1. The subjective discount rate is set equal
to 0.9615, consistent with real interest rate of 4%. The average annual rate of growth 
of real GDP, g , and the money supply growth rate, cr, are fixed equal to 1.7% and
6.7% respectively. We fix AH = 0.15. From BGP condition (39a) the proportion of 
time allocated to leisure is equal to 0.281. From BGP condition (39b) the proportion 
of time allocated to human capital production is equal to 0.44. The full set of baseline 
parameter values are presented in table 1.2.
Notice in table 1.2 that in fixing the baseline parameter values we have set 
lower total factor productivity in the informal sector bank (relative to the formal 
sector bank), and we have also set ys > y f . This is done with the intention to show
34
the growth properties and the analytical properties of the model in the sample case of 
a developing economy. The baseline parameter values are consistent with an inflation 
rate of 0.049.
The key issue in this calibration is fixing a government policy of money 
supply and transfers in (48). Since we are only concerned with calibrating the BGP, 
arbitrary choice of these exogenous variables of the model can lead to biased or 
inconsistent results. Notice that given (32b), we need to restrict all solutions such that 
working time in production satisfies ny + ns + nf  = 0.279. In addition, given
proposition 1 interior solution to the system of BGP conditions require additional 
restrictions such as Rs > 1 and Rf  >1.15. We therefore adopt an approximation
approach for the endogenous variables ns and nf . First, we consider (40a), which for
given set of parameter values is a functional relationship between ns and Rs . We fix
7^=1.0001 and compute ns. We conduct the same in (40b) where we fix
7/=1.15001 and compute nf . We then check the BGP condition
ny + ns + nf  = 0.279 for these computed values, and given that this is satisfied, we
check the consistency in (44). We continue this process by increasing Rs and Rf
slightly and computing ns and nf  until we converge to values of these two for which
both (32b) and (45) are satisfied. Once we derive the convergent values of ns and nf ,
we pin them down as calibrated values (along with pinned down values of RJ9
y' = 5 , / .  We find that given the baseline parameter values the solution ns = 0.18 and
nf  = 0.05 satisfy both (32b) and (44). This results in ny = 0.043, Rs = 1.015 and
Rf  = 1.162.
1.5.1 Properties of sectoral growth.
We now discuss the growth properties of the model. These properties are 
discussed in light of proposition 4. We focus on the growth properties for variations in 
the parameter yJ9j  = 5 , / ,  as in (38). In our first experiment, we examine the effect
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of Yj ,7 = s , f  on growth of consumption along the BGP for the two sectors assuming
that aggregate growth and growth in money supply are fixed. Because the results are 
symmetric for the two sectors, we only present the results for the informal sector. 
These are in figure 1, and are perfectly consistent with the analytical results in 
propositions 5.
Figure 1: Growth effect of sectoral consumption and prices for changes in Yj , j  = s , f  (y  in 
horizontal axis)
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Figure 2: Growth effect of sectoral financial service supply and prices for changes in 
inflation ( n  in horizontal axis).
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With more working time in producing the financial services and with inelastic 
wage, growth in consumption falls. This result is symmetric for both sectors. Lower 
growth in consumption demand which results from higher y . , j  = s , f  in turns results
in higher growth in consumer prices (again a symmetric result). The net effect on 
consumer expenditure is that it grows at the rate of growth in money supply. Higher 
allocation of working time in both sectors also results in a lower demand for financial 
services from both sectors, causing the unit price of financial services to grow. This is 
because more allocation of working time in producing financial services leave leisure 
and working time in human capital accumulation unchanged but trades off some 
working time in final goods production. In equilibrium this results in a lower demand 
for financial services required to deliver the good to the consumer.
Consider the effect of inflation on growth rates of these variables for fixed 
y j , j  = s , f . These are presented in figure 2. Because now we fix the parameter, we
present the growth properties for both sectors. We will assume that the increase in 
inflation is solely due to an increase in the money supply growth rate, and that the 
aggregate economic growth rate is unchanged. In figure 2, we show the growth effect 
of sectoral prices and supply of financial services for changes in the inflation rate (i.e. 
money supply growth rate). This is a numerical illustration of corollary 1. Since more 
inflation is associated with lower real price of financial services, and because wage is 
inelastic in labour supply, there is an increase in the amount of deposits to banks 
resulting in higher production of financial services. Excess supply of such services 
results in their market price to drop.
1.5.2 Properties of aggregate economic growth:
Along the BGP, the net aggregate growth effects of higher allocation of 
effective labour are not same across the two sectors. In order to verify this we 
calibrate the aggregate growth effect for a plausible range of values for the parameter 
y.  This calibration cannot simply be accomplished by changing the parameter
y j , j  = s , f , because any change in this parameter requires recalibration of the
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working time and the nominal return to deposits. The recalibrated values then need to 
be tested to verify the relevant BGP conditions (i.e. (32a) and (44)). Because 
aggregate growth is determined by the accumulation of human capital vis a vis the 
growth in the total consumption expenditure, recalibrating the aggregate growth for 
variation in key parameters of the model requires recalibration of leisure time (as in 
(39a)) and the working time in human capital production (as in (39b)). We first 
consider the calibrated values of ns,nf ,Rs,Rf  from (40) for the baseline growth rate.
Given these values we vary the parameters y . , j  = s , f  in (40) in order to calibrate the
new growth rate. The new growth rate is then used to recalibrate leisure time and 
working time in human capital production using (39). Together with (32b) and (40), it 
pins down the new ny,ns,nf . This process is continued until we derive convergent
values of these endogenous variables. We present the result of this experiment in 
figure 3.
Figure 3(a): Aggregate growth effect of expansion in ys
r Growth fector, sector s
0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55
More working time in the informal sector contributes to growth in the aggregate 
economy. Higher values of the parameter ys implies higher share of effective labour
in production. This creates more demand for human capital, and further accumulation 
of human capital contributes to aggregate growth. This result is symmetric for an
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increase in y f , however the interesting thing to note is that the magnitude by which
the aggregate growth improves for the formal sector is much higher than that for the 
informal sector. Both these experiments are accomplished for a set of solutions which 
are consistent with all BGP conditions. The model, as is clear by now is very sensitive 
to parameter values and many plausible parameter values can result in comer 
solutions to the BGP. We only discuss the range of values for y for which there exists
an interior solution to the BGP. We present the growth effect for yf  e [0.1,0.3] in
figure 3(b).
Figure 3(b): Aggregate growth effect of expansion in yf .
Growth fictor, sector f
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Figure 3(b) in effect illustrates one of the key findings of this study. Together 
with figure 3(a) it simply shows that higher values of y for the formal sector are 
associated with higher margins of growth improvement as compared to that in the 
informal sector. The implication is clear. The effect of nominal returns to deposits for 
changes in working time allocated to the two sectors are presented in figure 4, which 
assist in understanding the aggregate growth effects. For both sectors an increase in 
the allocation of effective labour (reflected by an increase in the parameter y ) reduces 
the nominal return to deposits. This result is symmetric for both sectors. However, for 
the formal sector this decline in nominal return is supplemented by the taxation of 
consumption. Higher levels of financial service production in the formal sector bank
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(due to higher levels of demand for consumption from the formal market) enable the 
government to collect more revenue in the form of consumption taxation. This in 
turns enable the government to redistribute more which contributes to growth at a 
relatively higher level.
Figure 4(a): Effect of nominal rate of return to deposits on work in informal sector.
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Figure 4(b): Effect of the nominal rate of return to deposits on work in formal sector
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In contrast, more demand for financial services for the informal market is not 
associated with higher tax revenue to be collected by the government. Rather, more
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purchase from the informal market enables more evasion of consumption tax. The net 
growth effect is therefore smaller in margin. In figure 5 we present the aggregate 
growth effect for changes in tax rates, where we try and relate the relevant finding to 
the case for developing countries.
Figure 5: Aggregate growth effect of increase in tax rates.
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In developing countries where the informal sector is predominant, further 
allocation of effective labour in that sector and its related financial services 
contributes to growth by relatively smaller margin. In contrast, if the country can 
design policies that encourage agents to shift allocations towards formalizing the 
financial markets it could enjoy better levels of improvement in growth. However, 
expansionary fiscal policy hurt growth in this model. We present a calibrated evidence 
of this result in figure 5, where we show that if the government increases the tax rates 
it results in a decline in the growth factor. The shifting of the demand for financial 
services would therefore have to be incentive based, and the process and the speed of
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this process is better left for the market to decide. Since any direct policy shock that 
reduces income or consumption may hurt growth, the governments of developing 
countries may consider designing incentive-enhancing schemes in order to expand the 
formal market and its capacities.
This result extends the important findings of Gillman et al. (2004). While they 
find that in a one sector monetary model of endogenous growth an increase in the y 
equivalent would reduce the aggregate economic growth, we find that in a two sector 
model this experiment in general improves aggregate economic growth. In order to 
illustrate the intuition, we present a table of computed real variables for an increase in
r f '
Table 1.3: Balanced growth effects on Endogenous Variables of an increase in
rr
Parameter Endogenous Variables
r f n f n H R f g
0.14 0.05 0.18 0.44 1.162 1.015 0.017
0.15 0.07 0.15 0.46 1.16 1.017 0.055
0.16 0.08 0.13 0.48 1.158 1.019 0.089
0.17 0.09 0 . 1 2 0.52 1.156 1.017 0 . 1 2 2
0.18 0.09 0 . 1 1 0.54 1.155 1.016 0.188
0.19 0 . 1 0 . 1 0.56 1.152 1 . 0 1 0.213
0 . 2 0 0 . 1 1 0.08 0.57 1.151 1 . 0 0 2 0.239
For table 1.3 we have considered the range yf  e [0.14,0.20] for which all 
solutions are interior. Notice here that an increase in the parameter y f  in this model
affects aggregate economic growth through different channels, and one of which is 
through the trade off of working time. For an increase in y f , a higher share of labour
in financial service output requires trading off some working time in the informal 
sector in order to accumulate more human capital. This accumulation contributes to 
higher levels of aggregate economic growth. For the formal sector, redistribution
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through higher consumption tax revenue creates a multiplier effect in aggregate 
economic growth.
Notice that with an increase in y f , the nominal return to deposit in the formal
sector falls while that in the informal sector increases. This is because in this model 
wage is inelastic. Higher allocation of working time in this sector in effect results in a 
decline in the growth of financial service from this sector but an increase in the 
growth of the price of the service. Because of the retail sector the total consumption 
expenditure from the formal sector grows, which in turns allows the government to 
collect more revenue from consumption taxation. This results in more redistribution. 
Assuming that the government adjusts the growth in money supply so as to fix 
inflation at a particular level, higher redistribution contributes to higher levels of 
aggregate economic growth. For the informal sector the same intuition for aggregate 
economic growth follows apart from the fact that the multiplier effect of redistribution 
is absent.
1.6 Concluding Remarks.
In this chapter we discuss the linkage between financial development and economic 
growth in an endogenously growing monetary economy where there is an active 
informal sector. We built and analyzed an endogenous growth model that can capture 
the idea of bank based creation of financial services and market based delivery of 
financial services. Our key emphasis is on the growth effects of changes in allocation 
of effective labour in the financial sector for the informal market and the financial 
sector for the formal market. We find that the two sector model in this chapter serves 
well in providing the insights into the issue of how predominance of the informal 
sector affects the allocation and growth along the balanced growth path.
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Chapter 2
Banking Development and 
Local Economic Growth in India: 
Evidence from State Level Data
Chapter summary:
In this chapter we examine the effect of banking sector development on regional economic 
growth, agricultural growth and industrial growth in India. In recent years the government of 
India has been making attempts to encourage the expansion of rural banking through policy 
reforms. Using state level data for India for a sample period of 1999-2008, we examine 
whether or not such reforms has affected state level growth in output and growth in the key 
components of state level output. Based on an empirical analysis that involve fixed effects 
panel and GMM estimation, we show that there is clear evidence of growth effects of 
commercial and rural banking development in 26 states and union territories of India. 
Deposits of commercial banks in general have a significant positive impact on growth, while 
mobilization of domestic savings through commercial banks do not significantly affect state 
level growth in agriculture. The positive and significant impact of domestic savings on per 
capita output growth mainly stems from their significant marginal effect on the growth of 
industry. The marginal effect of credits on state level growth is mixed. Credits that are 
channelled through rural banks positively affect agricultural growth. Given the relative 
importance of agriculture in India, this clearly implies that expansion of regional rural banks 
can positively affect economic growth in India.
2.1 Introduction:
It is well known that the relation between financial development and economic 
growth has been long under debate. Although there is plenty of evidence that financial 
as well as banking development plays an important role in promoting economic 
growth of the industrialized countries (see Beck and Levine, 2004 for a detailed 
survey), evidence is rather mixed within developing or emerging countries. Moreover, 
most studies that deal with this issue consider growth in the aggregate economy, 
which is why it is rather simple to explain a causal relationship (or the lack of it) 
between finance and growth. There have been very few studies that deal with the 
impact of domestic financial development on local as well as regional economic 
growth.
In this chapter, we examine the relation between banking development and 
local economic growth in a sample of 26 states and union territories (UTs) of India 
over the period 1999-2008 in three contexts. First, we examine the relationship 
between the growth in gross state domestic product (SDP) and the development of 
commercial and regional rural banking in these states. Second, we examine the 
relationship between the growth in the agricultural component of SDP and the 
development of commercial and regional rural banking for the same sample. Finally, 
we examine the relationship between the growth in the industrial component of SDP 
and the development of banking services to the industries for the same sample.
As discussed earlier, there are very few studies that attempt to analyze the 
impact of banking development on local economic growth of developing countries. 
Among the few studies, Cheng and Degryse (2010) consider the impact of bank and 
non bank financial development on local economic growth of China. Their study is a 
follow up of a stream of studies that deal similar issue on China, such as Hasan, 
Wachtel and Zhou (2006), Allen, Qian and Qian (2005), Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2010), and Ping (2003).
Prior to this study there have been some attempts to examine the link between 
financial development and economic growth in India, but most of these look either at
46
the aggregate economy or at the development of corporate finance schemes. Luintel 
and Demetriades (1996) consider aggregate data on Indian economy and examine the 
role of interest rate controls on aggregate economic growth. Das and Guha (2001) 
study the impact of aggregate financial development on economic growth of both 
India and China. One of their key arguments is that for both these economies financial 
development can be attributable to short term sustained growth in per capita income. 
However for the long term growth pattern their arguments are rather inconclusive.
Bhattacharya and Shivasubramanian (2003) conduct a study on the impact of 
money market development on aggregate economic growth of India where they use 
M3 over GDP as the main proxy for financial development6. Oura (2008) considers 
firm level data for India in an attempt to examine the efficiency of corporate finance 
schemes. This particular study is at the micro level and its key findings are very 
particular to one scheme of the entire financial system of India. Prior to the current 
study, Acharya, Imbs and Sturgess (2011) conducted a study on financial 
development and regional economic growth in India. Their approach was based on 
panel co-integration and fully modified ordinary least squares estimation of ad hoc 
growth specifications. Given the consideration of banking regulations in India their 
approach confirms a long run relationship between commercial banking development 
and regional economic growth. Their methodology, however, is one of reduced form 
which is unable to determine whether the proxies for banking sector development 
have endogenous effects, i.e. whether the lagged difference in these explains the 
subsequent levels in these and vice versa. In addition, they do not use a well defined 
growth regression, which is why their approach is unable to identify the exact growth 
effect of deposits and credits of the commercial banking system. Finally, their study 
only considers regional growth in per capita state domestic product and not the 
regional growth in the different components of the state domestic product. These three 
are the areas where the current study adds value to this particular literature.
In this study, we examine the relation between development in commercial 
bank deposits and credits and state level economic growth using the standard growth 
accounting approach, as in Barro & Salai Martin (1999). Our data is for 26 states and
6 Their approach is very similar to that o f Das and Guha (2001), but the approach in Luintel and 
Demetriades (1996) is relatively more comprehensive in examining the finance-growth nexus in India.
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UTs of India. We use this data in order to estimate three sets of growth specifications 
under two different approaches. Under approach one, we examine the impact of 
commercial and rural banking sector development on the growth in per capita state 
domestic product (SDP), on per capita agricultural SDP and on per capita industrial 
SDP using fixed effects panel estimation technique. We conduct formal diagnostic 
tests to verify the significance of the fixed effects, the growth effect of deposits and 
the growth effect for credits for all three models. Under approach two, we extend the 
full analysis to a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation in order to 
capture the potential endogeneity of the regressors of the growth equations.
The three areas where this study contributes are very important from policy 
point of view. This study is therefore motivated by the literature, the state level 
growth facts, and the series of banking sector reforms undertaken in India. The 
literature is more or less silent about how these reforms are affecting state level 
growth in per capita income, and there is literally no study that shows how these 
affect the components of per capita income in India. In recent years, the structure of 
employment and income generation in the Indian economy has been through some 
important changes. India, which was predominantly an agrarian economy, is now 
experiencing a boost in its service sector. This is why there is a high share of 
industrial output in the state level domestic product. The recent reforms in the banking 
sector say a different story, however. Although the regional rural banks (RRB) were 
started since the establishment of banking sector in India, only in the most recent 
banking sector reforms in India where the government is encouraging the expansion 
of regional rural banks (RRB). This reform is aimed at promoting rural development 
and development in the agricultural and allied sector. We consider this as an 
interesting mix of facts for a fast growing emerging economy like India, which is why 
we find the analysis of local economic growth effects of banking sector development 
in India as an important economic issue. In summary, our main motivation is 
investigating the two questions, which are (a) if the recent banking sector reform in 
India is aimed at promoting and expanding rural banking, what impact it is likely to 
have on the state level growth in per capita domestic product and its components?; (b) 
which dimension of banking sector development (demand side or supply side) has a 
significant marginal impact on state level growth in per capita domestic product and 
its components?
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We find that Scheduled Commercial Bank (SCB) deposits in the states and 
UTs of India in general have a significant positive impact on the growth of per capita 
SDP, but the marginal effect of SCB credits on this growth is rather inconclusive. 
SCB deposits have little or no effect on the growth of per capita agricultural SDP, but 
SCB credits that are channelled through RRBs positively affect the growth in the 
agricultural component of per capita SDP. For the growth in per capita industrial SDP, 
we find that both SCB credits and deposits have individual significant positive effects. 
These findings are robust to the methodology of estimation, i.e. these hold for both the 
fixed effects panel estimation and the GMM estimation. For the GMM estimation 
(where we control for the potential endogeneity problem), we however find that these 
key findings hold but the resulting magnitude of the marginal effect of deposits and 
credits are rather small in size. Based on the standard Sargan tests, the GMM 
estimation of these models show consistency of the choice of instruments. For the 
GMM estimation, we also find that industrial credit by SCBs (priority sector lending) 
has a significant positive net impact on the growth of the per capita industrial SDP.
In summary, we find some strong policy implications. We find that the 
expansion of RRB network and more credit channelled through the RRBs can 
significantly boost growth in agriculture. Agricultural credits that are extended 
through SCBs (not RRBs) do not contribute to the growth of agricultural production, 
which is why it is necessary to expand the network as well as the operations of the 
RRBs. In general, per capita growth in SDP in Indian states can be improved by 
increasing savings (i.e. deposits) in commercial banks. But it is the mobilization of 
savings through the RRB expansion that can contribute to the growth in agricultural 
production and rural well being. For industries, development in deposits and credits 
through commercial banking in general contributes to growth.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We present a brief 
description of the context in section 2.2. In section 2.3 we discuss the empirical 
methodology and model specifications. Description of data and data sources are 
presented in section 2.4. In section 2.5 we discuss the results from fixed effects panel 
estimation, and in section 2.6 we discuss the results from GMM estimation. Section 
2.7 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 The Background
India, a predominantly agrarian and rural economy, is currently the eleventh largest 
economy in the world in terms of nominal GDP and the fourth largest in the world in 
terms of Purchasing Power Parity (IMF reports, 2011). It ranks second worldwide in 
farm output and sixteenth worldwide in terms of nominal factory output. India is 
currently the second fastest growing economy (after China), which registered a 8.9% 
growth during the most recent quarter of 2010. However, it is predicted that the 
ongoing global recession is likely to hit the Indian economy in the latter part of 2011.
According to the most recent report of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce & Industries (FICCI), India’s industrial growth dropped to 4.4% in 
September 2010 from 8.2% in the same month a year before. Contraction in the 
capital goods industry is evident as the production slumped by 4.2% in September 
2010, allegedly due to non-completion of orders. The most recent (2010) share of 
agricultural and allied sector (fishing, logging and forestry) contribution to GDP in 
India was 15.7%, and these sectors employed 52.1% of the total workforce. Despite a 
steady decline in this share in the GDP, the agricultural and allied sector is still the 
largest economic sector (in terms of real production) and an important sector for the 
overall socio-economic development of India.
At present there are 35 regional entities in India which together are known as 
states and UTs. 28 of these regional entities are known as states, while the remainders, 
Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, 
Delhi, Lakshadweep and Puducherry, are known as UTs. There is huge variation in 
SDP per capita and the composition of SDP which makes state level study in India an 
interesting one. In this chapter we will discuss state level variations in output, the 
composition of state level growth in output and other relevant details of state level 
growth (i.e. local economic growth) in India in subsection 2.2.1.
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The commercial banking sector in India has been through many interesting
*7
phases of reforms . The Indian money market comprises of the organized sector that 
includes the private, public and foreign owned commercial banks and cooperative 
banks (together known as Scheduled Banks), and the unorganized sector that includes 
individual or family owned indigenous bankers or money lenders and non-banking 
financial companies. While the organized sector has the major share in the 
countrywide deposits and lending, the unorganized sector and microcredit are still 
allegedly preferred over traditional banks in rural and sub-urban areas, especially for 
non-productive purposes.
According to the reports of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), more than half of 
the personal savings in India are invested in physical assets (e.g. property, gold and 
cattle). The public sector banks hold over 75% of total assets of the banking industry, 
with the private and foreign banks holding 18.2% and 6.5% respectively. Since 
liberalization, the government of India has undertaken many important banking 
reforms which mainly were aimed at encouraging mergers, reducing government 
intervention and thereby increasing profitability and competitiveness, opening up the 
banking and insurance sectors to private and foreign investors, and most importantly 
for this study, promoting rural banking.
In this study what stands as the key motivation to consider the two types of 
banks is that during the most recent banking sector reforms in India, the major 
emphasis was on promoting and expanding regional rural banks. In addition to this, 
because of the recent reforms that are expected to increase profitability and 
competitiveness amongst all SCBs the issue of local economic growth effects of SCB 
and RRB development becomes an interesting one. This chapter aims to examine the 
details of this effect, i.e. the effect of bank deposits on local economic growth and the 
effect of bank credits on local economic growth. Moreover, following chapter 1 of 
this thesis, the net growth effect of development in commercial banks and rural banks 
are likely to be different across sectors. We therefore examine sectoral growth effects 
of development in SCBs and RRBs within the same sample.
7 Our main sources for the discussion on commercial banking and the related reforms in India 
(including those in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 to follow) are the various reports of the Reserve Bank of India, 
available from the publications link of its website http://www.rbi.org.in.
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2.2.1 State domestic product (SDP), its components and growth
For this study, mainly for data reasons (availability, continuity and completeness) we 
have chosen 25 states and 1 UT for the period 1999-2008. Because one of the main 
motivations of this study is to examine the impact of rural banking development on 
the growth in the agricultural component of SDP, relatively more urban union 
territories such as Chandigarh and Delhi are not included in the total sample. The 
states Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh are excluded because of partial 
unavailability and discontinuity of data.
Table 2.2.1a presents the most recent estimated average growth rates of the 
gross SDP at constant (2000) prices for the 26 entities in this study. On an average 
over the period 1995-2009, the states in the south region have the highest growth, 
although for the current period there is low growth in SDP in Tamil Nadu. There is 
also a large drop in the SDP growth rates of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. There is 
significant progress in SDP growth in Uttar Pradesh (one of the largest states of 
India). Improvement in SDP growth is also observed in Meghalaya, Bihar and Goa. 
States in the northern region show consistent growth performance. The economies of 
most of these states (e.g. Haryana, Punjab) are primarily based on either industry or 
agriculture.
The summary statistics for growth in SDP, growth in the agricultural 
component of SDP (ASDP), growth in the industrial component of SDP (ISDP), 
growth in capital stock, growth in per capita SDP and growth in per capita capital 
stock for the 26 states and UTs for the full sample period (1999-2008) are presented in 
table 2.2.1b. These growth rates are computed using the SDP, ASDP, ISDP, Gross 
capital data (all in 2000 prices). The ASDP includes the gross state domestic product 
from all agricultural and allied activities, while the ISDP includes the gross state
• odomestic product from all manufacturing and service activities . The data are
8 In India on an average approximately 9% of the total manufacturing contribution to GDP come from 
unregistered manufacturing activities. We use the data on total manufacturing which include both 
registered and unregistered manufacturing.
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collected from the National Data Warehouse of the Ministry of Statistics and 
Programme Implementation (MOSPI) of the Government of India.
Table 2.2.1a: Real growth rates (in %) of the 26 states and union territories’ 
gross state domestic product (2000 prices). __________ __________ _________
State/UT (Region) 2009
Average
2003-2009
Average
1995-2009
1 Andhra Pradesh (Southern) 5.04 8.20 6.87
2 Assam (North Eastern) 6.17 5.51 3.75
3 Bihar (Eastern) 16.59 9.80 7.21
4 Jharkhand (Eastern) 5.52 7.54 5.45
5 Goa (Western) 10.12 9.60 8.12
6 Gujarat (Western) 10.08 11.19 8.48
7 Haryana (Northern) 7.92 9.28 7.78
8 Himachal Pradesh (Northern) 7.44 7.77 7.26
9 Jammu & Kashmir (Northern) 6.10 5.71 4.99
10 Karnataka (Southern) 5.08 8.10 7.13
11 Kerala (Southern) 6.98 8.73 6.92
12 Madhya Pradesh (Central) 4.92 4.51 4.63
13 Chattisgarh (Central) 6.81 9.28 6.02
14 Maharashtra (Western) 8.59 8.70 6.57
15 Manipur (North Eastern) 7.13 6.05 5.09
16 Meghalaya (North Eastern) 8.17 6.97 6.85
17 Nagaland (North Eastern) 4.98 5.92 6.45
18 Orissa (Eastern) 6.65 9.34 6.44
19 Punjab (Northern) 6.40 5.56 4.90
20 Rajasthan (Northern) 6.57 7.60 7.47
21 Tamil Nadu (Southern) 4.45 7.33 6.38
22 Tripura (North Eastern) 4.02 6.05 7.30
23 Uttar Pradesh (Central) 6.46 5.78 4.88
24 Uttarkhand (Central) 8.67 9.15 6.73
25 West Bengal (Eastern) 6.34 6.66 6.70
26 Andaman & Nicobar Island (Eastern)£ 6.32 8.35 5.62
Notes: Author’s own calculations from data collected from Handbook of Indian Statistics, various 
issues. £ Union Territory.
As can be seen in table 2.2.1b, the key source of SDP growth for our sample 
period has been the growth in ISDP. The ASDP has a moderate average growth of
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3.4% during the sample period, but its standard deviation is large relative to those of 
SDP growth and ISDP growth. The 6.4% average growth in SDP of these 26 states 
and UTs is accompanied by a 5.8% average growth in capital stock, but the variation 
in the growth of capital stock across the 26 states and UTs is relatively larger than the 
variation in the growth of SDP.
Table 2.2.1b: Summary statistics of real growth rates of the 26 states and union
Growth in 
SDP
Growth in 
ASDP
Growth in 
ISDP
Growth in 
Capital 
Stock
Growth in 
per capita 
SDP
Growth in 
per capita 
capital
Mean 0.064 0.034 0.068 0.058 0.053 0.045
S.D. 0.049 0.126 0.044 0.228 0.452 0.053
Max 0.286 0.813 0.226 0.612 0.661 0.292
Min -0.098 -0.335 -0.138 -0.419 -0.856 -0.135
Figure 2a presents the cross sectional mean of SDP, mean of the agricultural 
component of SDP, mean of the manufacturing component of SDP and mean of the 
service component of SDP, all in 2000 prices, for the full sample period 1999-2008 
(the figures are in INR. Crore, where 1 crore =10 millions)9.
The trend in agricultural component of SDP and the manufacturing component 
of SDP is relatively flatter over the period 1999-2008, while that of SDP shows 
sustained increase. This is also evident in table 2.2.1a. Compared to the average 
growth rate of SDP for 1995-2009, the average growth rate of SDP for 2003-2009 is 
higher for all states in the sample except Nagaland and Madhya Pradesh. Figure 2b 
presents the mean of the growth rate in real per capita SDP, the growth rate in real per 
capita ASDP, and the mean of the growth rate in real per capita ISDP for the 26 states 
and UTs of India for the sample period 1999-2008, where the values are in numbers. 
For the full sample period, there is considerable variation in the mean growth rate of 
per capita ASDP, while the mean growth rate of per capita ISDP almost mimics the 
mean growth rate of per capita SDP. The probable reason behind this correlation (of 
SDP growth and ISDP growth) is that a large proportion of ISDP growth is the growth 
in the service component of SDP. Following the liberalization of markets in the
9 INR is Indian Rupees.
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nineties, the service sector in India has grown rapidly both in terms of output and 
employment.
Figure 2a: Mean of SDP and its key components for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999- 
2008 at 2000 prices (INR. Crore on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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Figure 2b: Mean growth rates of per capita SDP, per capita ISDP and per capita ASDP 
for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 (growth rates on the vertical axis, time on the 
horizontal axis).
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Figure 2c presents the mean of the real per capita SDP and the mean of the 
real per capita capital stock for the 26 states and UTs of India for the sample period 
1999-2008, where the values are in INR (2000 prices). There is clear evidence that 
growth in per capita SDP has an increasing trend while growth in per capita capital 
stock remained more or less flat.
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Figure 2c: M ean of per capita SDP and per capita capital stock for 26 states and UTs of 
India, 1999-2008 at 2000 prices (INR on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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We present the histograms of the share of ASDP in SDP and the share of ISDP 
in SDP for the full sample in figure 2d. For majority of the states and UTs in our 
sample, the share of agriculture and allied in SDP is above 20%. Distribution of the 
ISDP starts at its minimum 48% and its density is high in the range 50%-63%.
Figure 2d: Histograms of agricultural share and industrial share in SDP for 26 states 
and UTs, 1999-2008 (shares on the horizontal axis).
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For the full sample period the average share of agriculture and allied in SDP of 
all 26 states and UTs is 23% (maximum 38% and minimum 6%), while that of 
industry is 61% (maximum 82% and minimum 48%). The average share of 
manufacturing in SDP is only 12.5% (maximum 31%, minimum 1.6%), implying that 
the major source of growth in the ISDP is the growth in the service sector. On an 
average, only 19% of the ISDP comes from manufacturing in the 26 states and UTs in 
our sample. The service sector in these 26 states and UTs for the full sample period 
has experienced an average growth of 6.9% (maximum 17%, minimum -10%). The 
standard deviation of this growth is also relatively very low implying that for most 
states and UTs in our sample the main source of SDP growth was the growth in the 
service sector.
Figure 2e: Cross section average share of agriculture, m anufacturing, services and 
industry, 1999-2008 (shares on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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The relatively higher share of industry as well as services has shifted both the 
workers and capital towards industry at the cost of a declining share of agriculture in 
SDP. This is presented in figure 2e. For all 26 states and UTs in our sample, there is 
clear evidence of a fall in the share of agriculture and a rise in the share of industry.
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2.2.2 Commercial Banking in India
The banking system in India was primarily (in 1947) fairly well developed with over 
600 commercial banks operating in the country. Soon after that there was a 
widespread perception that the banks were biased against extending credit to small- 
scale enterprises, agriculture and commoners. This perception led to the creation of 
the State Bank of India (SBI) in 1955, which was primarily aimed at ensuring better 
coverage of the banking needs of the larger parts of the economy and the rural 
constituencies. Despite the progress in the 1950s and the 1960s, it was perceived that 
the creation of the SBI was not far reaching enough. As a consequence, in 1967 the 
policy of social control over banks was announced aiming to change the management 
and distribution of credit by commercial banks (see Fernandez and Rodrik, 1992 for 
details).
In 1969 the 14 largest public banks were nationalized. The two main 
objectives of the nationalizations were rapid branch expansion and the channelling of 
credit in line with the priorities of the periodic five year plans. In order to achieve 
these goals, the newly nationalized banks received quantitative targets for the 
expansion of their branch network and for the percentage of credit they had to extend 
to the priority sectors. Six more banks were nationalized in 1980. This second wave of 
nationalization occurred because the control over the banking system became 
increasingly important as a means to ensure priority sector lending, reach the poor 
through a widening branch network, and raising funds to manage the public deficits. 
This wave of nationalization also came with an increase in the priority sector lending 
proportion (from 33% in 1969 to 40% in 1980), an increase in the statutory liquidity 
ratio (from 25% in 1960 to 38.5% in 1991), and an increase in the cash reserve ratio 
(from 2% in 1960 to 15% in 1991).
Such policies which were primarily expected to promote a more equal 
distribution of funds eventually led to inefficiencies in the Indian banking system, 
however. As a consequence, the 1991 report of the Narasimham Committee served as 
the basis for the subsequent banking sector reforms in India. The objective of this set 
of reforms was in line with the economic reforms of the 1990s that include opening
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the economy, giving a greater role to the markets in setting prices and allocating 
resources, and increasing the role of the private sector. In the following years, the 
banking sector reforms covered the areas of (1) liberalization including interest rate 
deregulation; (2) stabilization of banks; (3) partial privatization of state-owned banks; 
(4) changes in the institutional framework; and (5) entry deregulation for both 
domestic and foreign banks.
At present the commercial banking system in India is one where different 
categories of commercial banks are grouped under the Scheduled Commercial Banks. 
This group comprises of the SBI and its associates, nationalized banks, foreign banks, 
regional rural banks and other scheduled commercial banks.
Figure 2f: Mean values of real SCB credits and real SCB deposits for 26 states and UTs 
of India 1999-2008 (INR. Crore 2000 prices on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal 
axis).
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In figure 2f we present the mean of the total value of credits and total value of 
deposits of all SCBs (we later denote these by SCBCRD and SCBDP respectively) for 
the 26 states and UTs of India for 1999-2008, where the mean values are computed at 
the cross sections for each year’s total value of SCB credits in real terms and total 
value of SCB deposits in real terms (both in INR crore, 2000 prices). In figure 2g we 
present the mean of the ratio of SCB credits to SDP, the mean of the ratio of
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agricultural credit (by SCB) to SDP, and the mean of the ratio of industrial credit (by 
SCB) to SDP for the same sample, all evaluated in real terms (2000 prices)10.
Figure 2g: M ean values of the share of total SCB credits, agricultural credits and 
industrial credits in SDP for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008, evaluated at 2000 
prices (shares on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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In real terms, both the deposits and credits of SCBs show an increasing trend 
for the full sample period. Relative to industrial credit, agricultural credits has a larger 
share in SDP, and during the most recent phase of banking sector reforms this share 
has increased (on an average for the 26 states and UTs) from 0.08% (in 2000) to 0.2% 
(in 2008). The average share of industrial credit in SDP has remained more or less 
constant during this period, but the boost in agricultural credit has contributed to 
larger shares of total credits in SDP.
2.2.3 Regional ru ra l banks (RRBs) in India
Rural banking in India started since the establishment of banking sector in India. 
Rural Banks in those days were mainly focussed on the agro sector. Regional rural 
banks in India penetrated every comer of the country and extended a helping hand in
10 These data are from the Reserve Bank o f India, and we will discuss the details o f this source in 
section 2.4.
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the growth process of the country. In 1977 the government of India passed a 
regulation which required both public and private banks to open at least four branches 
in unbanked locations for every branch they opened in banked locations. The SBI has 
30 Regional Rural Banks in India known as RRBs. The rural banks of SBI is spread in 
13 states extending from Kashmir to Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh to North East. 
Currently the total number of SBI’s Regional Rural Bank branches in India is 2349 
(16%). Till date in rural banking in India, there are 14,475 rural banks of which 2126 
(91%) are located in remote rural areas. Apart from SBI, there are many other banks 
which function for the development of the rural areas in India. Most of these rural 
banks are under the broad subcategory of RRBs of the Scheduled Commercial Banks. 
In this study, except for the union territory Andaman & Nicobar Islands and the state 
Goa, the 24 other states have RRBs operating in rural areas.
In figure 2h, we present the mean of the real value of credits extended by the 
RRBs and the mean of the real value of deposits in RRBs for these 24 states over the 
sample period, where both the credit and the deposits are in INR crore in 2000 prices. 
The trends are similar as in figure 2f where we present the trends in SCB deposits and 
SCB credits. For the full sample period, the average shares of RRB deposits and 
credits in total SCB deposits and credits were equal to 7.9% (standard deviation equal 
to 19.44) and 14.25% (standard deviation equal to 65.5), respectively.
Figure 2h: Mean values of RRB credits and RRB deposits for 24 states and UTs of India, 
1999-2008,2000 prices (INR Crore on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
28
2 4 -
20 -
16 -
1 2 -
8 -
2006 200820042000 2002
M ean of RRB credits 
M ean of RRB deposits
61
In figure (2i), we present the mean of the real value of SCB credits to 
agriculture and the mean of the real value of SCB credits to industry for the full 
sample. The amounts are in INR. crore evaluated at 2000 prices. Starting from 2002- 
2003, there is a clear trend of extending more credit to agriculture. This is largely due 
to the most recent reforms in commercial banking in India. The SCB credits to 
agriculture includes the outstanding amounts of advances given to finance for the 
distribution of fertilizers and other inputs, loans to state electricity boards, other types 
of indirect finance and direct finances to farmers. The SCB credits to industry include 
advances to small scale industries, loans for setting up industrial states and advances 
to roads and water transport operators.
Figure 2i: Mean values of SCB credits to agriculture and SCB credits to industry for 26 
states and UTs of India, 1999-2008, 2000 prices (INR Crore on the vertical axis, time on 
the horizontal axis).
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In a study which examines the impact of rural banking on poverty in India, 
Burgess and Pande (2003) show that a 1% increase in the number of rural bank 
locations (per capita) resulted in a 0.42% decline in poverty and a 0.34% increase in 
total output. Growth in rural banking therefore has positive impact not only on the 
well being of the rural population but also for the growth in total output. In fact, 
according to the RBI reports many economists and policy-makers in India 
increasingly believe that future growth of the domestic economy will largely depend
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on the robust performance of the agriculture and rural sector, and that the 
manufacturing and service sectors cannot sustain the economy's growth if the rural 
sector underperforms.
In 2004, the SBI announced that it would shift its focus to rural banking in 
order to improve its retail portfolio. In recent times in India, the development of the 
telecom infrastructure in the rural areas has simplified the operations of the rural 
business sector. Marketing intermediaries and loan recovery agents have brought 
down the cost of operations. Recent studies indicate that the actual level of non­
performing assets (NPAs) in the rural sector is less than elsewhere, and this coupled 
with the low cost of operations, less expensive labour, infrastructure, cost of living, 
and so on make rural India an attractive market for business. Many of these features 
are formally modelled in chapter 3 of this thesis.
Figure 2j: Share of agricultural and allied component of GDP in GDP and in Gross 
Capital Formation for India, 1999-2008, evaluated at 2000 prices (shares on the vertical 
axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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Despite decades of effort and experimentation in banking, the organised 
financial sector is still not able to meet the credit gap in the rural sector. Lack of 
infrastructure in the rural areas and the focus in the urban sector apparently delayed 
the realization of the potential of rural development in eradicating poverty and
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increasing total output. In the eighties and the nineties, directed and subsidised 
lending, cumbersome procedures, delay in sanctioning loans and lack of statutory 
backing for recoveries were major impediments to the growth of banking in the rural 
sector.
It is understandable that for a predominantly ruralised economy like India, 
domestic economic growth largely depends on the rural sector. However, due to the 
near drought conditions in recent years the GDP in agriculture in India is estimated to 
show a meagre growth rate of 0.2% during 2009-10. In figure 2j, we present the trend 
in the share of agriculture and allied activities in real GDP of India, and the share of 
the same in real Gross Capital Formation (GCF) of India for 1999-2008. These shares 
are for aggregate Indian economy, where the GDP, agricultural and allied activity in 
GDP and the gross capital formation data are in real terms (2000 prices).
2.3 Specification of the Empirical Models
The standard econometric specification of growth models in cross-country studies 
regress real per capita GDP growth on a number of growth determinants (see for 
instance, Luintel, Khan and Theodoridis, 2008). Given the discussion in this chapter 
so far, my main aim is to examine the impact of banking sector development on 
economic growth of the states in India. For this I start with a specification of fixed 
effects panel model controlling for state and time fixed effects, following King and 
Levine (1993):
r,, = «0 J'm-i + a \Y tit + + 6, + £  + s , t (l)
where, y; , is the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product
(sdp), y i t_j is lagged value of the per capita gross state domestic product, ykiJ is the
growth rate of real per capita capital stock, bd is the banking development indicator 
of either scheduled commercial banks or regional rural banks, 0t is a set of state
dummy variables, is a set of time dummy variables, and s  are stochastic
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disturbance terms which are independently and identically distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance equal to cre , all for state i in period t , 
i = \,2,....,N \t = \,2 ..............r “ .
Equation (1) is the benchmark empirical model. From the theoretical 
perspective, this can be considered as the estimable equation derived from a 
generalized Cobb-Douglas production function (with standard regularity properties) 
where banking development is a determinant of output growth. In equation (1), a0 is
showing the convergence. There are two broad concepts of convergence that appear in 
discussions of economic growth across countries or regions. In one view such as that 
of Barro (1984), Baumol (1986), Delong (1988), Barro (1991a), Barro and Sala-i- 
Martin (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1999), convergence applies if a poor economy tends to 
grow faster than a rich one, so that the poor economy catch up with the rich one in 
terms of the level of per capita income or product. The second concept, such as that in 
Easterlin (1960), Borts and Stein (1964), Streissler (1979), Barro (1984), Baumol 
(1986), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992a, 1992b) 
deals with the cross-sectional dispersion. According to this view convergence occurs 
if the measured dispersion (for instance defined by the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of per capita income or product across a group of countries or regions) 
declines over time. Convergence of the first kind tends to generate convergence of the 
second kind. In (1) a0 corresponds to the first concept of convergence.
In addition to (1), we estimate other growth equations that are similar to (1) 
using different measures of growth in state level per capita income in order to 
examine the impact of banking development on agricultural growth and industrial 
growth in income. For this, we estimate:
r asiJ = *0>W i + V*,v + + 0*g) + + e asU (2)
11 Throughout the chapter we will denote per capita variables o f the state domestic product by lower 
case letters, and aggregate variables with upper case letters. For instance, sdp, as dp and is dp denote the 
per capita SDP, per capita SDP from agriculture and per capita SDP from industry, respectively, while 
SDP, ASDP and ISDP denote their aggregates.
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where y agt,, *s the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product 
from agriculture (asdp), y  is the per capita gross state domestic product from 
agriculture in level, 6agi is a set of state dummy variables, £ a0 1S a set of time dummy 
variables, and s  are independently and identically distributed error terms with zero 
mean and constant variance equal to , all for state i in period t ,
i = 1,2,....,N ;t = 1,2..............................T .  For growth in the industrial sector, we
estimate
Ymu = + c, r kiJ + c2bd,,_, + e mi + t;m + s miJ (3)
where y mi, is the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product 
from industry (isdp), y m is the per capita gross state domestic product from industry 
in level, 6mi is a set of state dummy variables, £ mt is a set of time dummy variables, 
and s m are independently and identically distributed error terms with zero mean and 
constant variance equal to o ^ , all for state i in period t, 
i = 1,2,...., N ;t = 1,2,......................... T .
For all three models, we conduct a likelihood ratio test for the redundancy of 
the cross section fixed effects, the period fixed effects and jointly the cross section 
and the period fixed effects. The null hypothesis in this case is that these fixed effects 
are redundant. If the null hypothesis is true, the test statistic follows approximately a 
chi square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to (iV -l) for cross section 
fixed effects {N  is equal to the total number of cross sections in the estimation 
sample), (T - 1) for period fixed effects (T  is equal to the total number of years in the 
estimation sample), and (N - \)+ (T  - l )  for cross section and period fixed effects 
jointly. Failure to reject the null hypothesis would imply that the fixed effects (cross 
section, period, or cross section and period jointly, where applicable) are redundant, 
and that the estimation can be done using simple OLS.
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A major issue in this approach to estimating growth equations such as (1), (2) 
and (3) is the potential endogeneity. In this chapter we directly control for 
endogeneity between state level finance and growth by using the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (proposed by Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
Given (1), a brief illustration of GMM is as follows:
Yu -  A>>Vi + P\Yki,t + Pibdijt-1 + + i t  + £ijt (4-l)
y,j -  y ,,,~i = A. O vi -  y,j-2) + ft  ( K  -  K - 1) + f t  -  H ,,-2)+ O,., -  ) (4-2)
A system GMM jointly estimates the regression in levels as in (4.1) and the 
regression in differences as in (4.2). In order to correct for endogeneity, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) suggest employing the lagged first differences of the explanatory 
variables as instruments for the equation in levels (4.1) and the lagged values of the 
explanatory variables in levels as instruments for the equation in differences (4.2). 
Under certain conditions the lagged dependent variables can be used as instruments. 
We follow the same approach for controlling for the endogeneity for equation (2) and 
equation (3).
In order to test the validity of this approach, we employ the Sargan test (of 
over identifying restrictions). In the Sargan test, we employ the J  statistic and the 
instrument rank in order to derive the degrees of freedom of the Sargan test statistic, 
where the degrees of freedom is equal to the instrument rank minus the number of 
parameters in the model. Under the null hypothesis, the Sargan test statistic follows 
approximately chi square distribution. Failure to reject the null would imply that the 
over-identifying restrictions are true, i.e. the instruments are valid. In our study, we 
employ lagged values of the banking development indicators as instruments. Thus 
failure to reject the null hypothesis by the Sargan test would imply that they are valid 
instruments for the GMM estimation.
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2.4 Variables and Data
Data are mainly collected from online sources. These sources include the Database of 
the RBI (http://www.rbi.org.in), The National Data Warehouse o f  Official Statistics 
(tables, metadata and reports) of the MOSPI (http://mospi.nic.in), The Data Tables of 
the Planning Commission, Government of India (PC, 
http://planningcommission.nic.in), Studies and Surveys of the FICCI 
(http://www.ficci.com), and the Handbook o f  Statistics on Indian Economy 
(handbook) which we collected from the publications site of the RBI.
2.4.1 Data on gross State Domestic Product
The state wise data for gross SDP and its components are collected from the National 
Data Warehouse of the MOSPI tables. For two states we could not find the full 
sample which is why we use the handbook to complete the SDP and its components 
series. The MOSPI tables report per capita nominal SDP but do not report per capita 
real SDP. We collect the per capita net SDP data (at 2000 prices) from the handbook 
(table 9).
State wise data on number of workers and various measures of capital stock 
are available from the tables of the national data warehouse of MOSPI. These are 
available under the table heading Estimate o f  some important characteristics by state, 
but only available for 1999-2006. For the remaining two years of our sample, we first 
collect state level investment data from the handbook. We then convert the investment 
data in real terms using the wholesale price index for manufactured products 
(collected from the handbook). We use the working capital stock for 2006 and apply 
the inventory approach to simulate capital stock data for 200712. Similarly using the 
2008 investment value and the 2007 simulated value of capital stock, we simulate 
capital stock for 2008. We use the full series of capital stock data and the state wise 
population data in order to generate a series for the capital stock per capita for each
12 We collect information on state level depreciation from the Estimate o f  some important 
characteristics by state o f the data warehouse o f  MOSPI, and pin down an average value of 
depreciation rate o f capital stock by state.
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1 ^state and UTs of our sample for the entire sample period . Using the same data on the 
population we create the series for asdp and isdp for (2) and (3).
2.4.2 Data on commercial banking
All banking-related data are collected from the RBI database. The RBI reports these 
data as nominal values in INR. We use the wholesale price index for all commodities, 
for agricultural commodities and for the industrial commodities to convert the SCB 
banking data, the RRB banking data and the SCB credits to industry data into real 
values (2000 prices).
We use the SDP data and the banking data to create eight proxies that account 
for the level of financial development in the states of India. In real terms, these are 
different measures of the proportion of bank deposits and credits to the measures of
SDP. For deposits, we create the indicators BDl = ^ B D P  _ RRBDP
SDP ASDP
R R B D P
BD l = ----------- , where SCBDP and RRBDP denote the real value of the total
ISDP
deposits of the SCBs and the RRBs, respectively. For credits, we create the indicators
BDl = SCBCRD ^  B D 4  =  - RIK- K D , where SCBCRD and RRBCRD denote the 
S D P  A S D P
real value of the total credits by the SCBs and the RRBs, respectively. We also create
DMC AGRCRD Druc INDCRD A nT 0^ RRBCRD t  ^BD5 = ------------- , BD6 = ------------  and BDS = ------------- , where AGRCRD and
SDP SDP ISDP
INDCRD denote the real values of the agricultural credit by the SCBs and the
industrial credit by the SCBs, respectively14.
13 We derive the state wise population series by dividing the nominal SDP by the per capita nominal 
SDP for each state.
14 For the banking development indicators we use upper case letters for their actual value, while in the 
regressions (and in section 2.3 where we define the empirical specifications) we use lower case letters 
to denote their logarithmic values.
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2.4.3 Descriptive statistics of state level data
We present some summary statistics of the state level data in tables 2.4.3a and 2.4.3b. 
First in table 2.4.3a, we present the summary statistics and correlation matrix for SDP 
and its components. There is considerable amount of variation in the values of SDP 
and its components across the full sample. This justifies the use of cross section fixed 
effects in the panel estimation. There is a negative correlation between the ASDP and 
per capita SDP, but a reasonably high positive correlation between ASDP and SDP. 
There is very low positive correlation between per capita SDP and per capita capital 
stock. Service and manufacturing components of SDP have the highest positive 
correlation with SDP, which again justifies the predominance of these two sectors in 
the Indian economy.
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the different banking 
related variables are presented in table 2.4.3b. We find a correlation coefficient of 
0.97 between the SCB deposits and SCB credits, and a correlation coefficient of 0.89 
between the RRB deposits and RRB credits.
Table 2.4.3a: Descriptive statistics of SDP and related data for the 26 states and 
union territories, 1999-2008 (2000 prices)._____________________________________
Real SDP 
(INR, cr)
Real sdp 
(INR)
Real Per 
capita capital 
(pck, INR)
Real Agr- 
Allied (AGR, 
INR, cr)
Real Services 
(SER, INR, 
cr)
Real Manuf. 
(MAN, INR, 
cr)
Mean 81673.19 20058.88 6316.52 18230.50 41291.13 12404.26
SD 82141.79 8935.79 4254.50 17266.66 45451.67 15422.45
Max 416247.6 60232.00 17674.01 73166.39 252155.8 79393.66
Min 936.85 5785.60 373.93 206.25 520.67 22.75
Obs. 260 260 260 260 260 260
correlation Matrix
SDP Sdp pck AGR SER MAN
SDP 1 0.09 0 . 1 0 0 . 8 8 0.98 0.91
Sdp 0.09 1 0 . 1 2 -0.07 0 . 1 2 0 . 2 0
Pck 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2 1 0.03 0.06 0.24
AGR 0 . 8 8 -0.07 0.03 1 0.82 0.69
SER 0.98 0 .1 2 0.06 0.82 1 0.90
MAN 0.91 0 . 2 0 0.24 0.69 0.90 1
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Table 2.4.3b: Descriptive statistics of banking data for the 26 states and union 
territories, 1999-2008 (2000 prices).
SCBCRD SCBDP RRBCRD RRBDP SCBAGR SCBIND
(real, INR, (real, INR, (real, INR, (real, INR, (real, INR, (real, INR,
crore) crore) crore) crore) crore) crore)
Mean 287.77 436.57 8.99 17.80 35.33 24.92
SD 631.18 676.42 11.89 23.25 48.37 35.42
Max 5869.14 6198.59 69.45 144.39 276.78 232.94
Min 0 . 2 2 0 2.461 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.051
Obs. 260 260 260 260 260 260
correlation Matrix
SCBCRD SCBDP RRBCRD RRBDP SCBAGR SCBIND
SCBCRD 1 0.97 0.24 0.15 0.78 0.84
SCBDP 0.97 1 0.38 0.32 0.83 0.85
RRBCRD 0.24 0.38 1 0.89 0.65 0.28
RRBDP 0.15 0.32 0.89 1 0.48 0 .2 2
SCBAGR 0.78 0.83 0.65 0.48 1 0.78
SCBIND 0.84 0.85 0.28 0 . 2 2 0.78 1
2.4.4 List of variables and key empirical hypotheses
As we have discussed earlier, we conduct the analysis on three sets of model. For 
model (1) and (4), we use growth rate in real per capita SDP as the dependent 
variable. Then for model (2) and its GMM equivalent (model 5, say), and model (3) 
and its GMM equivalent (model 6, say), we use growth rate in real per capita 
agricultural SDP and growth rate in real per capita industrial SDP as dependent 
variables, respectively.
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Table 2.4.4a: List of variables, used in the empirical modelling.
Variable Variable type Mnemonics
Growth rate in real per capita SDP/real per
capita agricultural SDP/real per capita Dependent variables yiYag iy m
industrial SDP
Real per capita SDP/real per capita
agricultural SDP/real per capita industrial Lagged regressors y . V y ^ i y m - x
SDP*
Growth rate in real per capita capital stock Regressor Yk
Banking development indicator 1 
(SCB deposit/SDP)*
Lagged regressor bd\t_x
Banking development indicator 2 
(SCB credit/SDP)*
Lagged regressor bd2t_x
Banking development indicator 3 
(RRB deposit/ASDP)*
Lagged regressor bd3t_x
Banking development indicator 4 
(RRB credit/ASDP)*
Lagged regressor bdAt_x
Banking development indicator 5 
(AGR credit/SDP*
Lagged regressor bd 5,_,
Banking development indicator 6 
(IND credit/SDP)*
Lagged regressor bd6t_x
Banking development indicator 7 
(RRB deposit/ISDP) *
Lagged regressor b d l t_x
Banking development indicator 8 
(RRB credit/ISDP)*
Lagged regressor bdS,_x
* logarithm in regression
For all three sets of models, we use the growth in per capita capital stock as 
one of the regressors. We also use the (logarithm of) lagged value of per capita SDP, 
per capita ASDP and per capita ISDP as regressors for models (1&4), (2&5) and 
(3&6), respectively. In addition to these, we use the (logarithm o f ) lagged values of 
financial development proxy and their combinations as regressors. In table 2.4.4a, we 
summarize the list of variables used in the regressions, their role and the 
corresponding symbol that we use in reporting the results in section 2.5 and 2.6.
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In section 2.3 we have explained the technical hypotheses that we are 
interested in. For the models where we employ fixed effects panel estimation, we test 
the statistical significance of the cross section fixed effects, the period fixed effects 
and the cross section and period fixed effects jointly. For the models where we 
employ the GMM estimation, we are interested in the Sargan test which tests the 
statistical significance of the instruments used in the estimation. In addition to these, 
we are also interested in a few important empirical hypotheses.
For all models, our key empirical interest is in the marginal effect of banking 
development in state level growth of per capita SDP and its components. For this we 
test the statistical significance of the marginal effect of (lagged) SCB deposits and 
credits on the growth of per capita SDP and its components for all specifications (in 
both the fixed effects estimation and the GMM estimation).
For each set of growth regressions, we use many combinations of (lagged 
values of) deposits and credits. For the specifications with only one financial 
development indicator, it is straightforward to test whether the marginal effect of 
lagged SCB deposits or credits on per capita SDP, per capita ASDP or per capita 
ISDP is statistically significant. To see this, consider for instance model ( l ) ’s initial 
specification, 1(a), where we use bdll_l as an explanatory variable. Because
SCBDP \bd\ -  In
SDP
, given (1) the marginal effect of lagged SCB deposit on per capita
d / i ,
SDP growth is simply --------1-----= a2. We perform a simple Wald test in order to
dSCBDPt_ j
verify if this coefficient estimate is statistically significantly different from zero.
For the specifications where we use banking development indicators involving 
RRB deposits and credits, the marginal effects of SCB deposits and credits are simple 
to compute. Since all RRBs are part of SCBs, the RRB deposits and credits are fixed 
proportions of SCB deposits and credits, respectively. The marginal effect of SCB 
deposit or credit for such specifications is simply the estimated coefficient of the 
banking development indicator involving RRB deposit or credit. To see this, consider 
specification 1(c) where we use bd3t_} as an explanatory variable. Because
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bd 3 = In(  RRBDP 
ASDP
and RRBDP = </>(SCBDP) where </> e (0,l), the marginal effect
of lagged SCB deposit on per capita SDP growth is simply
dSCBDPt_x
= a~
For specifications where we use both SCB deposits (or credits) and RRB 
deposits (or credits), the net marginal effect of SCB deposits or credits on per capita 
SDP (and its components’) growth has two components, one from the SCB deposits 
(or credits) and the other from the fixed proportion of SCB deposits (or credits) 
through the RRBs. To see this, consider for instance model ( l ) ’s specification 1(e) 
where we use both bd\,_x and bd3t_x, and assume that the associated coefficients for
these two are b2 and b3, respectively. Given (1), the net marginal effect of lagged
SCB deposits for this specification is therefore b2 +b3. We verify if this effect is
significantly different from zero using the Wald test. In principle, this net marginal 
effect should be equal to the marginal effect of lagged SCB deposits or credits 
available from a specification where we use the financial development indicator that 
involve bd\,_x or bd2 t_x.
2.5 Results from fixed effects panel estimation
For model (1), we use six specification that involve financial development indicators 
bd\t_x,bd2t_x,bd3t_x and M4,_, and their combinations. In table 2.5.1 A we
summarize the results from fixed effects panel estimation of these six specifications. 
We report the estimated coefficient and its associated p-value (based on White cross 
section standard errors).
All specifications are estimated using both cross section and period fixed 
effects. In table 2.5.1 A we report the important statistics related to model selection 
(adjusted R 2 and Akaike Information Criterion), the F-statistic (and its associated p- 
value) for the overall significance of the estimated parameters, and the log of the 
likelihood function associated with every specifications. In the same table we also
74
report the Chi-square test statistics (and their associated p-values) related to the joint 
significance of the cross section fixed effects, the period fixed effects and the cross 
section and period fixed effects together.
Table 2.5.1A: Summary of Fixed effects Panel estimation of model 1, dependent 
variable is real per capita SDP growth.
1(a) 1(b) 1(c) 1(d) 1(e) m
y,~ i
-0.3279
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.3299
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.3186
[0 .0 0 1 ]
-0.2808
[0 .0 0 1 ]
-0.3238
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2913
[0 .0 0 1 ]
Yk,
0.0007
[0.883]
0.0007
[0.896]
0.0009
[0.855]
-0.0006
[0.901]
0.0019
[0.687]
0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.982]
bdl,_{ 0.0274[0.080]
0.0269
[0.068]
bdl, 0.0088[0.271]
0.0072
[0.350]
0.0648
[0 .0 0 1 ]
0.0633
[0 .0 0 1 ]
bd4,_, 0.0482[0.087]
0.0429
[0.131]
Observations
R 2
AIC
ln-likelihood
234
0.309
-3.254
417.73
234
0.294
-3.233
415.28
216
0.312
-3.242
385.21
216
0.293
-3.215
382.26
216
0.332
-3.269
389.06
216
0.295
-3.214
383.18
Cross section 
Chi-square
72.58
[0 .0 0 0 ]
68.58
[0 .0 0 0 ]
69.37
[0 .0 0 0 ]
59.38
[0 .0 0 0 ]
75.53
[0 .0 0 0 ]
61.14
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Period Chi- 
square
74.538
[0 .0 0 0 ]
84.601
[0 .0 0 0 ]
40.564
[0 .0 0 0 ]
26.281
[0 .0 0 0 ]
39.073
[0 .0 0 0 ]
26.752
[0 .0 0 0 ]
CS-P Chi- 
square
116.70
[0 .0 0 0 ]
114.25
[0 .0 0 0 ]
103.55
[0 .0 0 0 ]
92.82
[0 .0 0 0 ]
106.94
[0 .0 0 0 ]
93.94
[0 .0 0 0 ]
F stat 3.8971
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.7029
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.8736
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.6258
[0 .0 0 0 ]
4.0639
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.5767
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications l(c-f) 
we remove two states because there are no RRBs in these (Goa and Andaman & Nicobar Islands). 
Cross section and period fixed effects used in all specifications.
For all six specifications, we find that the lagged per capita SDP has 
significant negative marginal effect on the growth of per capita SDP. This is simply 
showing that there is evidence of convergence for these states and a poor state tends to 
grow faster than a rich one, so that the poor state catch up with the rich one in terms 
of the level of per capita income or product. However, for all specifications we find 
that the marginal effect of per capita capital stock growth on per capita SDP growth is 
insignificant. This finding is in line with our conjecture about the recent growth in 
SDP in Indian states; as we have discussed following the figure 2c in subsection 2.2.1,
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the rapid development of the service sector did not contribute in the growth of per 
capita stock of physical capital, which is why growth in this variable is not a 
significant component of the growth in per capita SDP. Another reason in this context 
we can say that, among these 26 states there are some states where capital stock really 
low, may be those states are influencing our this result. We find that lagged SCB 
deposits have significant marginal effect on per capita SDP growth. The lagged ratio 
of RRB credits to ASDP significantly affects growth in per capita SDP, but the lagged 
ratio of SCB credits to SDP fails to explain any variation in growth.
For all specifications, we find significant cross section fixed effects and period 
fixed effects. When considered together, these effects are statistically significant, 
which in turns justify our estimation technique. Based on the highest R 2 and the 
lowest AIC, specification 1(e) (where we use the financial development indicators 
involving lagged SCB deposits and lagged RRB deposits together) is the best 
specification. We present a summary of the Wald tests that we perform for model (1) 
in t able 2.5.IB. In this table, we report the null hypotheses and their associated Chi- 
square test statistics (together with p-values).
Table 2.5.1B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.5.1A.
Null hypothesis 1(a) 1(b) 1(c) Kd) 1(e) 1(f)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits is equal to 
zero
3.081
[0.079] -
9.987
[0 .0 0 1 ]
-
16.901
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Growth effect o f SCB credits is equal to 
zero
-
1.217
[0.269]
-
2.944
[0.086]
-
3.199
[0.073]
All coef est. are zero
12.328
[0.006]
11.658
[0.008]
16.246
[0 .0 0 1 ]
10.508
[0.014]
19.228
[0 .0 0 0 ]
11.135
[0.025]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
For the three specifications that involve SCB deposits and RRB deposits, we 
find significant marginal growth effect of SCB deposits. For specification 1(a), this 
effect is significant at the 10% level, while for the remaining two it is significant at 
the 1% level. For specification 1(e) the net marginal effect of SCB deposits is equal to 
0.0902, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Individually, the coefficient
76
estimates of bd\t_x and bd3M for 1(e) are statistically significant at the 10% and the 
1% levels, respectively.
We do not reject the null hypothesis that growth effect of SCB credits is equal 
to zero for specification 1(b) where we use the lagged ratio of SCB credits to SDP. 
For specification 1(d), the net marginal growth effect of SCB credits is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. For specification 1(f) where we use both fo/2M and
bdAt_x, the individual effects are insignificant, but the net marginal growth effect of
SCB credits, which is equal to 0.0501, is statistically different from zero at the 10% 
level. From model (1), we therefore find that in general SCB deposits have a positive 
and significant net marginal effect on the growth of per capita SDP. However, the 
findings on the net marginal effect of SCB credits on growth are rather inconclusive.
The results summary of fixed effects panel estimation for model (2)’s seven 
specifications are reported in table 2.5.2A. The presentation structure of the summary 
is as same as in table 2.5.1 A. For this model, our dependent variable is the growth in 
per capita ASDP. We find significant negative marginal effect of the lagged per capita 
ASDP, and insignificant marginal effect of per capita capital stock growth for all 
seven specifications. Specification 2(f) where we use bd\t_x and bd3t_l together as
explanatory variables have the highest R 2 and the lowest AIC. For all specifications, 
we find statistically significant cross section and period fixed effects. Except for 
bdAt_] which represents the lagged ratio of RRB credits to ASDP, the other financial 
development indicators perform poorly as explanatory variables for this model. In 
specification 2(d) the coefficient estimate for bd4,_, is statistically significant at the
10% level, and when used jointly with bd2t_x in specification 2(g), its coefficient 
estimate is significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.5.2A: Summary of Fixed effects Panel estimation of model 2, dependent 
variable is real per capita ASDP growth.______________________________________
2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(g)
y a g l- 1
-0.7508
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.7498
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8387
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8767
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.7361
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8467
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8884
[0 .0 0 0 ]
r kl
-0.0187
[0.537]
-0 .0 2 2 1
[0.508]
-0.0377
[0.257]
-0.0388
[0.238]
-0.0257
[0.456]
-0.0328
[0.208]
-0.0368
[0.214]
bd\,_x 0.0567[0.137]
0.0550
[0.123]
bd 2 ,_ , 0.0054[0.854]
0.0096
[0.738]
bd3,_x 0.0182[0.641]
0.0235
[0.097]
bd4,_, 0.0633[0.078]
0.0724
[0 .0 0 0 ]
bd5,_i 0.0130[0.653]
Observations
R 2
AIC
ln-likelihood
234
0.420
-1.698
235.71
234
0.403
-1.669
232.31
216
0.453
-1.772
226.43
216
0.458
-1.780
227.33
234
0.403
-1.669
232.36
216
0.468
-1.797
230.11
216
0.457
-1.775
227.72
Cross section 
Chi-square
135.58
[0 .0 0 0 ]
128.04
[0 .0 0 0 ]
130.91
[0 .0 0 0 ]
133.17
[0 .0 0 0 ]
127.67
[0 .0 0 0 ]
137.76
[0 .0 0 0 ]
133.82
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Period Chi- 
square
49.767
[0 .0 0 0 ]
63.461
[0 .0 0 0 ]
47.401
[0 .0 0 0 ]
44.644
[0 .0 0 0 ]
37.315
[0 .0 0 0 ]
44.003
[0 .0 0 0 ]
45.125
[0 .0 0 0 ]
CS -  P Chi- 
square
164.11
[0 .0 0 0 ]
156.71
[0 .0 0 0 ]
162.54
[0 .0 0 0 ]
164.80
[0 .0 0 0 ]
156.54
[0 .0 0 0 ]
169.16
[0 .0 0 0 ]
165.45
[0 .0 0 0 ]
F stat 5.7006
[0 .0 0 0 ]
5.3805
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.2485
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.3460
[0 .0 0 0 ]
5.3850
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.4243
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.1711
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications 2(c-d) 
and 2(f-g) we remove two states because there are no RRBs in these (Goa and Andaman & Nicobar 
Islands). Cross section and period fixed effects used in all specifications.
The summary of Wald tests associated with the estimation results in table 
2.5.2A is reported in table 2.5.2B, again following the same structure as in table 
2.5.IB. Here we do not find any statistically significant net marginal effect of SCB 
deposits on the growth of per capita ASDP. The marginal growth effects of SCB 
credit to agriculture (which is in specification 2(e)) and aggregate SCB credit (which 
is in specification 2(b)) are insignificant as well. However, when we use RRB credits 
in specifications 2(d) and 2(g), the net marginal growth effects of SCB credits, equal 
to 0.063 and 0.082, respectively, are both statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.5.2B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.5.2A.
Null hypothesis 2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(g)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits 
is equal to zero
2 .2 2 1
[0.136]
-
0.215
[0.642]
- -
1.328
[0.249]
-
Growth effect o f  SCB credits is 
equal to zero
-
0.0333
[0.854]
-
3.134
[0.076]
0 .2 0 1
[0.653]
-
2.813
[0.093]
All coef est. are zero
47.871
[0 .0 0 0 ]
40.137
[0 .0 0 0 ]
63.513
[0 .0 0 0 ]
35.708
[0 .0 0 0 ]
38.001
[0 .0 0 0 ]
92.160
[0 .0 0 0 ]
74.209
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
These findings suggest that in general SCB deposits had no impact but SCB 
credits had a significant positive net impact on the growth of per capita ASDP for 
these 26 states and UTs during 1999-2008. The rather interesting finding is that SCB 
credits that are extended to agriculture in particular had no significant impact on the 
growth of per capita agricultural output. The only channel through which SCB credits 
has made a significant improvement in per capita agricultural output growth is the 
credits that were channelled through RRBs. The clear policy implication of this 
finding is that there is a need for expanding the network of RRBs in India.
The summary of results from fixed effects panel estimation of model (3), for 
which our dependent variable is growth in per capita ISDP, is reported in table 
2.5.3A, and the summary of Wald tests corresponding to this estimation is in table 
2.5.3B. For this model, specification 3(b) has the highest R 2 and the lowest AIC. For 
all specifications the cross section and the period fixed effects are statistically 
significant.
For this model, we find that the marginal effect of SCB deposits is positive 
and statistically significant at the 10% level for specification 3(a), but the net effect of 
SCB deposits in specification 3(f) is statistically not different from zero. This is 
because we find significant negative marginal effect of RRB deposits as a share of 
ISDP.
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Table 2.5.3A: Summary of Fixed effects Panel estimation of model 3, dependent 
variable is real per capita ISDP growth.
3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 3(d) 3(e) m 3(g)
y m l - 1
-0.1823 -0.1885 -0.1784 -0.1522 -0.1786 -0.1871 -0.1833
[0.003] [0 .0 0 1 ] [0.007] [0.018] [0.005] [0.003] [0 .0 0 2 ]
y  kt
0 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 1 2 -0.0006 0 . 0 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0025
[0.099] [0.109] [0.249] [0.394] [0.691] [0.594] [0.660]
bd\,_x 0.0187 0.0193[0.061] [0.056]
0.0109 0.0113bdl, , [0.006] [0 .0 0 2 ]
bdl,_x -0.0244 -0.0255[0.004] [0.005]
bd%,_x 0.0127 0 . 0 0 1 0
[0.555] [0.692]
bd6,_, 0 . 0 1 0 0
[0.199]
Observations 234 234 216 216 234 216 216
R 2 0.397 0.400 0.370 0.366 0.386 0.385 0.385
AIC -3.748 -3.754 -3.746 -3.740 -3.730 -3.767 -3.766
ln-likelihood 475.63 476.28 439.62 439.01 473.50 442.89 442.77
Cross section 77.09 78.98 70.61 66.70 73.91 76.45 73.64
Chi-square [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Period Chi- 90.044 94.999 62.849 46.218 100.880 61.456 49.021
square [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
C S - P  Chi- 142.48 144.70 126.39 1 2 0 . 0 0 145.43 127.47 122.48
square [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
F stat 5.2706 5.3308 4.7225 4.6655 5.0775 4.8599 4.8493
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications 3(c-d) 
and 3(f-g) we remove two states because there are no RRBs in these (Goa and Andaman & Nicobar 
Islands). Cross section and period fixed effects used in all specifications.
In specification 3(c), the marginal effect of b d l on the growth of per capita
industrial output is equal to -  0.024, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This negative marginal effect is understandable, since higher amounts of RRB 
deposits is unlikely to create any positive impact on industrial output at the state level. 
This can also be justified from specification 3(d) where the marginal effect of bdSt_x
(i.e. the ratio of RRB credit to ISDP) on per capita growth in industrial output is 
insignificant. For the best specification, 3(b), the marginal effect of SCB credits on 
per capita ISDP growth is equal to 0.0109, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. In specification 3(g), the coefficient estimate for bd2t_x is individually
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significant, but when considered together with bd%t_x the net marginal effect of SCB 
credit in the growth of ISDP (equal to 0.0123) is not significantly different from zero.
Table 2.5.3B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.5.3 A.
Null hypothesis 3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 3(d) 3(e) 3(f) 3(g)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits 
is equal to zero
3.529
[0.060]
-
8.502
[0.003]
- -
0.196
[0.657]
-
Growth effect o f SCB credits is 
equal to zero
-
7.684
[0.005]
-
0.349
[0.554]
1.656
[0.198]
-
0.324
[0.199]
All coef est. are zero
9.835
[0 .0 2 0 ]
18.130
[0 .0 0 0 ]
18.931
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.115
[0.106]
8.689
[0.033]
22.235
[0 .0 0 0 ]
21.619
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
Notice that the coefficient estimate of the growth in per capita capital stock for 
3(a) and 3(b) are statistically significant at the 10% level. This indicates the 
importance of physical capital growth in explaining the growth in per capita industrial 
output. In general for model (3) we find that both SCB credits and deposits have 
individual significant effect on the growth of ISDP, but RRB operations in general do 
not contribute to this growth rate. We also find that SCB credits to industry in the 
form of priority sector lending did not significantly contribute to the growth of per 
capita industrial output.
2.6 Results from GMM estimation
In this section we discuss the results from system GMM estimation of models (4), (5) 
and (6). The system GMM estimation is a dynamic panel estimation where we set the 
explanatory variables as instruments, and test whether these instruments are the 
correct choice. We have discussed the rationale behind using this estimation technique 
in section 2.3. The key idea behind this estimation is the consideration of the potential 
endogeneity of regressors, or more simply the potential endogeneity of a set of 
explanatory variables. In order to correct for this potential endogeneity, we employ 
the lagged first differences of the explanatory variables as instruments for the
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specification in levels, and the lagged values of the explanatory variables as 
instruments for the specification in differences.
A summary of results from the GMM estimation of model (4) is presented in 
table 2.6.1 A, and the summary of Wald tests corresponding to the results in table
2.6.1 A is presented in table 2.6.IB. For all GMM estimations we use time dummies 
but in reporting the results we suppress the details of the estimates corresponding to 
these time dummies. We test the joint significance of the time dummies and the 
associated results are in the Wald test summary tables. In the results summary tables 
for all three models, we report the coefficient estimates for the explanatory variables 
(except time dummies) and their associated p-values, the instrument rank, and the J- 
statistic and its associated p-value. We set out the specifications for model (4) in the 
same way we did for model (1). Specifications for model (5) and model (6) 
correspond to the similar specifications for model (2) and model (3), respectively.
For model (4) where our dependent variable is growth in per capita SDP, we 
estimate six specifications. For all specifications, based on the Sargan test we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous, i.e. they are 
valid instruments.
Table 2.6.1A: Summary of GMM estimation of model 4, dependent variable is 
real per capita SDP growth.
4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d) 4(e) 4(f)
-0.8701 -0.8641 -0.8403 -0.8491 -0.8358 -0.8396
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
r k,
0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0024 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0029 0.0026
[0.309] [0.324] [0.250] [0.357] [0.084] [0.139]
hd1 0.0188 0.0165f-i [0 .0 0 0 ] [0.015]
bdl 0.0062 0.0066
[0.048] [0.050]
M3,., 0.0404 0.0371[0.226] [0.028]
W4(., -0.0026 -0.0059[0.917] [0.822]
Observations 182 182 168 168 168 168
Instrument
Rank 38 38 38 38 39 39
J-statistic 36.15 36.76 36.32 36.79 35.08 35.86
[p-value] [0.326] [0.309] [0.311] [0.307] [0.361] [0.346]
82
Table 2.6.1B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.6.1A.
Null hypothesis 4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d) 4(e) 4(f)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits is equal to 
zero
12.259
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-
1.475
[0.224]
-
3.216
[0.072]
-
Growth effect o f SCB credits is equal to 
zero
-
3.945
[0.047]
-
0 . 0 1 0
[0.917]
-
0.0007
[0.978]
All time dummies are insignificant
87.385
[0 .0 0 0 ]
77.654
[0 .0 0 0 ]
63.414
[0 .0 0 0 ]
75.712
[0 .0 0 0 ]
69.572
[0 .0 0 0 ]
75.155
[0 .0 0 0 ]
All coef. est. (except time dummies) are 
zero
571.33
[0 .0 0 0 ]
32.872
[0 .0 0 0 ]
23.530
[0 .0 0 0 ]
28.935
[0 .0 0 0 ]
58.095
[0 .0 0 0 ]
37.427
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
As we found earlier in the estimation of model (1) using fixed effects panel 
method, the GMM estimation of model (4) also suggests that the lagged per capita 
SDP has significant negative effect while growth in per capita capital stock has 
insignificant effect of growth of per capita output. We find that in the GMM 
estimation of model (4), the coefficient estimates for bd \t_x and bd2t_x are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Given specification 4(a), this finding is 
consistent with the findings of specifications 1(a), i.e. the aggregate SCB deposits 
have a strictly positive and significant impact on growth of per capita SDP. The 
coefficient estimates for the financial development indicators in specifications 1(c) 
and 1(d), i.e. the ones that include RRB deposits and credits, are statistically 
insignificant. The net marginal effect of SCB deposits on growth in per capita SDP 
are equal to 0.0188 and 0.0536 for specifications 4(a) and 4(e), respectively, and both 
are statistically significant at the 10% level. We find significant (at the 5% level) net 
marginal effect of SCB credits (equal to 0.006) for specification 4(b) only.
The results of GMM estimation of model (4) therefore is consistent with the 
results we discussed earlier for model (1). The SCB deposits which are channelled 
through the RRBs in general fails to explain the changes in growth of per capita SDP, 
whereas the aggregate level of SCB deposits does very well in this. The result is 
similar for SCB credits. The time effects are statistically significant which justifies the
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choice of specification. The instruments are valid, and therefore the results in general 
satisfy the robustness characteristics.
Table 2.6.2A: Summary of GMM estimation of model 5, dependent variable is 
real per capita ASDP growth.________________________________________________
5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) 5(e) 5(f) 5(g)
yag!~\
-1.4061 -1.4108 -1.4370 -1.5281 -1.3762 -1.4380 -1.5393
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Y k ,
-0.0078 -0.0115 -0.0195 -0.0185 -0.0186 -0.0147 -0.0156
[0.646] [0.501] [0.187] [0.161] [0.244] [0.242] [0.195]
hd\ 0.0398 0.0343o u i t_ i [0.086] [0.080]
hd? 0.0034 0.0063DU Z,_, [0.791] [0.568]
bdl,_x 0.0136 0.0186[0.758] [0.094]
hdA 0.1069 0.1113/- i [0.007] [0.013]
bd5,_x 0.0353[0.282]
Observations 182 182 168 168 182 168 168
Instrument
Rank 38 38 38 38 38 39 39
J statistic 37.53 39.04 33.96 35.30 37.59 33.04 34.99
[p-value] [0.310] [0.253] [0.469] [0.406] [0.309] [0.413] [0.436]
Table 2.6.2B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.6.2A.
Null hypothesis 5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) 5(e) 5(f) 5(g)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits 2.968 0.0938 0 . 1 1 0
is equal to zero [0.084] [0.759] [0.740]
Growth effect o f SCB credits is 0.0697 7.285 1.162 7.031
equal to zero [0.791] [0.007] [0.281] [0.008]
All time dummies are 36.652 39.975 47.359 55.926 32.274 48.014 56.139
insignificant [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
All coef est. (except time 51.318 42.147 30.426 33.418 43.513 36.857 35.810
dummies) are zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
In table 2.6.2A we report the summary of the GMM estimation results for 
model (5) where our dependent variable is real per capita ASDP growth. As we did
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for fixed effects panel estimation of model (2), we use seven specifications for this 
model. The associated Wald test results summary is presented in table 2.6.2B. The 
way we construct these reports is similar to the way we constructed the reports in 
tables 2.6.1 A and 2.6.IB, which were for model (4). Based on the Sargan test for all 
specification in table 2.6.2A, we fail to reject the null hypothesis concerning the 
validity of over identifying restrictions in these estimations. The Sargan tests therefore 
validate the choice of instruments for all specifications. As we found before, we find 
significant negative impact of lagged per capita agricultural SDP and insignificant 
impact of growth in per capita capital stock on the growth in per capita agricultural 
SDP. The coefficient estimate for aggregate SCB deposits is statistically significant at 
the 10% level for specifications 5(a) and 5(f), while that of aggregate SCB credits are 
statistically insignificant for specifications 5(b) and 5(g). The coefficient estimates for 
bd3,_x that concerns SCB deposits in RRBs is insignificant in specification 5(c), and
only marginally significant in specification 5(f). The SCB credits that are channelled 
through RRBs however have significant impacts on the growth of per capita ASDP, as 
confirmed by the estimations of specifications 5(d) and 5(g). Priority sector lending to 
agriculture by SCBs do not have any significant impact on the growth of per capita 
ASDP, as can be seen in specification 5(e).
As can be summarized from table 2.6.2B, the net marginal growth effect of 
SCB deposits in specification 5(a) is significantly different from zero. However for 
the other two specifications this effect is insignificant. The net marginal growth effect 
of SCB credits in specifications 5(d) and 5(g), both of which involve the credits 
channelled through RRBs, is significantly different zero (at the 1% level). All time 
dummies are jointly significant for this model. These findings are very much in line 
with what we found earlier for model (2) using the fixed effects panel estimation 
technique.
The GMM estimation summary for model (6) and the Wald tests associated 
with this estimation are presented in table 2.6.3A and table 2.6.3B, respectively. 
Dependent variable for this estimation is the growth in per capita industrial SDP. 
Except for the growth in per capita capital stock and the marginal effect of industrial 
credit by SCBs, the findings are generally similar to the findings of fixed effects panel
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estimation of model (3). The Sargan tests for all seven specifications once again 
confirm the validity of the instruments and the approach. The lagged per capita ISDP 
has a significant negative impact on growth of per capita ISDP for all specifications.
The coefficient estimates for bd\t_x and bd2M are positive and statistically
significant for the specifications where these are used as explanatory variables. The 
coefficient estimates that are related to RRB credits are statistically insignificant. For 
specification 6(e) we find significant (at the 5% level) positive marginal growth effect 
of priority sector industrial credit, where the effect is equal to 0.006. The net marginal 
growth effect of SCB credits in specification 6(b) and 6(g) are equal to 0.014 and 
0.011, and they are statistically significant at the 5% and the 1% level, respectively. 
Thus except for the significant marginal effect of priority sector lending in industry, 
the findings are generally similar to those of model (3).
Table 2.6.3A: Summary of GMM estimation of model 6, dependent variable is 
real per capita ISDP growth.
6(a) 6(b) 6(c) 6(d) 6(e) 6(f) 6(g)
yM-1
-0.6877 -0.6395 -0.6502 -0.6351 -0.6613 -0.6322 -0.5983
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
r k,
0.0050 0.0092 0 . 0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0036 0.0037 0.0039
[0.469] [0.236] [0.284] [0.481] [0.244] [0.242] [0.195]
bd\,_x 0.0149 0.0013[0.005] [0.080]
bd2'_x 0.0139 0 . 0 1 0 2
[0.026] [0.068]
hrJl 0.0028 -0.0108oa /,_!
[0.928] [0.094]
bd%_x 0.0091 0.0003[0.672] [0.113]
bd6,_, 0.0061[0 .0 2 1 ]
Observations 182 182 168 168 182 168 168
Instrument
Rank 38 38 38 38 38 39 39
J statistic 23.80 23.51 24.53 24.25 23.56 25.02 24.49
[p-value] [0.904] [0.911] [0.883] [0 .8 8 8 ] [0.900] [0.816] [0.822]
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Table 2.6.3B: Summary of Wald tests related to the results in table 2.6.3A.
Null hypothesis 6(a) 6(b) 6(c) 6(d) 6(e) 6(f) 6(g)
Growth effect o f SCB deposits 7.799 0.0074 0.177
is equal to zero [0.005] [0.931] [0.674]
Growth effect o f SCB credits is 5.034 0.178 5.041 7.713
equal to zero [0.024] [0.672] [0 .0 2 1 ] [0.009]
All time dummies are 93.998 99.939 81.971 74.398 77.564 64.256 69.154
insignificant [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
All coef est. (except time 56.985 51.247 25.546 27.952 26.113 29.896 35.264
dummies) are zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Note: Chi-square test statistic [p-value] reported.
2.7 Conclusion
In recent years the government of India has been making attempts to encourage the 
expansion of rural banking in India. These attempts involve regulations towards SCBs 
to open more branches in rural areas, higher level of social sector expenditure directed 
towards rural development, formalization of rural financial markets and encouraging 
competitive environment in the rural credit markets etc. Whether or not such reforms 
will affect state level growth remains an important question; and one way of 
answering this question is to examine the growth effect of commercial vis a vis rural 
banking development in the states of India. This is exactly what is attempted in this 
chapter.
We use a growth accounting approach in accomplishing this task. Our 
regressions show that there is clear evidence of growth effects of commercial and 
rural banking development in the 26 states and UTs of India that we consider over the 
period 1999-2008. We find that deposits of commercial banks in general have a 
significant positive impact on the growth of per capita SDP. Thus domestic savings in 
commercial banks affect local economic growth positively and significantly. We also 
find that domestic savings and mobilization of domestic savings through commercial 
banks do not significantly affect the state level growth in the agricultural component
87
of SDP, and their positive and significant impact on per capita SDP growth mainly 
stems from their significant marginal effect on the growth of the industrial component 
of SDP. This finding is robust whether we use fixed effects panel estimation or system 
GMM estimation. We also find that the marginal effect of SCB credits on the growth 
of per capita SDP is mixed. Credits that are channelled through rural banks positively 
affect the growth in the agricultural component of per capita SDP and the growth in 
per capita industrial SDP. When we consider the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables and use these variables as instruments for the GMM estimation, 
we find that the resulting magnitude of the marginal effect of deposits and credits are 
smaller.
What we find interesting is the variation in growth effect of deposits and 
credits, and the channel through which development in commercial vis a vis rural 
banking in India affect different measures of growth. This implicitly implies that some 
state specific characteristics that are essential in determining the level and strength of 
banking development (e.g. rural well being, infrastructure) may assist in explaining 
the growth effects of banking development better.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Infrastructure and Rural 
Development in Explaining the 
Banking-Growth Nexus in India: 
Evidence from State Level Data
Chapter summary:
In this chapter we examine how and to w hat extent developm ent in infrastructure and rural 
well being can assist in explaining the banking development led growth in state level output, 
agricultural output and industrial output in India. We use state level data for India for a 
sample period of 1999-2008. Based on an empirical analysis that involve fixed effects panel 
and GMM estimation, we show that there is clear evidence of growth effects of commercial 
and rural banking development, infrastructure development and development in rural well 
being in 26 states and union territories of India. We find that expansion of road 
transportation and rail routes generally improves state level growth in output and industrial 
output. More allocation of production in the informal sector can hurt growth, but 
improvement in rural well being can bring in more growth to the economy. Expanding rural 
roads negatively affects growth in agriculture, which could be because such expansion may 
involve loss of agricultural land. We argue that a major determinant of the success of rural 
banking development led growth in India, which is emphasized heavily in the current policy 
reforms in India, is the development of physical infrastructure and rural well being.
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3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we discussed the importance of banking sector development in explaining 
state level growth in output, agricultural output and industrial output in India. In this 
chapter we examine how and to what extent the introduction of some important state 
specific characteristics which are linked to banking sector development can improve 
the understanding of the reasons behind the regional difference in banking 
development led growth in the key measures of output. Here we examine the role of 
infrastructure and rural development in explaining the banking development - state 
level growth link in India. Given this link, we examine how and to what extent 
infrastructure and rural development in India can explain the regional difference in 
growth in output, agricultural output and industrial output in a sample of 26 states and 
union territories (UTs) of India over the period 1999-2008.
Our empirical approach in this study primarily involves an investigation of the 
relationship between the growth in gross state domestic product (SDP) and the 
development of commercial and regional rural banking, infrastructure and rural 
development in the 26 states and UTs of India. We then examine how the same 
determinants affect the growth in the agricultural component of SDP. Finally, we 
examine the relationship between the growth in the industrial component of SDP and 
the development of banking services to the industries, infrastructure and rural well 
being for the same sample.
The key findings of this chapter is that Scheduled Commercial Bank (SCB) 
deposits in general have a significant positive impact on the growth of per capita SDP, 
but the marginal effect of SCB credits on this growth is rather inconclusive. SCB 
deposits have little or no effect on the growth of per capita agricultural SDP. SCB 
credits that are channelled through Regional Rural Banks (RRBs) positively affect the 
growth in the agricultural component of per capita SDP. For the growth in per capita 
industrial SDP, we find that both SCB credits and deposits have individual significant 
positive effects. These findings are perfectly consistent with the findings of a reduced 
form empirical model as in chapter 2. In addition to these, we also find that expansion
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of road transportation and rail routes improves state level growth, and expansion of 
informal sector has a negative effect on growth. Improving rural well being can bring 
in more growth to the economy. Expanding rural roads may hurt growth in 
agriculture, which could be because such expansion may involve loss of agricultural 
land. We conduct the empirical estimation using fixed effects panel technique and 
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) technique, and find that these results are 
robust to the methodology of estimation.
What primarily motivates us in examining the key research question in this 
chapter is that for a fast growing and predominantly rural economy like India, there is 
huge disparity in state level infrastructure growth, rural well being and banking 
development, and there is no study in the literature that attempts to identify their 
growth effects in a unified growth accounting approach. Identifying the exact state 
level growth effects of infrastructure, rural well being and banking development 
would enable one to directly infer policy lessons that are directed towards boosting 
state level growth and encouraging convergence at the state level. Also, identifying 
the marginal effect of infrastructure and rural well being on the components of state 
level growth is in fact equivalent to identifying the channels through which state level 
growth in production sectors (agriculture and industry) are affected by these, which in 
turns provides clear policy implications.
There are very few studies in the related literature that attempt to analyze the 
impact of banking development, infrastructure and rural development on local 
economic growth of developing countries in a unified framework. Cheng and Degryse 
(2010) consider the impact of bank and non bank financial development on local 
economic growth of China, where they give some insight about the relationship 
between infrastructure and local economic growth of China. They consider 
infrastructure (rail and road) as conditioning set of variables for regional growth 
difference in Chinese provinces, but they do not emphasize on the marginal growth 
effect of these infrastructure. They do not really focus on how variations in these can 
affect growth or can explain the reasons behind the regional difference in growth of 
output. They also do not consider the marginal effect of infrastructure on the growth 
of different sectors of the economy. Among others, Cull and Xu (2000) and Cull and
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Xu (2005) examine how the level of bureaucracy has affected in the efficiency of 
agricultural credit extended towards the state owned enterprises in China.
Canning and Pedroni (2008) investigate the effect of infrastructure on long run 
economic growth in a panel of countries for 1950-1992. Their results provide clear 
evidence that in the vast majority of cases infrastructure does induce long run growth 
effects. They however find that these results can be inconclusive across individual 
countries and across individual groups of countries. They find that while telephones, 
electricity generating capacity and paved roads are provided at close to the growth 
maximizing level on an average, these are under-supplied in some countries and over­
supplied in others. Their results also help in explaining why cross section and time 
series studies have in the past found contradictory results regarding a causal link 
between infrastructure provision and long run growth.
Boopen (2006) in his paper provides evidence on the importance of transport 
capital development in promoting economic development for African and island 
states. His study analyses the contribution of transport capital to growth for two 
different data sets, namely for a sample of Sub Saharan African countries, and for 
developing states. In both sample cases, the analysis concluded that transport capital 
has been a contributor to the economic progress of these countries. Esfahani and 
Ramirez (2003) in their paper develop a structural model of infrastructure and output 
growth that takes account of institutional and economic factors that mediate in the 
infrastructure-GDP interactions. Their cross country estimates of the model indicate 
that the contribution of infrastructure services to GDP is substantial and in general this 
level exceeds the cost of provision of those services. Their results also shed light on 
the factors that shape a country’s response to its infrastructure needs and offer policy 
implications for facilitating the removal of infrastructure inadequacies.
A study by Demurger (2001) provides the empirical evidence on the links 
between infrastructure investment and economic growth in China. Using panel data 
from a sample of 24 Chinese provinces for the 1985 to 1998 period this study shows 
that besides the differences in terms of reforms and openness, geographical location 
and infrastructure endowment did account significantly for observed differences in 
growth performances across provinces. His results indicate that transport facilities are
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a key differentiating factor in explaining the growth gap and point to the role of 
telecommunication in reducing the burden of isolation.
The current study is motivated by the literature, the state level growth facts, 
and the series of banking sector reforms undertaken in India. The literature is more or 
less silent about how these reforms are affecting state level growth in per capita 
income, and there is literally no study that shows how these affect the components of 
per capita income in India15. This chapter try to give the insights of these issues. We 
are also interested in the state level growth facts of India, and in this study we attempt 
to identify clear policy implications that would assist in boosting regional growth and 
promoting regional convergence in growth in India.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We present a brief 
description of the motivation and the context in section 3.2. In section 3.3 we discuss 
the empirical methodology and model specifications. Description of data and data 
sources are presented in section 3.4. In section 3.5 we discuss the results from fixed 
effects panel estimation, and in section 3.6 we discuss the results from GMM 
estimation. In section 3.7 we present the concluding remarks.
3.2 The Context
In conducting a regional level growth study for a fast growing large economy like 
India, it is primarily essential to explain the regional difference in banking sector 
development, infrastructure and rural well being. Most of the discussions related to 
the banking sector development and regional difference in output and its components 
are in chapter 2 of this thesis. In this section we discuss some important proxies for 
stocks of physical infrastructure and levels of rural well being in Indian states. The 
details of the data sources are discussed in section 3.4 to follow.
15 Chakraborty (2009) studies the link between infrastructure and economic growth in India using 
micro data, although in that study very less is emphasized on the growth in the key components of state 
domestic product. A more macro based approach of the infrastructure-growth nexus for India can be 
found in Sahoo and Das (2010). In a recent paper Chaudhuri and Krishnendu (2009) discuss the impact 
of corruption in a model with informal and formal credit sources. They argue that different measures of 
the stock of physical capital can control the corruption affected distribution of formal as well as 
informal credit.
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3.2.1 Physical infrastructure at the state level
In this chapter, we consider the data for 26 states and UTs of India for the period 
1999-200816. These are the same regional entities and the same time period that was 
considered in chapter 2. In table 3.2.1a we present the average growth rate of per 
capita state domestic product (sdp), the growth rate of per capita agricultural state 
domestic product (asdp) and the growth rate of per capita industrial state domestic 
product (isdp) for these states, where the growth rate are in real (2000 prices) terms of
1 7SDP and its components .
As can be seen in this table, there is a considerable amount of variation in 
these growth rates across states. The agricultural SDP growth is very high in states 
such as Bihar, Chattisgarh, Nagaland and Rajasthan. Industrial component of per 
capita SDP shows high growth in all states except Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and 
Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur, Nagaland, Uttar Pradesh and Andaman & 
Nicobar Islands. This relatively very high growth in the industrial component of per 
capita SDP is mainly due to the rapid progress of the service section in India, which 
for all states and UTs in India accounted for an average growth rate of 15.3% during 
the last decade, compared to a low 2.9% average growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector. Generally for manufacturing growth it is the growth in the core large and 
medium scale infrastructure (e.g. steel, coal and other heavy core infrastructure) that 
matter. In transitional economies the rapid growth in service sector is generally 
accompanied by a growth in the transport and other communication related 
infrastructure and the overall well being of population. This is because if people live 
well, and they can commute as well as communicate flexibly, they are more mobile 
which makes their services available to many places. This is the key reason why we 
consider transport and other communication related infrastructure and the well being
16 In this chapter we limit the discussion on the context to a discussion on the state level physical 
infrastructure and rural well being in India. For a discussion on the state level domestic product, its 
components and banking related facts for India, see section 2.2 of chapter 2 of this thesis.
17 The industrial component of the SDP is the sum of total manufacturing and total services component 
of SDP. The agricultural component involves all output from agriculture and allied activities.
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of rural population (72% of Indian total population) as important determinants of state 
level growth in income and its components.
Table 3.2.1a: Real growth rates (in %) of the 26 states and union territories’
1999-2008 (2000 prices).
State/UT (Region) sdp growth asdp growth isdp growth
1 Andhra Pradesh (Southern) 7.79 5.79 8.08
2 Assam (North Eastern) 4.85 0.92 7.00
3 Bihar (Eastern) 8 . 1 2 6 . 6 6 7.79
4 Jharkhand (Eastern) 5.52 2.31 7.06
5 Goa (Western) 6.48 -0.561 7.40
6 Gujarat (Western) 7.84 9.11 7.89
7 Haryana (Northern) 9.19 3.18 10.95
8 Himachal Pradesh (Northern) 6.50 5.42 5.75
9 Jammu & Kashmir (Northern) 4.51 2.59 4.91
1 0 Karnataka (Southern) 6.77 -0.286 9.01
11 Kerala (Southern) 7.85 0.425 8.49
1 2 Madhya Pradesh (Central) 3.02 2.08 3.24
13 Chattisgarh (Central) 8 . 1 0 6.03 8.95
14 Maharashtra (Western) 6 .0 1 4.17 6.67
15 Manipur (North Eastern) 4.75 2.87 3.26
16 Meghalaya (North Eastern) 6.79 4.73 6.67
17 Nagaland (North Eastern) 6.40 8.49 4.77
18 Orissa (Eastern) 7.05 2.75 8.36
19 Punjab (Northern) 4.92 2.62 5.80
2 0 Rajasthan (Northern) 4.85 8.30 6.37
2 1 Tamil Nadu (Southern) 6.18 1.42 7.29
2 2 Tripura (North Eastern) 6.24 3.47 6.44
23 Uttar Pradesh (Central) 4.97 2.19 5.43
24 Uttarkhand (Central) 8.71 1.98 9.33
25 West Bengal (Eastern) 5.84 2.51 6.36
26 Andaman & Nicobar Island (Eastern) 5.88 -0.283 4.87
Source: Author’s own calculations from data collected from Handbook of Indian Statistics, various
issues.
According to the Studies and Surveys of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), growth in the six core infrastructure industries of 
India (finished steel, cement, crude petroleum, petroleum refinery, coal and power)
registered an increase of output of 2.5% in September 2010 as compared to an 
increase of 4.3% during the same month a year before. This drop in the growth rate 
allegedly was due to shrinkage in the output of petroleum refinery and coal sector. 
This decline in core infrastructure sector lagged behind the decline in industrial sector. 
According to Reserve Bank of India (RBI) reports the prevailing growth trends in 
these sectors (especially the power generation sector) needs to be improved for a 
sustained recovery in growth in the industrial sector.
In this chapter, we consider state level data for three types of infrastructure, 
namely, roads (and rural roads), electricity and rail routes. Our conjecture is that these 
basic measures of infrastructure can explain the variation in state level growth in 
income and its components. Roads and rural roads are central to transportation of 
goods and services, which is why their role in determining regional growth is widely 
known. In figure 3.2a we present the cross sectional means of road length and the 
cross sectional mean of rural road lengths (both in 1000 kms) for the 26 states and 
UTs in our sample for 1999-200818.
Figure 3.2a: Mean of road length and mean of rural road lengths for 26 states and UTs 
of India, 1999-2008 (length in 1000 kms on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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18 The roads here are the branch roads of the state and national highways that serve as the main roads 
for intra-district movements within one state. They traverse the length and breadth of a district to 
connect the areas of production and marketing in the district to one another and to the national 
highways, and therefore they are the key means of local transportation of goods and services. The rural 
roads are the total rural roads including parts of district roads for which lower specifications are 
prescribed and the village roads. The village roads serve as the feeder roads of the other highways as 
well as the roads for inter village movements.
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For the full sample period there has been an average increase in the road and 
rural road lengths for the 26 states and UTs that we consider. The average road length 
per capita and rural road length per capita for these states and UTs during the sample 
period is equal to 0.00345 kms and 0.0032 kms, respectively. The road length per 
capita for the relatively high growing states such as Kerala, Karnataka, Himachal 
Pradesh and Gujarat are above the average road length of 0.00345, and overall sample 
standard deviation for this variables is equal to only 0.0000004 (similar low 
dispersion is in rural road per capita). Mainly due to this low variation in this variable, 
in the regressions instead of this variable we use the road length per square km and 
the rural road length per square km. The average road length per square km and rural 
road length per square km for the full sample are equal to 0.981 km (,st. dev. 0.871) 
and 0.889 km (st. dev. 0.757), respectively, implying that approximately 90% of the 
roads in these states and UTs are rural roads. This is understandable, because 
according to the 2001 census the proportion of rural population in total population of 
India is equal to 72.2%. In figure 3.2b we present the scatter plot of the proportion of 
rural roads in total roads for our sample.
Figure 3.2b: Scatter plot of the proportion of rural road in total roads for 26 states and 
UTs of India, 1999-2008 (proportion on the vertical axis, sample points on the horizontal 
axis).
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Clearly, majority of the states in our sample have a very high (over 85%) 
proportion of rural roads in total road length. For Rajasthan, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, 
Kerala, Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Assam and other North Eastern 
states (Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland, Manipur) this proportion is well over 90%. For
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states which are predominantly service industry based, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, this proportion is around 83%. For predominantly 
agriculture based states such as Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal this 
proportion is also lower than the average (around 84%).
Consumption of electricity is an important determinant for industrial as well as 
aggregate productivity, well being and communication, all of which can strongly 
influence growth in income. In figure 3.2c we present the scatter plot of per capita 
electricity consumption for our sample.
Figure 3.2c: Scatter plot of per capita electricity consumption for 26 states and UTs of 
India, 1999-2008 (kilo watts on the vertical axis, sample points on the horizontal axis).
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We find considerable amount of variation in the 26 states and UTs in terms of 
consumption of electricity. States in which there is a relatively larger share of urban 
population and/or industry (e.g. Haryana, Maharashtra, Gujarat. Tamil Nadu) the 
average per capita electricity consumption for the sample period is very high, 
generally over 500 kwh (kilo watts). For these states the 2003-2009 average growth 
rate of SDP is well over 7%. Goa, which is a state that has one of the main sea ports in 
India, has the highest per capita electricity consumption (average over 100 kwh), and 
has experienced an average growth rate of over 9% during 2003-2009. Relatively 
larger states (in terms of population and area) that are predominantly agriculture based 
have very low per capita electricity consumption. Large states with low average 
growth rate of SDP (under 7% for 2003-2009) such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
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Pradesh, Assam, and West Bengal also has experienced very low average per capita 
electricity consumption (under 300 kwh). For heavily ruralised states such as 
Nagaland, Bihar and Manipur this figure is less than 100 kwh.
We consider another important transport infrastructure which is the rail 
system. Our proxy for this is the length of rail routes in the 26 states and UTs. There 
are, however, no rail communication in Meghalaya (a state) and Andaman & Nicobar 
Island (A UT) which are in our sample, so we consider this variable for the remaining 
24 states. The total length of rail routes shows considerable amount of variation, both 
across states and over time for each state. In figure 3.2d we present its cross section 
average measured in 1000 kms for the entire sample period. The length of rail routes 
is the sum of narrow and meter gauged rail routes.
Figure 3.2d: Mean of rail route length for 24 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 (length 
in 1000 kms on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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Rail transport, which is the most common mode of long-distance 
transportation in India, forms an important part of infrastructure for 28 states and 3 
UTs. The rail network in India traverses the length and breadth of the country, 
covering a total length of 64015 kms, and currently is the fourth largest railway 
network in the world. The annual average transport of Indian railways is 
approximately 6 billion passengers and well over 350 million tonnes of freight. The 
average annual growth of rail routes in all states of India for the period 2001-2008
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was accounted for approximately 0.9%, while for our sample of 24 states this growth 
rate for the sample period is equal to 0.7%. Due to an expansion policy undertaken by 
the Indian Ministry of Rail during the early nineties, there has been considerable 
amount of increase in both the rail network and rail infrastructure. Rail routes in India 
do not only perform transportation, they are also keys to many other forms of 
electronic communication such as rural telegraph network, postal delivery and low 
pass band telecommunication.
In this study we would have liked to include telecommunication as an 
explanatory infrastructure variable in the growth regression, but due to data 
limitations this is not possible. The Infrastructure Statistics 2010 only reports 
telecommunication data for 2003-2009, and the concerned ministry (Ministry of 
Telecommunication and IT) reports were not useful in collecting state-wise back data 
which our sample requires (i.e. data for 1999-2002). Based on the 2003-2009 data on 
telecommunication, we are however able to present some insights of this 
infrastructure sector here.
Most rural (and urban) areas are connected to the rest of India through two 
popular modes of telecommunication, namely, PCO (Public Call Offices) and Public 
Telephones. The 2003-2009 data on PCO suggest that for the 23 major states in India 
the mean area between two PCOs is around 5.38 square kms, and its standard 
deviation for these states is equal to 6.83. For relatively not so well populated and 
connected states (e.g. Jammu & Kashmir) this (mean) figure is as high as 17 square 
kms. Other states which have longer distance between two PCOs include Jharkhand 
(5.4 sq kms), Uttarkhand (6.1 sq kms), Rajasthan (5.7 sq kms), Orissa (5.9 sq kms), 
Madhya Pradesh (5.9 sq kms), and regions in the North East (18 sq kms). There has, 
however been an improvement in the PCO infrastructure. For all states the mean area 
between two PCOs show a declining trend over the period 2003-2009, as may be seen 
in figure 3.2e.
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Figure 3.2e: Mean of distance between two Public Call Offices for 23 states and UTs of 
India, 2003-2009 (distance in square kms on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal 
axis).
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This improvement in PCO network has resulted in more PCOs per square km, 
and its mean increased from 0.12 in 2003 to 0.54 in 2009. Its variation across the 23 
states has dropped by 33% between these years, showing that this particular mode of 
communication is developing quickly in rural India. There has also been an 
improvement in the number of villages that are covered with public phones. In figure 
3.2f we present the scatter plot of public phones per square kms in the 23 major states 
for 2003-2009.
Figure 3.2f: Scatter plot of public phones per square km, 23 states, 2003-2009 (number 
on vertical axis, sample points on horizontal axis).
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The average number of public phones per square km is generally quite high 
(around 1.7) in the relatively more production oriented states, such as Haryana, 
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. For states that are more service 
oriented, such as Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat and Goa, this figure is generally 
low (around 0.2). According to the reports of the concerned ministry, the number of 
cellular phones and household as well as commercial landlines are much larger in 
these states. For most other states, the average number of public phones per square km 
is around its mean (for all states, around 0.7).
3.2.2 Rural well-being at the state level
In this chapter, we capture the level of well being of rural households by two 
indicators, the level of sanitation, which is proxied by the number of rural households 
having access to toilet facilities, and the real value of social sector expenditure by 
state governments. This short listing is for data reasons, and we acknowledge that 
there are many other proxies that one can possibly use in order to measure rural well 
being.
Figure 3.2g: Mean of Toilet facilities for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 (in 
100000 numbers on the vertical axis, time on the horizontal axis).
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In figure 3.2g we present the mean of access to toilet facilities (by the number 
of rural households in 100000) for the 26 states in our sample for the period 1999- 
2008. There is a clear trend of improvement in sanitation arrangement for rural 
households during the sample period. In general the states in the South region have 
the maximum average sanitation arrangements. For Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and 
Tamil Nadu (all in South region) on an average over 3 million households have access 
to toilet facilities. For the other relatively larger states, such as West Bengal, Uttar 
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra this average is over 2 million (highest for 
Uttar Pradesh, equal to 6 million), while for allegedly least developed states like 
Assam and Bihar, this average is just over 1 million.
Figure 3.2h: Scatter plot of the proportion of social sector expenditure by state 
government in SDP, both at 2000 prices, for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 
(proportion on vertical axis, sample points on horizontal axis).
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The other proxy that we use is the ratio of social sector expenditure to SDP, 
both evaluated at 2000 prices. Its scatter plot is in figure 3.2h. The social sector 
expenditure in India includes expenditure on safe drinking water provision, sanitation 
provision, housing provision, welfare provisions for socially deprived casts, urban 
development, and provision of relief on natural calamities. It is often argued that India 
lags behind the rest of the world in terms of social sector expenditure. The total 
combined expenditure of central and state governments on social services in 2008-09 
was 6.72% of GDP at current prices. This is too low when compared to what some of 
the western countries spend on their people. Germany leads others by spending a 
significant 25% of its GDP on social services that include education, sports, art and 
culture, medical and public health, family welfare, social security and nutrition.
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France is a close second with an expenditure of 23% of GDP while UK and US come 
third and fourth with 13% and 12%, respectively (IMF reports).
Table 3.2.2a: Summary statistics of growth rates in infrastructure and rural well 
being proxies for the 26 states and union territories, 1999-2008._________________
Growth in 
Sanitation
Growth in 
Social Sector 
Exp.
Growth in 
Road length
Growth in 
Rural Road 
length
Growth in 
Rail routes
Growth in 
Electricity 
Consmp.
Mean 0.123 0.129 0.034 0.040 0.007 0.056
S.D. 0.190 0.395 0.128 0.161 0.038 0.113
Max 0.423 0.767 0.181 0.708 0.433 0.469
Min -0.050 -0.468 -0.385 -0.406 -0.088 -0.887
In table 3.2.2a we present the mean growth rates of the infrastructure variables 
and the rural well being variables. The average growth rate of both rural well being 
variables are very high, implying that during our sampling period the government has 
been keen to improve rural well being. The average growth rate of road lengths and 
rural road lengths are 3.4% and 4%, respectively. Both the growth rate of rail routes 
and its variation across the states is very low. Rapid development of the service sector 
posed higher demands of electricity across all states, which is why the average growth 
rate of electricity consumption is 5.6% for the sample period. We observe higher than 
average growth rate in electricity consumption demand in relatively larger states such 
as Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and in relatively more service 
oriented states such as Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
3.2.3 The informal sector and System Losses in Infrastructure
In this chapter we consider two proxies in order to account for informal sector and the 
system loss in infrastructure. For the informal sector, we consider the share of 
unregistered manufacturing in SDP for the 26 states and UTs, and its scatter plot is in 
figure 3.2i.
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Figure 3.2i: Scatter plot of the percentage of SDP originating from unregistered 
manufacturing activities, at 2000 prices, for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 
(percentage on vertical axis, sample points on horizontal axis).
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The mean share of unregistered manufacturing sector in SDP for the full 
sample is equal to 3.92%, and this series has a rather large variance (equal to 3.232). 
For most states in the north east region mean share of unregistered manufacturing in 
SDP is lower than the full sample average, such as Meghalaya (1.1%), Assam (1.7%), 
Nagaland (1.4%) and Tripura (1.3%). However, for some industrial states such as 
Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat the mean share is well over 4%. For Gujarat, the mean 
share of informal sector is around 8.2%.
In India in recent years a number of rural as well as urban development 
projects have been undertaken in order to increase the production of electricity. 
However, due to a significant amount of losses in transmission and distribution, the 
actual consumption of electricity in states and UTs is much lower than the actual 
potential of generating electricity. In figure 3.2j we present the mean of potential 
electricity generation capacity and the mean of electricity consumption, both 
measured in giga watts. The figures are for the state aggregate. There is an increasing 
gap between the potential electricity and electricity consumption, indicating that there 
is an increasing trend of the transmission and distribution loss in electricity supply. 
We measure this system loss and hold it as the proxy for system loss in infrastructure. 
In figure 3.2k we present the scatter plot of the percentage of this system loss for the 
full sample.
%
%
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Figure 3.2j: Mean of electricity generation capacity and mean of electricity consumption 
for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 (Giga watts on the vertical axis, time on 
horizontal axis).
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Figure 3.2k: Scatter plot of the percentage of transmission and distribution losses in 
electricity for 26 states and UTs of India, 1999-2008 (percentage on vertical axis, sample 
points on horizontal axis).
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For all 26 states and UTs, the 1999-2008 average system loss is 33.16%, but 
its variance is considerably high (equal to 12.173). For states in the southern region 
such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, the average system loss 
is well below the 33.16% full sample average, and for all these states during 1999- 
2008 there is a clear trend of declining system loss (i.e. an improvement in electricity 
transmission and distribution system). The worst case of system loss in electricity
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supply is in the north east region, where for Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and 
Meghalaya the average system loss is well above the full sample average with an 
increasing trend. For West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab and Orissa the
system loss is steady during the sample period, and the average is below the full
sample average.
3.3 Specification of the Empirical Models
The main aim in this chapter is to examine the impact of banking sector development, 
infrastructure and rural well being on state level economic growth in India. For this 
we start with a specification of fixed effects panel model controlling for state and time 
fixed effects, following King and Levine (1993 & 1993a):
Yu = OoJVi + ai Yk» + + ^Con,, + 0 + £  + s tJ (l)
where yjt is the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product
(sdp), yhiJt is the growth rate of real per capita capital stock, bd is the (log of) banking
development indicator of either scheduled commercial banks or regional rural banks, 
Con is the vector of conditioning set of variables where we include the indicators of 
infrastructure and rural well being (associated with a vector of parameters (f>), 6t is a
set of state dummy variables, <£", is a set of time dummy variables, and s  are 
stochastic disturbance terms which are independently and identically distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance equal to <j£, all for state i in period t, 
i = 1,2,...., N;t = 1,2,..................... T ' 9 .
In addition to (1), we estimate other growth equations that are similar to (1) 
using different measures of growth in state level per capita income in order to
19 Throughout the chapter we will denote per capita variables o f the state domestic product by lower 
case letters, and aggregate variables with upper case letters. For instance, sdp, as dp and isdp denote the 
per capita SDP, per capita SDP from agriculture and per capita SDP from industry, respectively, while 
SDP, ASDP and ISDP denote their aggregates.
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examine the impact of rural financial development on agricultural growth and 
industrial growth in income. For this, we estimate
K glJ = &0J W 1 + t>iYU) + W .  + *C°n0 + 0asi + + easlJ (2)
where yaglJ is the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product
from agriculture (asdp), r  is the vector of parameters associated with the 
conditioning set of variables in (2), 0agi is a set of state dummy variables, ga0 is a set
of time dummy variables, and s a are independently and identically distributed error 
terms with zero mean and constant variance equal to <Jm, all for state i in period t ,
/ = 1,2,....,N ;t = 1,2............................. T . For growth in the industrial sector, we
estimate
y m J  =  Co Y m l j - l  +  C 1 Y u j  +  C2b d , ) - \  +  * C o n ,J +  e m, +  +  S mi,, ( 3 )
where ymi, is the growth rate of real per capita gross state domestic product
from industry (isdp), X is the vector of parameters associated with the conditioning 
set of variables in (3), 0m/ is a set of state dummy variables, C, mt is a set of time
dummy variables, and s m are independently and identically distributed error terms 
with zero mean and constant variance equal to cr^ , all for state i in period t , 
i = 1,2,...., N;t = 1,2,......................... T .
We conduct a likelihood ratio test for the redundancy of the fixed effects in the 
same way we did for the models in chapter 220. We also conduct standard Wald test in 
order to validate some important hypotheses regarding the joint significance of some
20 If the null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects is true, the test statistic follows approximately a chi 
square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to (iV — l)  for cross section fixed effects ( N  is 
equal to the total number of cross sections in the estimation sample), {T — l)  for period fixed effects
(T  is equal to the total number of years in the estimation sample), and (tV —1)+ (T  — l)  for cross 
section and period fixed effects jointly. Failure to reject the null hypothesis would imply that the fixed 
effects (cross section, period, or cross section and period jointly, where applicable) are redundant.
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of the conditioning set of variables that represent infrastructure and well being, and 
the joint significance of banking development and the conditioning set of variables.
A major issue in this approach to estimating growth equations such as (1), (2) 
and (3) is the potential endogeneity. We control for endogeneity between state level 
finance, infrastructure, rural well being and growth by using the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (proposed by Arellano and Bover, 1995). For 
instance, regression of equation (1) is extended into a system of panel regression as 
follows:
where y/ is the vector of parameters associated with the conditioning set of 
variables in the GMM estimation. A system estimator jointly estimates the regression 
in levels as in (4.1) and the regression in differences as in (4.2). In order to correct for 
endogeneity, we employ the lagged first differences of the explanatory variables as 
instruments for the equation in levels (4.1) and the lagged values of the explanatory 
variables in levels as instruments for the equation in differences (4.2). We follow the 
same approach for controlling for the endogeneity for equation (2) and equation (3), 
and for these two equations the GMM equivalent will be referred to by (5) and (6), 
respectively. For the GMM estimation we are assuming that the lagged differences of 
banking development and other conditioning set of variables (that include proxies of 
infrastructure and rural well-being) are good instruments for explaining subsequent 
levels and the lagged levels of banking development and other conditioning set of 
variables are good instruments for explaining subsequent first differences.
Yi,t -  PoYu-x +P\Yktj + p2^i,i-\ + &i + £ i,t (4.1)
(4.2)
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In order to test the validity of this approach, we employ the standard Sargan
01test (details of this test are discussed in chapter in section 2.3) . In addition to the 
Sargan test, we also employ standard Wald test in the GMM estimations in order to 
test a group of hypotheses that involve the joint significance of the conditioning set of 
variables and the joint significance of banking development and the conditioning set 
of variables.
3.4 Data and variables
Data are mainly collected from online sources. In section 2.4 of Chapter 2, we have 
discussed the data source and some details of the data for state domestic product, its 
components and commercial banking at the state level. For empirical estimation of the 
growth regressions in this chapter, we use the same data (and processing technique) 
for these variables. In addition, in this chapter we use data on infrastructure, rural well 
being and informal sector activities. We discuss the infrastructure and informal sector 
related data in 3.4.1. In section 3.4.2 we discuss the proxies and data related to rural 
well being.
3.4.1 Data on Infrastructure and informal sector
Data on the State wise distribution of per capita electricity consumption can be found 
in Infrastructure Statistics 2010, available online in the reports section of the National 
Data Warehouse of MOSPI. This data is originally collected from All India Electricity 
Statistics, published by the Ministry of Power of the Government of India. However, 
the data is not for continuous years, and thus this source is not really useful for our 
purpose. We collect data on state wise available electricity potential and the 
percentage of transmission and distribution loss from the Planning Commission 
website for 2002-2008. For 1999-2001, we collect the same from the various issues of
21 If the null hypothesis is true, the Sargan test statistic follows approximately chi square distribution. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis would imply that the over-identifying restrictions are true, i.e. the 
instruments are valid. In our study, we hold the financial development indicators and the proxies for 
infrastructure and rural well-being as the instruments. Thus failure to reject the null hypothesis for the 
Sargan test would imply that these are good instruments for the GMM estimation.
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the Central Electricity authority’s General Review. We use the two series (potential 
electricity and percentage of loss) in order to compute the state wise actual aggregate 
use of electricity (figure 3.2j). We then divide this by the state wise population in 
order to derive per capita consumption of electricity, which we convert in kilo watts 
(the scale is 1 giga watt = 1000000 kilo watts).
Data on state wise rail routes (both in kms and in square kms) are available 
from the Infrastructure Statistics 2010 (MOSPI) for 2003-2008. For the remaining 
years of the sample, we collect this data from the various reports of the Ministry of 
Railways of the Government of India. For the regressions, we use the state wise rail 
routes in km per 1000 squared kms. The same data source gives us the state wise 
length of roads and rural roads for 2003-2008, and the remainder we collect from 
various reports of the Basic Road Statistics of the Ministry of Road Transport & 
Highways of the Government of India. For the regression, we convert the length of 
roads and rural roads in kms per square km using the total area of the state in square 
kms. Because of incompleteness of data, we cannot use telecommunication as a proxy 
for communication infrastructure. We use two proxies to account for informal sector 
and system loss. We use the percentage of electricity lost due to transmission and 
distribution failure in order to account for a measure of system loss. For the informal 
sector activity, we take the share of unregistered manufacturing sector in SDP as a 
proxy.
3.4.2 Data on rural well being
We use two proxies in order to account for the level of rural well being. We use the 
share of social sector expenditure in SDP and a measure of sanitation per square km. 
The state government expenditure on social sectors is available from the handbook. 
We use wholesale price index on all commodities to convert this series for all states 
and UTs into real series (at 2000 prices).
Data on sanitation is collected from the Ministry of Rural Development of the 
Government of India (also available in the Infrastructure Statistics 2010 of MOSPI
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reports). This data is the number of rural households that have access to toilet 
facilities. For the regression we convert this series into number of rural household per 
square km of the state that have access to toilet facilities.
3.4.3 Banking and other data
All banking-related data and other data are same as we have explained in
chapter 2 of this thesis. As we did in chapter 2, here also we use the SDP data and the
banking data to create eight proxies that account for the level of banking development
in the states of India. In real terms, these are different measures of the proportion of
bank deposits and credits to the measures of SDP, and therefore they account for the
level of banking development from both the supply side and the demand side. For
nni SCBDP nfV, RRBDPdeposits, we create the indicators BD\  -----------,BD3 = ----------- and
SDP ASDP
R RRD P
BD1 = ----------- , where SCBDP and RRBDP denote the real value of the total
ISDP
deposits of the SCBs and the RRBs, respectively. For credits, we create the indicators
BD2 = SCBCRD and BD4 = RRBCRD where SCBCRD and RRBCRD denote the 
SDP ASDP
real value of the total credits by the SCBs and the RRBs, respectively. We also create
nMC AGRCRD nrui INDCRD A Drw> RRBCRD u ^BD5 =  , BD6 = ------------- and BD8 = ------------- , where AGRCRD and
SDP SDP ISDP
INDCRD denote the real values of the agricultural credit by the SCBs and the
industrial credit by the SCBs, respectively .
3.4.4 Summary statistics of state level data
The summary statistics of SDP and its components and the banking related data are in 
tables 2.4.3a and 2.4.3b of chapter 2. In this section, we present the summary statistics 
of the infrastructure and rural well being related data in table 3.4.4a.
22 For the financial development indicators we use upper case letters for their actual value, while in the 
regressions (and in section 3.3 where we define the empirical specifications) we use lower case letters 
to denote their logarithmic values.
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Table 3.4.4a: Summary statistics of Infrastructure and rural well being related 
data for the 26 states and union territories, 1999-2008._________________________
Rural hhs’ 
access to 
toilet (SAN, 
1 0 0 0 0 0 )
Road length 
(ROAD, 
1 0 0 0  kms)
Rural road 
length 
(RROAD, 
1 0 0 0  kms)
Rail route 
length 
(RAILRT, 
1 0 0 0  kms)
Per capita 
electricity 
(PCE, kwh)
Real Social 
Sector exp 
(SS, INR, cr)
Mean 18.02 104.53 94.08 2.41 378.70 57.80
SD 21.94 90.39 81.77 2.33 284.38 52.57
Max 139.56 345.01 331.21 8.79 1651.10 278.14
Min 0.19 0.99 0.96 0 . 0 0 38.27 0 . 0 0
Obs 260 260 260 260 260 260
SAN ROAD RROAD PCE RAILRT SS
SAN 1 0 .6 8 0 . 6 6 0 .0 1 0.62 0.79
ROAD 0 . 6 8 1 0.99 -0 . 0 2 0.79 0.81
RROAD 0 . 6 6 0.99 1 -0 . 0 2 0.76 0.79
PCE 0 .0 1 -0 .0 2 -0 . 0 2 1 0 . 0 2 0.13
RAILRT 0.62 0.79 0.76 0 . 0 2 1 0.84
SS 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.13 0.84 1
As we can see from the correlation matrix, road lengths have a negative 
correlation with per capita electricity consumption. A clearer picture of this negative 
correlation (and potentially others) can be observed if one considers the correlation 
between the growth rates of these variables, which show some interesting correlation 
properties. For instance, we find that there is negative correlation between the growth 
in road length and the growth in rail route length. This may be due to the fact that 
given the area of a state, increasing the length of roads is only possible at the cost of 
decreasing the other transport related infrastructure (e.g. rail route). Similarly we find 
that the correlation between the growth rate of transport infrastructure of any form 
(e.g. rail route or road length) is negatively correlated with the growth rate in the other 
infrastructure (e.g. electricity) and with the growth rate of the rural well being 
variables (e.g. social service expenditure or sanitation). This is perhaps because the 
trade off related to state level resources.
113
Table 3.4.4b: Correlation matrix of SDP growth rates and growth in rural well 
being proxies. _____________________________________________________________
7 7  ag 7m 7k SS san
7 1 0.696 0.729 -0.007 0 . 0 1 2 0.252
7  ag 0.696 1 0.182 -0.039 -0.015 0.053
7m 0.729 0.182 1 0.019 -0.060 0.276
7k -0.007 -0.039 0.019 1 0.015 -0.081
SS 0 . 0 1 2 -0.015 -0.060 0.015 1 0.037
san 0.252 0.053 0.276 -0.081 0.037 1
Table 3.4.4c: Correlation matrix 
infrastructure proxies.
of SDP growth rates and growth in
7 7  ag 7m 7 k road rroad rail elec
7 1 0.711 0.735 -0 .0 0 1 0 . 0 1 2 0.006 -0.087 0.052
7 ag 0.711 1 0.157 -0.018 -0.040 -0.036 -0.061 -0.092
7 m 0.735 0.157 1 0.044 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.010 -0.078 0.164
7k -0 .0 0 1 -0.018 0.044 1 -0.018 -0.022 0.067 0.007
road 0 . 0 1 2 -0.040 -0 . 0 0 2 -0.018 1 0.976 -0.004 -0.068
rroad 0.006 -0.036 -0 . 0 1 0 -0 . 0 2 2 0.976 1 -0.005 -0.079
rail -0.087 -0.061 -0.078 0.067 -0.004 -0.005 1 -0.030
elec 0.052 -0.092 0.164 0.007 -0.068 -0.079 -0.030 1
We present the correlation matrix of the dependent variables and the growth in 
rural well being proxies in table 3.4.4b, and the correlation matrix of the dependent 
variables and the growth in the infrastructure proxies in table 3.4.4c. Notice that the 
data exhibits some interesting correlations between the growth rates of different 
variables. There is a 0.037 correlation coefficient between the growth in sanitation 
and the growth in social sector expenditures, which is as expected. The growth in road 
length and the growth in rural road length are strongly positively correlated, and both 
these growth rates are positively correlated with the growth in per capita SDP. We 
observe negative correlation between the growth rates of both road length and rural 
road length with the growth rate in per capita ASDP, which indicates the trade off of 
agricultural land (and labour) for paving new roads. There is a clear positive
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correlation between Industrial SDP growth and growth in electricity consumption, 
which is also as expected.
3.4.5 List of variables and key empirical hypotheses
We conduct the analysis on three sets of models using two approaches. In fixed 
effects panel estimation, we use growth rate in real per capita SDP, growth rate in real 
per capita agricultural SDP and growth rate in real per capita industrial SDP as 
dependent variables for model (1), (2) and (3), respectively. We do the same for 
model (4), (5) and (6) when we use the system GMM estimation technique. In table 
3.4.5a we list all variables and their roles (and symbols) that are used in this chapter.
For all three sets of models, we use the growth in per capita capital stock as 
one of the regressors. We also use the (logarithm of) lagged value of per capita SDP, 
per capita ASDP and per capita ISDP as regressors for models (1&4), (2&5) and 
(3&6), respectively. In addition to these, similar to chapter 2 we use the (logarithm of) 
lagged values of banking development proxy and their combinations as regressors. 
The variables which are measured per square km (i.e. road, rural road, rail route and 
sanitation) are used with a squared term and with logarithms as regressors. The three 
ratios are used without logarithms.
Apart from the technical hypotheses (as discussed in section 3.3), we are also 
interested in a number of empirical hypothesis. As we did in chapter 2, here also we 
test the null hypothesis of zero marginal growth effect of the supply side and the 
demand side of banking development. In this chapter we test this only for the fixed 
effects panel estimations.
For the same set of estimations, we also compute the marginal growth effect of 
the infrastructure and the rural well being related variables that are in squared term 
(i.e. the ones for which we believe there is a second order effect). These are the 
variables which are measured per square km. In order to demonstrate the 
computational technique for this marginal effect, consider a (post estimation) version
of (1):
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T i j  =b<sy,.,-\ + bA '  + k bd,.,-\ + 4  [rdt M )2 + others (7)
Table 3.4.5a: List of variables, their role and symbol used 
estimations.
in econometric
Variable Role Symbol
Growth rate in real sdp/real asdp/real isdp Dependent variables y'Y ejY n
Real sdp/real asdp /real isdp * Lagged regressors y .J y ,# - 1 i y M-\
Growth rate in real per capita capital stock Regressor Y k ,
Banking development indicator 1 (SCB deposit/SDP)* Lagged regressor bd \t_x
Banking development indicator 2 (SCB credit/SDP)* Lagged regressor bd2,_x
Banking development indicator 3 (RRB deposit/ASDP) * Lagged regressor bd3t_x
Banking development indicator 4 (RRB credit/ASDP)* Lagged regressor bd4,_x
Banking development indicator 5(AGR credit/SDP* Lagged regressor bd5t_x
Banking development indicator 6 (IND credit/SDP)* Lagged regressor bd6t_x
Banking development indicator 7 (RRB deposit/ISDP) * Lagged regressor bdl,_x
Banking development indicator 8 (RRB credit/ISDP)* Lagged regressor bdSt_x
Per capita electricity consumption* Lagged regressor pcet_x
Length o f rail route per square km * Lagged regressor r l,~\
Length o f  road per square km * Lagged regressor rd ,_,
Length o f rural road per square km* Lagged regressor rrd,-,
proportion o f electricity lost in T&D Regressor Sloss
Proportion o f unregistered manufacturing in real SDP Regressor Infrm
No. o f rural households per sq. km with access to toilets* Lagged regressor sn,_x
Ratio o f  real Social sector expenditure in real SDP Lagged regressor ssr_ t
* logarithm in regression
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Notice that the marginal growth effect of the variable rdjt_x in (7) is23
drdiJt_\
= + 2<;2rdit_x. The marginal growth effect of road infrastructure in this
model is therefore variable, and it depends on the level of the road length for state i in 
period t and estimates of the two parameters and <J2. Using the same technique, 
we compute the marginal growth effect of sanitation, rural roads and rail network for 
the models where they are included. We do not compute this marginal effect for all 
specifications, but only do it for the specifications where either the estimated 
parameters for these variables are statistically significant, or the model has the best 
coefficient of variation or the least information criterion, or both.
For both sets of estimations (fixed effects and GMM), we test joint restrictions 
on a number of parameters. We test the validity of the infrastructure variables and the 
rural well being variables in squared terms. We also test the joint significance of 
banking related proxy and the social sector expenditure variable. We test if per capita 
electricity consumption and system loss are jointly significant as explanatory 
variables. We also test if all infrastructure variables and the system loss proxy are 
jointly statistically significant. In all these tests we use the standard Wald test.
3.5 Results from fixed effects panel estimation
For model (1), we use six specification that involve banking development indicators 
bd\,_x,bd2t_x,bd3t_x and bdAt_x and their combinations. In table 3.5.1 A we
summarize the results from fixed effects panel estimation of these six specifications. 
We report the estimated coefficient and its associated p-value (based on White cross 
section standard errors). All specifications are estimated using both cross section and 
period fixed effects. In table 2.5.1 A we report the important statistics related to model 
selection (adjusted R 2 and Akaike Information Criterion), the F-statistic (and its 
associated p-value) for the overall significance of the estimated parameters, and the 
log of the likelihood function associated with every specifications. In the same table
23 The variable rdt t_ x is the (lagged value of) logarithm of road length per square km.
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we also report the Chi-square test statistics (and their associated p-values) related to 
the joint significance of the cross section fixed effects, the period fixed effects and the 
cross section and period fixed effects together.
Table 3.5.1A: Summary of Fixed effects Panel estimation of model 1, dependent
variable is real per capita SDP growth.
1(a) 1(b) 1(c) 1(d) 1(e) 1(f)
y,-i
-0.5463
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.5529
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.5399
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.4923
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.5307
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.4952
[0 .0 0 0 ]
r k,
-0 .0 0 2 1
[0.341]
-0.0023
[0.430]
-0 . 0 0 2 2
[0.468]
-0.0037
[0.302]
0 . 0 0 1 0
[0 .1 0 1 ]
0.0032
[0.105]
bd\,_ i 0.0186[0.078]
0.0257
[0.006]
bd2,_x 0.0047[0.455] 0.0047[0.107]
0.0769
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.0808
[0 .0 0 0 ]
W f , 0.0510[0.131]
0.0489
[0.106]
P cet-\
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.007]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.008]
0 . 0 0 0 1
[0 .0 0 1 ]
0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.006]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.005]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.009]
rl,~i 0.2065[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.1808
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.2909
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.2198
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.3255
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0 . 2 1 2 0
[0 .0 0 0 ]
rl2i-i -0.0176[0 .0 1 0 ] -0.0151[0.016] -0.0225[0 .0 0 1 ] -0.0161[0.007]
-0.0262
[0 .0 0 1 ]
-0.0158
[0.009]
rd'-i 0.0004[0.330]
0.0004
[0.344]
0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.687]
0 . 0 0 0 2
[0 .6 6 6 ]
0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.658]
0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.620]
rd2,-\ -0.0000[0.484] -0.0000[0.487]
-0.0000
[0.879]
-0.0000
[0.801]
-0.0000
[0.864]
-0.0000
[0.765]
Sloss 0.0004[0.493]
0.0003
[0.636]
0.0004
[0.493]
0.0008
[0.263]
0.0007
[0.197]
0.0009
[0.172]
Infrm -0.1117[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1131
[0 .0 0 0 0 ]
-0 . 1 1 0 1
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1107
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1081
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1106
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0 . 0 0 1 0
[0.052]
0 .0 0 1 1
[0.041]
0 . 0 0 1 1
[0 .0 2 0 ]
0 . 0 0 1 1
[0.055]
0.0013
[0.027]
0 . 0 0 1 2
[0.045]
sn 2 t-1
-0.00008
[0.006]
-0.00009
[0.005]
-0.00008
[0 .0 0 1 ]
-0.00008
[0 .0 2 0 ]
-0.00009
[0.006]
-0.00008
[0.023]
SSY„ 0.0038[0.057]
0.0084
[0.072]
-0.0043
[0.209]
0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.311]
0.0185
[0.015]
-0.0032
[0.328]
Observations
R 2
AIC
ln-likelihood
216
0.533
-3.613
469.82
216
0.526
-3.598
468.05
207
0.563
-3.661
440.40
207
0.535
-3.598
433.60
207
0.578
-3.693
444.85
207
0.534
-3.593
434.13
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications l(a-b) 
we remove two states because there are no rail routes in these (Meghalaya and A&N Islands), and for 
specifications l(c-f) we remove three states because there are no rail routes and RRBs in these (No 
RRB in Goa and A&N Islands). Cross section and period fixed effects used in all specifications.
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For all six specifications, we find that the lagged per capita SDP has 
significant negative marginal effect on the growth of per capita SDP. However, for all 
specifications we find that the marginal effect of per capita capital stock growth on 
per capita SDP growth is insignificant. This finding is in line with our conjecture 
about the recent growth in SDP in Indian states; as we have discussed following the 
figure 2c in subsection 2.2.1 of chapter 2, the rapid development of the service sector 
did not contribute in the growth of per capita stock of physical capital, which is why 
growth in this variable is not a significant component of the growth in per capita SDP. 
We find that lagged SCB deposits have significant marginal effect on per capita SDP 
growth. The net marginal effect of SCB deposits is equal to 0.0257+0.0808=0.1065, 
and it is statistically significant. In every model per capita electricity has statistically 
significant positive net growth effect. The same holds in general for the length of rail 
route per square km. In all of the models informal sector has negative significant 
effect (as one would predict). Both rural well being proxies, access to toilets and 
social sector expenditure in real SDP have significant marginal effect on growth. In 
table 3.5.IB we present the diagnostic tests for redundancy of fixed effects. For all 
specifications all fixed effects are significant, so they are important and not redundant.
Table 3.5.IB: Summary of redundant fixed effects test for model 1 
(null hypothesis: fixed effects are redundant).___________________
Specification Effects Test Statistic (d.f.) Prob. Decision
1(a) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
167.46(23) 
93.848 (8 ) 
210.666 (31)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
1(b) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
164.05(23) 
103.83 (8 ) 
208.31 (31)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
1(c) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
171.74 (22) 
60.274 (8 ) 
205.97 (30)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
1(d) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
154.01 (22) 
33.975 (8 ) 
187.73 (30)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
1(e) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
179.58(22) 
60.09 (8 ) 
210.60 (30)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
m Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
154.86 (22) 
33.61 (8 ) 
187.26 (30)
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 0
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
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In table 3.5.1C we present the test result summary of the key hypotheses. All 
the squared terms are jointly significant. In 1(b) the banking development and social 
sector expenditure are not jointly significant. As we found in chapter 2, the growth 
effect of deposits is statistically significant but the growth effect of credits is not. We 
also find that per capita electricity and system loss in electricity are jointly statistically 
significant, and the same holds for all the infrastructure variables.
Table 3.5.1C: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 1
(F statistic [p-value]).
Null hypothesis 1(a) 1(b) 1(c) 1(d) 1(e) 1(f)
Coef. est.for rlt_x, rl2,-\, r d r d \ - i , 18.60 23.12 390.54 61.59 190.01 33.66
snt_v sn 2i-1 are all zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Coef. est. for bd,_x and SSYt_x 
are all zero
2.79
[0.063]
1.953
[0.144]
25.94
[0 .0 0 0 ]
5.778
[0.003]
16.239
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.374
[0.019]
Growth effect o f SCB deposits is equal to 
zero
3.140
[0.078] -
36.93
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-
39.36
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Growth effect o f  SCB credits is equal to 
zero
0.547
[0.455] -
2.194
[0.138]
-
2.434
[0.118]
Coef est. for p ce t_x and Sloss 
are both zero
4.081
[0.018]
3.998
[0.019]
5.349
[0.005]
4.321
[0.014]
4.285
[0.015]
3.743
[0.025]
Coef. est.for ri( i , rl2,-i, rd^> rd2,->, 
pee,-1, Sloss are all zero
17.336
[0 .0 0 0 ]
23.451
[0 .0 0 0 ]
269.20
[0 .0 0 0 ]
74.41
[0 .0 0 0 ]
41.322
[0 .0 0 0 ]
46.052
[0 .0 0 0 ]
All coef. est. are zero
6.798
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.635
[0 .0 0 0 ]
7.305
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.623
[0 .0 0 0 ]
7.559
[0 .0 0 0 ]
6.488
[0 .0 0 0 ]
In figure 3.5.1a we present a histogram that shows the net marginal growth 
effect of rail routes when we use specification 1(e). We choose this specification 
because this is the best model in terms of highest adjusted R squared and lowest AIC. 
The net marginal growth effect of rail routes is equal to 0.32, which means more rail 
routes positively affect growth in SDP.
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Figure 3.5.1a: Histogram o f m arginal growth effect o f rail route expansion,
computed from 1(e).
60
50
Series: Marginal effect of Railroute expansion 
Sample 1999 2008 
Observations 240
40-
2 0 -
30-
Mean 0.329207
Median 0.284438
Maximum 0.677913
Minimum 0.211550
Std. Dev. 0.113832
Skewness 1.470415
Kurtosis 4.502489
1 0 -
Jarque-Bera 109.0595
Probability 0.000000
0
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
The results summary of fixed effects panel estimation for model (2)’s seven 
specifications are reported in table 3.5.2A. The structure of the summary is as same as 
in table 3.5.1 A. For this model, our dependent variable is the growth in per capita 
ASDP. We find significant negative marginal effect of the lagged per capita ASDP, 
and insignificant marginal effect of per capita capital stock growth for all seven 
specifications. Specification 2(f), where we use bd\,_x and bd3t_x together as
explanatory variables, has the highest R 2 and the lowest AIC. For all specifications 
we find statistically significant cross section and period fixed effects. Except for 
bd 1M which represents the lagged ratio of SCB deposits to SDP, the other banking
development indicators perform poorly as explanatory variables for this model. 
Among the infrastructure indicators only rural roads and rail routes are generally 
statistically significant. Among the proxies for rural well being informal sector and 
sanitations are generally significant. We present the diagnostic tests for redundancy of 
fixed effects in table 3.5.2B, and these tests validate the use of fixed effects in this 
estimation.
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Table 3.5.2A: Summary o f Fixed effects Panel estimation o f model 2, dependent
variable is real per capita ASDP growth.
2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(g)
y o g , / - 1
-0.8520 -0.8350 -0.9621 -0.9438 -0.8202 -0.9648 -0.9538
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Yt,
-0.0052 -0.0097 -0.0286 -0.0289 -0.0149 -0.0189 -0.0262
[0.809] [0.684] [0.304] [0.296] [0.582] [0.331] [0.239]
bd\,_x 0.0609 0.0543[0.031] [0.014]
b*2,-x
0.0083 0.0075
[0.751] [0.751]
bd3t_{ -0.0484 -0.0297[0.476] [0.637]
bd4,_\ -0.0286[0.300]
-0.0331
[0.151]
bd5,_, 0.0148
[0.589]
Pcet-\
- 0.0000 - 0.0000 0.000009 0.000009 -0.00005 0.00006 0.00008
[0.429] [0.436] [0 .1 0 2 ] [0.132] [0.397] [0.242] [0.106]
r l , - x
-0.1887 -0.2572 -0.3912 -0.3359 -0.2792 -0.3043 -0.3500
[0.429] [0 .1 2 1 ] [0.027] [0.092] [0.132] [0.047] [0.057]
rl2i-\ 0.0231 0.0296 0.0433 0.0380 0.0315 0.0347 0.0387[0.108] [0.060] [0.005] [0.032] [0.054] [0.008] [0.025]
0 .0 0 1 1 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0015 0.0015 -0 . 0 0 1 2 -0.0013 -0.0014ffdt_ i [0.018] [0 .0 1 1 ] [0.004] [0 .0 0 2 ] [0.007] [0.009] [0.003]
i 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2rrd ,-i [0.062] [0.057] [0.034] [0.081] [0.044] [0.043] [0.029]
Sloss 0.0017 0 .0 0 1 1 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0017 0.0009[0.244] [0.415] [0.524] [0.602] [0.599] [0.175] [0.407]
Infirm -0.1526 -0.1559 -0.1576 -0.1553 -0.1554 -0.1558 -0.1553[0 .0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 1 ]
0.0025 0.0025 0.0006 0.0006 0.0025 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0007
sn/-\ [0.064] [0.063] [0.095] [0.098] [0.058] [0.138] [0.194]
-0.00008 -0.00008 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 -0.00008 0.00005 0 .0 0 0 0 1sn i-1 [0.332] [0.327] [0.728] [0.730] [0.322] [0.537] [0 .6 8 8 ]
0.0523 0.0340 0.0236 0.0278 0.0345 0.0536 0.0335
i—i [0.072] [0.231] [0.287] [0 .2 0 1 ] [0.241] [0.075] [0.055]
Observations 216 216 207 207 216 207 207
R 2 0.499 0.482 0.548 0.547 0.482 0.560 0.546
AIC -1.810 -1.777 -1.928 -1.925 -1.777 -1.951 -1.918
ln-likelihood 258.85 255.00 253.29 252.99 254.91 256.78 253.24
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications 2(a-b) 
and 2(e) we remove two states because there are no rail routes in these (Meghalaya and A&N Islands), 
and for specifications 2 (c-d) and 2 (f-g) we remove three states because there are no rail routes and 
RRBs in these (No RRB in Goa and A&N Islands). Cross section and period fixed effects used in all 
specifications.
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Table 3.5.2B: Summary of redundant fixed effects test for model 2 
(null hypothesis: fixed effects are redundant).
Specification Effects Test Statistic (d.f.) Prob. Decision
2(a) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
170.03 (23) 
31.88 (8 ) 
198.15(31)
0.0000
0 .0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(b) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
162.26(23) 
36.72 (8 ) 
190.89 (31)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(c) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
165.67 (22) 
39.82 (8 ) 
203.44 (30)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(d) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
165.98(22) 
31.52 (8 ) 
203.30 (30)
0.0000
0 . 0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(e) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
156.50(23) 
29.47 (8 ) 
186.58 (31)
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(f) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
170.91 (22) 
35.65 (8 ) 
208.93 (30)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
2(g) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
165.98 (22) 
31.52 (8 ) 
203.12(30)
0.0000
0 . 0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
We present the test result summary of the key hypotheses related to the results 
in table 3.5.2A in table 3.5.2C. Once again we find that all the squared terms are 
jointly significant. We find that only for 2(a) the net growth effect of commercial 
bank deposits is positive and statistically significant, and there is no significant 
marginal growth effect of credits. Electricity and system loss in electricity are not 
generally jointly significant in this model, but all the infrastructure variables are 
jointly statistically significant.
In figure 3.5.2a we present the histogram of the agricultural growth effect of 
rural road expansion when we use the results of 2(f). There is significant negative 
marginal effect on agricultural growth for expansion of rural roads, equal to -0.0011. 
This is potentially because expansion of rural roads requires allocation of more land 
which results in a drop in agricultural production. In figure 3.5.2b we present the 
histogram that shows the agricultural growth effect of sanitation (again using the 
results of specification 2(f)). It is clear that net agricultural growth effect of sanitation 
is positive and significant. It has a mean equal to 0.0012.
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Table 3.5.2C: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 2 
(F statistic [p-value]).
Null hypothesis 2(a) 2(b) 2(c) 2(d) 2(e) 2(f) 2(g)
Coef est.for r/2,-., rrd,_r 7.214 9.902 4.047 4.921 8.864 3.369 5.022
rrd1,-1, sn,_v sn 2 t -1 are all zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0.003] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Coef est. for bd,_x and SSYt_x 
Are all zero
4.743
[0.009]
0.728
[0.484]
9.947
[0 .0 0 0 ]
1.323
[0.268]
0.769
[0.464]
11.167
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.750
[0 .0 1 2 ]
Growth effect o f SCB deposits is 
equal to zero
4.685
[0.030]
-
0.5081
[0.475]
- -
0.2190
[0.639]
-
Growth effect o f SCB credits is 
equal to zero
-
0 . 1 0 0 2
[0.751]
-
1.076
[0.299]
0.2901
[0.589]
-
0.5590
[0.454]
Coef. est. for p ce t_x and Sloss 
are both zero
3.102
[0.047]
1.597
[0.205]
2.034
[0.134]
1.979
[0.141]
1.480
[0.230]
2.207
[0.113]
1.473
[0.232]
Coef. est.for r/( i , r/2,-i, rrd,_,> 17.433 19.797 11.813 31.046 20.972 9.768 9.728
rrdl,~\, p c e t_x, Sloss are all 
zero
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
6.049 5.722 6.947 6.917 5.914 7.098 6.748
All coef. est. are zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Figure 3.5.2a: Histogram of marginal agricultural growth effect of rural road 
expansion, computed from 2(f).
Series: Marginal effect of Rural Road expansion
Sample 1999 2008
Observations 260
Mean -0.001143
Median -0.001132
Maximum -0.001068
Minimum -0.001302
Std. Dev. 5.32e-05
Skewness -0.823235
Kurtosis 3.314485
Jarque-Bera 30.43910
Probability 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.0013 -0.0012 - 0.0011
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Figure 3.5.2b: Histogram o f m arginal agricultural growth effect o f more
sanitation, computed from 2(f).
Series: Marginal effect of expansion in sanitation
Sample 1999 2008
Observations 260
Mean 0.001211
Median 0.001234
Maximum 0.001494
Minimum 0.000834
Std. Dev. 0.000144
Skewness -0.531446
Kurtosis 2.906749
Jarque-Bera 12.33305
Probability 0.002099
0.00100 0.00125 0.00150
The summary of results from fixed effects panel estimation of model (3), for 
which our dependent variable is growth in per capita ISDP, is reported in table 
3.5.3A. The fixed effects redundancy tests summary and hypotheses test summary are 
in table 3.5.3B and 3.5.3C, respectively. For this model, specification 3(b) has the 
highest R 2 and the lowest AIC. For all specifications the cross section and the period 
fixed effects are statistically significant. For this model, we find that the marginal 
effect of SCB deposits on growth of industries is positive and statistically significant 
at the 10% level for specification 3(b) and 3(g). Among the infrastructure indicators 
only rail routes are generally statistically significant. Same holds for informal sector 
and the second order effect of sanitation.
From table 3.5.3C we can conclude that all the squared terms are jointly 
significant, and only for 3(b) marginal industrial growth effect of credit is positive and 
statistically significant. Electricity and system loss in electricity are not jointly 
significant, and except for 3(a) all the infrastructure variables are jointly statistically 
significant. We present the histograms of marginal industrial growth effect of rail 
expansion and road expansion in figures 3.5.3a and 3.5.3b, respectively. These show 
that both such expansions can positively affect growth in industrial output.
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Table 3.5.3A: Summary of Fixed effects Panel estimation o f model 3, dependent
variable is real per capita ISDP growth.
3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 3(d) 3(e) 3(f) 3(g)
yM-\
-0.2888
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2975
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2841
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2629
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2878
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2837
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.2826
[0 .0 0 0 ]
Yk,
0.0034
[0.067]
0.0041
[0.108]
0.0025
[0.278]
0.0031
[0.273]
0.0024
[0.299]
0.0053
[0.562]
0.0068
[0.432]
bd\,_x 0.0127[0.204]
0.0151
[0.148]
W2 , , 0.0079[0.059]
0.0098
[0.007]
bd 7 ,_, -0 . 0 2 2 2[0.087]
-0.0173
[0.269]
0.0127
[0.592]
0.0065
[0.791]
bd6,_x 0.0035[0.696]
W - i
0.00005
[0.133]
0.00006
[0.140]
0.00003
[0.430]
0.00004
[0.302]
0.00005
[0.150]
0 . 0 0 0 0 2
[0.165]
0.00003
[0.415]
r l ,- \
0.2420
[0 .0 1 2 ]
0.2106
[0.023]
0.2005
[0.054]
0.2417
[0 .0 2 0 ]
0.2321
[0 .0 1 0 ]
0.2227
[0.059]
0.2209
[0.053]
rl2,-i -0 . 0 2 2 2[0.015]
-0 . 0 2 0 0
[0 .0 2 1 ]
-0.0187
[0.041]
-0.0214
[0.013]
-0 .0 2 1 1
[0.014]
-0 . 0 2 1 0
[0.044]
-0.0204
[0.030]
rd,-x 0 .0 0 0 1[0.058]
0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.109]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.171]
0.00009
[0.487]
0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.294]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.327]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.135]
rd1,-1 -0 . 0 0 0 0 1[0.180]
-0 . 0 0 0 0 2
[0.274]
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0 .8 6 6 ]
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.882]
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.858]
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.902]
- 0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.853]
Sloss -0.00007[0.851]
-0.00008
[0.844]
-0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.748]
-0 .0 0 0 1
[0.799]
-0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.568]
0.00009
[0.804]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.748]
Infrm -0.0592[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0599
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0621
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0622
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0603
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0615
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.0626
[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.0004
[0.256]
0.0004
[0.199]
0.0004
[0.405]
0.0004
[0.339]
0.0004
[0.183]
0.0005
[0.203]
0.0006
[0 .2 0 2 ]
sn 2 ,-1 -0.00005[0 .0 2 2 ]
-0.00005
[0.016]
-0.00005
[0.066]
-0.00005
[0.073]
-0.00005
[0 .0 1 1 ]
-0.00006
[0.058]
-0.00006
[0.046]
SSY,., 0 . 0 1 1 2[0.269]
0.0108
[0 .1 0 2 ]
0.0159
[0.079]
0.0089
[0.409]
0.0141
[0 .2 1 2 ]
0.0075
[0.223]
0 . 0 0 2 0
[0.289]
Observations
R 2
AIC
ln-likelihood
216
0.486
-3.874
500.35
216
0.489
-3.880
500.99
207
0.473
-3.889
465.11
207
0.471
-3.886
464.68
216
0.480
-3.863
499.01
207
0.479
-3.898
467.02
207
0.483
-3.904
467.66
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. For specifications 3(a-b) 
and 3(e) we remove two states because there are no rail routes in these (Meghalaya and A&N Islands), 
and for specifications 3(c-d) and 3(f-g) we remove three states because there are no rail routes and 
RRBs in these (No RRB in Goa and A&N Islands). Cross section and period fixed effects used in all 
specifications.
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Table 3.5.3B: Summary of redundant fixed effects test for model 3
(null hypothesis: fixed effects are redundant).
Specification Effects Test Statistic (d.f.) Prob. Decision
3(a) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
110.89 (23) 
103.16(8) 
177.23 (31)
0.0000
0 . 0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(b) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
112.10(23)
108.18(8)
178.02(31)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(c) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
104.93 (22) 
72.58 (8 ) 
158.90 (30)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(d) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
101.14(22) 
49.30 (8 ) 
153.25 (30)
0.0000
0 .0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(e) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
106.68 (23) 
114.09 (8 ) 
176.53 (31)
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(f) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
108.66 (2 2 ) 
67.82 (8 ) 
159.35 (30)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
3(g) Cross Section Chi-square 
Period Chi-square 
Cross Section/Period Chi-square
106.75 (22) 
50.38 (8 ) 
155.49 (30)
0.0000
0 . 0 0 0 1
0.0000
Reject null 
Reject null 
Reject null
Table 3.5.3C: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 3
(F statistic [p-value]).
Null hypothesis 3(a) 3(b) 3(c) 3(d) 3(e) 3(f) 3(g)
Coef. est.for rl,_x, rl2,-X, rdt_x, 5.269 5.429 15.143 14.810 4.362 8.537 9.970
rd2i-x, sn,_v sn2t-1 are all zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Coef. est. for bd,_x and SSY,_X 
are all zero
3.442
[0.034]
3.632
[0.028]
1.690
[0.187]
3.182
[0.043]
2.424
[0.091]
3.220
[0.024]
3.397
[0.019]
Growth effect o f SCB deposits is 
equal to zero
1.618
[0.203]
-
2.959
[0.085]
- -
0.008
[0.925]
-
Growth effect o f SCB credits is 
equal to zero
-
3.594
[0.058]
-
0.287
[0.591]
0.152
[0.695]
-
0.426
[0.513]
Coef. est. for pcet_x and Sloss 
are both zero
1.157
[0.316]
1 .1 2 1
[0.328]
0.324
[0.723]
0.561
[0.571]
1.043
[0.354]
0.401
[0.669]
0.488
[0.614]
Coef. est.for rit x, rl2,-X, rdt_x, 1.546 1.879 2.782 3.850 4.825 2 . 0 1 2 3.262
rd2,~i, pcet_j , Sloss are all zero [0.165] [0.086] [0.013] [0 .0 0 1 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0.066] [0.004]
5.793 5.847 5.399 5.362 5.681 5.409 5.464
All coef. est. are zero [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
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Figure 3.5.3a: Histogram of m arginal industrial growth effect o f rail route
expansion, computed from 3(b).
Series: Marginal effect of Railroute expansion
Sample 1999 2008
Observations 240
Mean 0.213246
Median 0.181292
Maximum 0.462131
Minimum 0.129269
Std. Dev. 0.081246
Skewness 1.470415
Kurtosis 4.502489
Jarque-Bera 109.0595
Probability 0.000000
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
Figure 3.5.3b: Histogram of marginal industrial growth effect of road expansion, 
computed from 3(b).
Series: Marginal effect of Road expansion
Sample 1999 2008
Observations 260
Mean 3.89e-05
Median 2.79e-05
Maximum 0.000200
Minimum -3.37e-05
Std. Dev. 5.40e-05
Skewness 0.842303
Kurtosis 3.319337
Jarque-Bera 31.84860
Probability 0.000000
- 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002
3.6 Results from GMM estimation
In this section we discuss the results from system GMM estimation of models (4), (5) 
and (6). The system GMM estimation is a dynamic panel estimation where we set the
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explanatory variables as instruments, and test whether these instruments are the 
correct choice.
Table 3.6.1 A: Summary of GMM estimation of model 4, dependent variable is
real per capita SDP growth.
4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d) 4(e) 4(f)
y,-\
-0.8637
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8624
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8519
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8660
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8471
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.8356
[0 .0 0 0 ]
n ,
0.0015
[0.109]
0 . 0 0 1 2
[0.105]
0.0019
[0.445]
0.0015
[0.566]
0.0026
[0 .1 1 0 ]
0 .0 0 2 1
[0.106]
bd\,_x 0.0189[0 .0 0 0 ]
0.0178
[0 .0 0 0 ]
M2,_x 0.0035[0.361]
0.0031
[0.215]
W3,_, 0.0380[0.076]
0.0349
[0 .1 0 1 ]
bdA,_x -0.0088
[0.635]
-0.0072
[0.512]
pce,_ i -0 . 0 0 0 0[0.298]
-0 . 0 0 0 0
[0.697]
-0 . 0 0 0 0
[0.670]
-0 . 0 0 0 0
[0.719]
-0 . 0 0 0 0
[0.588]
-0 . 0 0 0 0
[0.423]
r*,-\
0.2138
[0.085]
0.2049
[0.089]
0.2142
[0.097]
0.1968
[0 .1 0 2 ]
0.2123
[0.099]
0.2029
[0.078]
rl2,-\ -0.0186[0.094]
-0.0181
[0.095]
-0.0184
[0.119]
-0.0171
[0.129]
-0.0181
[0 .1 2 1 ]
-0.0113
[0.106]
rd.-i -0 .0 0 0 1[0.662]
-0 .0 0 0 1
[0.631]
-0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.541]
-0 . 0 0 0 1
[0.689]
-0 . 0 0 0 2
[0.611]
-0 .0 0 0 1
[0.513]
rd2,-i 0 . 0 0 0 0 0[0.449]
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.434]
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.309]
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.435]
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.359]
0 . 0 0 0 0 0
[0.419]
Sloss 0 .0 0 0 1[0.712]
0 .0 0 0 2
[0.653]
0.0004
[0.310]
0.0004
[0.287]
0.0003
[0.361]
0 .0 0 0 1
[0.561]
Infrm -0.1594[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1592
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1560
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1566
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1560
[0 .0 0 0 ]
-0.1591
[0 .0 0 0 ]
sn,-x
0 . 0 0 2 0
[0.037]
0 . 0 0 2 0
[0.041]
0 . 0 0 2 2
[0.029]
0 . 0 0 2 1
[0.034]
0.0023
[0.023]
0.0023
[0.016]
sn 2 ,-1 -0 .0 0 0 0 1[0.030]
-0 .0 0 0 0 1
[0.031]
-0 . 0 0 0 0 1
[0.025]
-0 . 0 0 0 0 1
[0.026]
-0 . 0 0 0 0 1
[0.023]
-0 .0 0 0 0 1
[0 .0 2 0 ]
SSY'_t 0.0105[0.285]
0 . 0 1 0 0
[0 .2 1 0 ]
-0.0028
[0.709]
0.0089
[0.042]
-0.0033
[0.767]
0 .0 1 0 1
[0.164]
Observations 
Instr. Rank 
J-statistic 
[p-value] 
Sum squared 
residuals
182
48
28.775
[0.371]
0.157
182
48
30.295
[0.301]
0.159
168
48
31.383
[0.255]
0.141
168
48
32.021
[0.231]
0.144
168
49
25.553
[0.334]
0.139
168
49
31.484
[0.251]
0.143
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. 2SLS weighing matrix,
Period fixed effects used in all specifications.
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A summary of results from the GMM estimation of model (4) is presented in 
table 3.6.1 A. For all specifications, based on the Sargan test we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous, i.e. they are valid 
instruments. As we found earlier in model (1) estimations using fixed effects panel 
method, the GMM estimation of model (4) also suggests that lagged per capita SDP 
has significant negative effect while growth in per capita capital stock has 
insignificant effect of growth of per capita output. We find that in the GMM 
estimation of model (4), the coefficient estimates for bdl M is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level. Given specification 4(a), this finding is 
consistent with the findings of specifications 1(a), i.e. the aggregate SCB deposits 
have a strictly positive and significant impact on growth of per capita SDP. The 
coefficient estimates for the banking development indicators in specifications 4(c) and 
4(d), i.e. the ones that include RRB deposits and credits, are statistically insignificant. 
Among the infrastructure indicators rail routes, per capita electricity and roads all are 
insignificant. Among rural development indicators sanitation has positive and 
significant effect in all six specifications and informal sector has negative and 
significant effect.
Table 3.6.IB: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 4
(F statistic [p-valuel).
Null hypothesis 4(a) 4(b) 4(c) 4(d) 4(e) 4(f)
Coef. est.for rit i, r!2,-\, rd\-x, 2.266 1.713 3.284 2.603 3.483 2.466
sn,_v sn 2 t-1 are all zero [0.039] [0 .1 2 1 ] [0.004] [0.019] [0.003] [0.026]
Coef. est. for bd,_x and SSYt_x 
are all zero
1.874
[0.156]
1.811
[0.166]
2.064
[0.130]
0.332
[0.717]
22.90
[0 .0 0 0 ]
2.492
[0.062]
Coef est.for pcet_x and Sloss 
are both zero
0.117
[0.889]
0.104
[0.900]
0.547
[0.579]
0.587
[0.557]
0.477
[0.621]
0.573
[0.564]
Coef. est.for ^ _ | f  r/Vi, rd,_x> rd2,-i, 1.161 1 .0 2 1 2.026 1.641 2 . 1 2 0 1.582
pcet_{, Sloss are all zero [0.329] [0.413] [0.065] [0.139] [0.054] [0.156]
In table 3.6.IB we present the results summary of all the diagnostic tests. We 
find that all the squared terms are generally jointly significant. Only for 4(e) we find
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that bd\t_{ and SSYt_x are jointly statistically significant. For the same specification
we find that the infrastructure related variables jointly significantly affect growth. 
Table 3.6.2A: Summary of GMM estimation of model 5, dependent variable is
real per capita ASDP growth.
5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) 5(e) 5(f) 5(g)
yagt-\
-1.2958 -1.2964 -1.3526 -1.4323 -1.2838 -1.3543 -1.4400
[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
Yk,
-0.0063 -0 . 0 1 1 0 -0.0193 -0.0194 -0.0147 -0.0143 -0.0177
[0.720] [0.516] [0.148] [0 .1 2 1 ] [0.334] [0.241] [0.126]
bdl,_} 0.0405 0.0350[0.040] [0.029]
bdl,_x 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0037[0.245] [0.346]
W3,_, 0.0155 0.0119[0.174] [0.098]
hr] 4 0.0869 0.0891oa  V-l [0 .0 2 2 ] [0.030]
bd5,_x 0.0190[0.095]
P cet-\
-0.00000 -0.00000 0.00005 0.00006 -0.00000 0.00007 0.00006
[0.565] [0.568] [0.106] [0.113] [0.277] [0.109] [0.167]
rl,-\
0.0551 0.0525 0.0204 0.0098 0.0358 0.0193 0.0004
[0.817] [0.625] [0.516] [0.661] [0.277] [0.399] [0.891]
rl2t-\ -0.0091 -0.0095 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0084 -0.0057 -0.0056[0.640] [0.423] [0.466] [0.456] [0.455] [0.496] [0.467]
”4,-1
-0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0008
[0.090] [0.096] [0.081] [0.127] [0.108] [0.099] [0.134]
j 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 0 2rrd r-i [0.050] [0.049] [0.044] [0.066] [0.032] [0.083] [0.074]
Sloss 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006[0.583] [0.536] [0.481] [0.544] [0.599] [0.516] [0.543]
Infrm -0.2762 -0.2675 -0.2686 -0.2656 -0.2649 -0.2683 -0.2652[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
srh-x
0.0035 0.0034 0 . 0 0 2 2 0 . 0 0 2 2 0.0035 0.0024 0 .0 0 2 2
[0.018] [0.025] [0.104] [0.105] [0.028] [0 .1 0 0 ] [0.109]
-0 . 0 0 0 0 1 -0 .0 0 0 0 1 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0 . 0 0 0 0 1 -0.00009 -0.00008sn /-i [0.065] [0.080] [0.297] [0.271] [0.084] [0.127] [0.253]
0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0.0036 -0.0317 -0.0106 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0339 -0 .0 1 1 1
[0.165] [0.191] [0.402] [0.273] [0.349] [0.092] [0.325]
Observations 182 182 168 168 182 168 168
Instrument
Rank 48 48 48 48 48 49 49
J-statistic 40.285 41.829 34.769 34.842 41.330 33.173 34.522
[p-value] [0.048] [0.034] [0.144] [0.142] [0.038] [0.191] [0.151]
Sum squared 
residuals 1 .2 0 0 1.213 0.815 0.799 1 .2 1 0 0.806 0.799
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. 2SLS weighing matrix.
Period fixed effects used in all specifications.
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In table 3.6.2A and table 3.6.2B we report the summaries of the GMM 
estimation results for model (5) and its related diagnostic tests. The dependent 
variables is the growth in real per capita agricultural output. Based on the Sargan test 
for all specification in table 3.6.2A, we fail to reject the null hypothesis concerning 
the validity of over identifying restrictions in these estimations. The Sargan tests 
therefore validate the choice of instruments for all specifications. As we found before, 
we find significant negative impact of lagged per capita agricultural SDP and 
insignificant impact of growth in per capita capital stock on the growth in per capita 
agricultural SDP. The coefficient estimate for aggregate SCB deposits is statistically 
significant at the 10% level for specifications 5(a) and 5(f), while that of aggregate 
SCB credits are statistically insignificant for specifications 5(b) and 5(g). The 
coefficient estimates for M3,_, that concerns SCB deposits in RRBs is insignificant
in specification 5(c), and only marginally significant in specification 5(f). The SCB 
credits that are channelled through RRBs however have significant impact on the 
growth of per capita ASDP, as confirmed by the estimations of specifications 5(d) and 
5(g). Priority sector lending to agriculture by SCBs have marginal significant impact 
on the growth of per capita ASDP, as can be seen in specification 5(e). Except rural 
roads in squared term in 5(a) and 5(d), all other infrastructure indicators are 
insignificant. Informal sector has negative and significant effect in all models. 
Sanitation has positive and significant effect in 5(a), 5(b) and 5(e).
Table 3.6.2B: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 5
(F statistic [p-value]).
Null hypothesis 5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) 5(e) 5(0 5(g)
Coef. est.for r/( i , rl2,-\, rrd 1.914 1.752 1.003 0.9001 1.785 1.055 0.885
rrd2,-1, sn,_v sn 2,-\ are all zero [0.081] [0 .1 1 2 ] [0.425] [0.496] [0 .1 0 0 ] [0.392] [0.507]
Coef est. for b d a n d  SSYt_x 
are all zero
2.147
[0 . 1 2 0 ]
0 . 0 1 0
[0.988]
0.738
[0.479]
5.370
[0.005]
2.326
[0.071]
2.942
[0.035]
2.476
[0.063]
Coef est. for p c e t_l and Sloss 
are both zero
0.489
[0.613]
0.544
[0.581]
0.312
[0.732]
0.237
[0.789]
0.465
[0.628]
0.275
[0.759]
0.243
[0.784]
Coef. est.for ri( [, rl\-\, rrd,_x, 1.154 1 .1 2 1 1.137 1.070 1 .2 1 0 1.066 1.052
rrd2i-i, p c e t_x, Sloss are all 
zero
[0.333] [0.352] [0.343] [0.383] [0.303] [0.385] [0.393]
132
Table 3.6.3A: Sum m ary o f  GM M  estim ation o f model 6, dependent variable is
real per capita ISDP growth.____________________________________________________
6 (q) 6(b) 6(c) 6(d) 6(e) 6(f) 6(g)
-0.6560 -0.6209 -0.6500 -0.6453 -0.6553 -0.6502 -0.6122ymt-1 [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
7k,
0.0064 0.0096 0.0024 0.0030 0.0056 0.0043 0.0086
[0.063] [0.092] [0.079] [0.164] [0.343] [0.520] [0.143]
hd\ 0.0113 0 . 0 0 1 0UUlt_ 1 [0.007] [0.009]
hd2 0.0105 0.0113uu [0.035] [0.032]
hdl -0.0244 -0.0262u u  'i-1 [0.446] [0.401]
bdS 0.0045 0.0008
[0.579] [0.459]
W6m 0.0065[0.065]
pee,-1
-0 . 0 0 0 0 1 -0 . 0 0 0 0 1 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0 . 0 0 0 0 1 -0.00003 -0.00003
[0.753] [0.665] [0.540] [0.518] [0.707] [0.515] [0.423]
rh-x 0.2228
0.1995 0.1923 0.2027 0.2237 0.1898 0.1757
[0.103] [0.117] [0.155] [0.147] [0.123] [0.160] [0.140]
rl2,-i -0.0175 -0.0159 -0.0150 -0.0156 -0.0178 -0.0146 -0.0135[0.224] [0.215] [0.255] [0.247] [0 .2 1 2 ] [0.267] [0.257]
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003
[0.320] [0.361] [0.245] [0.229] [0.229] [0.297] [0.343]
»2 0.000009 0.000008 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.000003ra r-i [0.097] [0.099] [0.094] [0.094] [0.127] [0.090] [0.094]
Sloss -0.00005 -0 . 0 0 0 0 2 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00005 -0 . 0 0 0 1 -0.00007[0.099] [0.167] [0.089] [0.096] [0.098] [0.097] [0.081]
Infrm -0.0647 -0.0636 -0.0689 -0.0696 -0.0656 -0.0679 -0.0669[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ]
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0014 0.0014
[0 .1 0 2 ] [0.119] [0.192] [0.187] [0 .2 1 0 ] [0.183] [0.186]
2 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00009 -0.00008sn /-i [0.243] [0.265] [0 .2 2 0 ] [0.218] [0.243] [0.216] [0.233]
S5TM 0.0394 0.0367 0.0417 0.0344 0.0384 0.0414 0.0305[0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0.006] [0 .0 0 0 ] [0.008] [0.004]
Observations 182 182 168 168 182 168 168
Instrument
Rank 48 48 48 48 48 49 49
J-statistic 21.423 21.830 24.978 25.243 21.330 24.988 25.216
[p-value] [0.766] [0.745] [0.575] [0.560] [0.770] [0.575] [0.562]
Sum squared 
residuals 0.178 0.174 0.151 0.152 0.179 0.150 0.149
Notes: p-values (based on White cross section standard errors) in parentheses. 2SLS weighing matrix.
Period fixed effects used in all specifications.
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The GMM estimation results summary for model (6) is presented in Table 
3.6.3A. Dependent variable for this estimation is the growth in per capita industrial 
SDP. Except for the growth in per capita capital stock and the marginal effect of 
industrial credit by SCBs, the findings are generally similar to the findings of fixed 
effects panel estimation of model (3). The Sargan tests for all seven specifications 
once again confirm the validity of the instruments and the approach. The lagged per 
capita ISDP has a significant negative impact on growth of per capita ISDP for all 
specifications.
The coefficient estimates for bd \t_x and b d l t_x are positive and statistically
significant for all the specifications where these are used as explanatory variables. The 
coefficient estimates that are related to RRB credits are statistically insignificant. For 
specification 6(e) we find significant (at the 10% level) positive marginal growth 
effect of priority sector industrial credit, where the effect is equal to 0.006. Thus 
except for the significant marginal effect of priority sector lending in industry, the 
findings are generally similar to those of model (3). Results related to infrastructure 
indicators and rural development are same as we have got in fixed effect estimation 
case.
Table 3.6.3B: Summary of coefficient restrictions test for model 6
(F statistic [p-value]).
Null hypothesis 6(a) 6(b) 6(c) 6(d) 6(e) 6(f) 6(g)
Coef. est.for rl2,-,, rd,_x. 
rd2t~\, sn,_x, sn 2i-1 are all zero
1.118
[0.353]
0.898
[0.496]
1.116
[0.355]
1.150
[0.335]
1 .2 2 0
[0.298]
1.171
[0.324]
0.942
[0.466]
Coef. est.for f d a n d  SSY(_X 
are all zero
8.998
[0 .0 0 0 ]
10.444
[0 .0 0 0 ]
5.159
[0.006]
4.059
[0.019]
7.842
[0 .0 0 0 ]
3.111
[0.028]
2.757
[0.044]
Coef. est. for p c e t_x and Sloss 
are both zero
0.061
[0.940]
0 . 1 0 2
[0.902]
0 .2 1 1
[0.809]
0.226
[0.797]
0.083
[0.919]
0.248
[0.780]
0.350
[0.704]
Coef. est.for rii [t rl2,-\, rd,_x, 
rd2t~i, pce,_x, Sloss are all zero
1.159
[0.330]
1.042
[0.399]
1.097
[0.366]
1 .0 0 1
[0.427]
1.360
[0.233]
1.070
[0.383]
0.777
[0.588]
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we use a standard growth accounting approach in order to examine the 
relationship between banking development, infrastructure, rural well being and local 
economic growth in India in a sample of 26 states and union territories (UTs) over the 
period 1999-2008. Our regressions show that there is clear evidence of growth effects 
of development in commercial and rural banking and development in infrastructure 
and rural well being. For banking development in India, the state level growth effects 
are generally same as we found in chapter 2 where we used a reduced form approach 
in examining the banking development-growth nexus. Similar to the findings in 
chapter 2, in this chapter we find that deposits of commercial banks in general have a 
significant positive impact on the growth of per capita SDP, but domestic savings and 
mobilization of domestic savings through commercial banks do not significantly 
affect the state level growth in the agricultural component of SDP. The marginal 
growth effect of SCB credits is mixed. Credits that are channelled through rural banks 
positively affect the growth in the agricultural and industrial components of per capita 
SDP.
The new findings in this chapter include the marginal growth effects of 
infrastructure and rural well being in India. We find that among the infrastructure 
indicators roads and rail routes in general have positive and significant effect on the 
growth of per capita SDP. Expansion in rural roads can negatively affect the growth in 
agriculture apparently because of the trade off associated with agricultural land. We 
also find that expansion of the informal sector has negative significant effect on 
growth. Rural well being generally has positive and significant effect on growth. 
These results suggest that in order to harvest the benefits of rural banking 
development in India there is a need to emphasize the role of development in the 
infrastructure and rural well being.
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